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THE PURPOSE, METHOD, AND SCOPE 
OP THE DISSERTATIOH 
The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze 
the balance-of-payments problems of a particular debtor 
country by focusing on the effects of rapid external debt 
accumulation and of expanding debt servicing obligations 
on external balance, Brazil from 191$& to 1963 Is a 
logical choice for a study of this type since severe 
debt servicing problems vers experienced throughout this 
period, particularly between 1955 *»£ 1963. The Intention 
is not to portray Braiil as a typical debtor country since 
its problems were more Intense and more immediate than 
related problems in most other debtor countries In the 
process of development* 
The severity of Brasll* s external debt problems is 
revealed in a study by the Economic Commission for 
Latin America of the United Nations. The study concludes 
that Braiil* s external imbalance from 1955 to 1963 "had 
already assumed a fundamentally structural character."1 
•mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmammmmMmmmmmmmmmmmmm^^ • • m u m m mum n mi 
^United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin 
America, "The Growth and Decline of Import Substitution in 
BrasH*** Economic Bulletin for Latin America, IX (March, , 
L196i*)t 13" 
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Empirical evidence It submitted to show that Import growth ' 
reo^Lireaente were maintained and debt servicing obligations 
honored eoly at the ooat of considerable external financing. 
In order to offset the declining capacities to import and 
to service external debt oauaed by atagnated external 
receipts, it became necessary to attract foreign capital aa 
cowpenaatory financing at annually increasing rates* During 
this period Bresil accounted for more than one-third of all 
external debt acciuealated in katin America. Moreover* noat 
of this debt waa contracted on hard terme (i# e., at 
cossaereial pates), despite growing skepticism on the part of 
private lenders m& public lending institutions concerning 
the country* a capacity to repay without the creation of 
undesirable repercussions with respect to both Internal 
stability and external balance* 
The Brazilian experience la also interesting from 
the standpoint of the country** sustained postwar growth* 
On the basis of an impressive growth performance, the 
immediate temptation is to assume that Brasil waa at least 
Moving in the proper direction towards the eventual 
transition from the status of a maturing debtor country 
to that of a young creditor nation. However, on the 
basis of preliminary statistical evidence concerning the 
L- _J 
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growth of Brazil*• external Indebtedness is relation to ' 
other aspects of Its balanoe-of-payments experience and at 
the risk of an a priori Judgment concerning such relation-
ships, it wist bo concluded that Brazil appeared to bo 
moving In the opposite direction. Sustained growth was 
accompanied by an increasing accumulation of external 
indebtedness unsupported by a correspondingly increasing 
capacity to repay# The purpose of this dissertation is, 
in part, to ascertain whether this a priori judgment is 
indeed valid and, if so* to assess and evaluate the 
implications. 
In order to isolate those factors which adversely 
affected Brazil's external debt servicing oapaoity during 
this time period, an analytical framework is constructed 
in Chapter I upon which the empirical investigation in 
succeeding chapters Is based. Although the dissertation 
focuses on elements of balanoe-of-payments rigidity in the 
form of contractually fixed interest and amortization 
obligations, other elements of rigidity as well as elements 
of disturbance and of adjustment are considered in order to 
plaee the debt servicing problem in proper perspective, 
fo accurately assess the else and the gravity of the 
external debt burden and to measure Its impact on external 
L -J 
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balance, this Is Indeed necessary* A heavy debt burden 
may or amy not be supportable depending on these other 
considerations* 
Of principal Interest In this dissertation Is the 
external Impact of periodic liquidity crises—the form 
debt servicing problems assume In the short or medium 
tern. Whether liquidity crises can be avoided or overcome 
depends on the relative strength of these elements of 
balance-of-payments disturbance, rigidity, and adjustment. 
Following a description of the over-all Brazilian 
balance-of-paymenta experience In Chapter H , external 
disturbances arising from export stagnation, Inflation* 
and emergency-induced increases In importation, terms-of-
trade deterioration, and speculative outflows of capital 
are analysed in Chapter XIX • The impact of Increased 
balance-of-payments rigidity in both the debt and Import 
structure is then assessed In Chapter XV, Key elements of 
rigidity are related to key elements of disturbance In the 
form of liquidity crisis Indicators* The principal tool 
of analysis In this regard Is the debt service ratio, 
defined as the proportion of foreign exchange earnings on 
current account absorbed by Interest and amortisation 
repayments. Other variations of this ratio and other 
L J 
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combinations of variables in the form of ratios and ' 
residuals are employed since, clearly, fluctuations in 
external earnings are not the only sources of disturbance 
in Brasilia balance of payments, and external debt service 
is not the only source of rigidity* 
This approach is based on the assumption that 
absolute changes in external indebtedness are meaningless 
in assessing repayment capacity or in measuring the burden 
of debt on external balance. The intensity of liquidity 
crises depends on the degree of balanoe-of-payments rigidity 
in relation to the degree of disturbance. The liquidity 
crisis indicators in Chapter IV measure this intensity* 
Throughout the dissertation, a building block 
approach is employed. The analysis in Chapter V of 
balanoe-of-payments adjustment achieved through reserve 
depletion, compensatory financing, import compression, 
import substitution, and export stimulation is the final 
step* Liquidity crises produced by the combination of 
balanoe-of-payments disturbance and rigidity can be 
successfully overcome by the rapid and efficient applica-
tion of public policies of adjustment. Of course, crises 
of this type can be completely avoided if the proper 
adjustment policies are implemented before the fact. This 
L J 
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Is particularly significant In the case of contractually n 
fixed debt service obligations, A repayment schedule can 
be used as a forecasting device to anticipate future 
liquidity pressure. The problem then becomes one of timing 
(1. e,t bringing the appropriate policy measures to bear at 
the proper time). 
In Chapter V Brazilian external adjustment policies 
are analyzed in relation to the liquidity problems indicated 
In earlier chapters. The attempt is made to assess the 
impact of balance-of-payments rigidity in the form of fixed 
interest and amortisation obligations on the dec!sion-making 
processes of Brazilian policymakers with respect to external 
adjustment. 
With reference to the over-all dissertation approach 
the following key questions are considered and answered? 
(1) What elements of disturbance produced external imbal-
ance in the Brazilian experience? (2) What was the 
Impact of balance-of^payments rigidity on external balance? 
(3) In particular, did Brazil overextend Itself In the 
accumulation of external debt involving fixed service 
obligations? ik) Was there evidence of increasing diffi-
culty in the maintenance of external solvency on one hand 
and In the successful servicing of external debt on the 
u j 
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 other? (5) In the repayment process, what sacrifices* 
if any, vara neoeseary 1» terms of resource reallocation? 
(6) What public policies supported such reallocations? 
(7) Specifically, did the rapayaaot process create short-
and medium-term liquidity problems necessitating the 
depletion of monetary reserves, the shortening of the debt 
structure through compensatory financing, Import compression 
and export subsidisation through foreign exchange and trade 
policy, and the artificial reduction in debt service out-
flow* through the Imposition of payments barriers? 
Although tha dissertation does focus on the shorter-
term liquidity problems of Brazil, tha somewhat artificial 
distinction made between short-term and long-term oonsid-
erations in this regard necessitates the incorporation of 
tha latter into tha analysis insofar as overlapping areas 
of Interest exist and inasmuch aa conclusions and findings 
based on tha former are modified by consideration of the 
latter. For the same reasons, tha analysis of Brazil's 
external balance is not completely divorced from questions 
relating to domestic stability and internal growth. These 
questions are considered only insofar as they are related 
to the central problem* 
8 
i 1
 The repayment of debt service Involves a saving 
as veil as a transfer problem* Although the diaaertation 
io primarily concerned with the latter, conaideration of 
the former la eaaential in the measurement of the total 
debt servicing burden. Aa such, the gravity of tha debt 
problem la weighed in relation to the growth of Brazilian 
national income and domestic savings* 
The time period from 1948 to 1963 was selected for 
four baalo reasons• First, Braail by 19^8 had recovered 
from most of the disruptive effeats of World War XI • 
Secondly, since the dissertation is, in part, policy-
oriented the yoar 19^8 was the most logical starting 
point from an analytical point of view* This year marked 
the introduction of a rigid foreign exchange polioy which 
had important repercussions during subsequent years. 
thirdly, statistical deficiencies prevented the extension 
of the Investigation beyond 1963* 1ms decision was mads 
to avoid the inclusion of preliminary, unreliable data. 
Lastly, the stxt«*n*y*ar time period can be msaningfully 
broken down into two parts with strikingly contrasting 
characteristics. 
Braail was one of the few Latin American countries 
that succeeded In regaining its capacity to Import In 
L -1 
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 absolute torn* during the earlier postwar period. 19l|B«-
1952j.. An increasing capacity to import and to service 
external debt was enjoyed primarily as a result of improve* 
ments in the terms of trade. Import and debt service 
requirements were financed without strain by an expanding 
export sector. In direct contrast to this earlier 
experience Brazil suffered export stagnation and torms-of-
trade deterioration between 1955 and 1963. External 
imbalance became chronic and the country's external in* 
debtedness became increasingly burdensome* A declining 
capacity to import and to service external debt required 
an accelerated application of public policies of adjustment. 
Tba time period from 19U8 to 1963 was selected for 
empirical as well as for analytical purposes* the 
availability of data in public documents published by such 
international institutions as the International Monetary 
Fund and the International Bank tw Reconstruction and 
Development afforded a convenient cross reference with 
similar documents published by Brazilian institutions* 
Cross reference was impossible only in the cases of detailed 
debt servicing data* available only in Brasillan documents. 
Some discrepancies were observed in comparing different 
statistical sources; however, most were minor In nature* 
L J 
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 To the best of the author9 8 knowledge the 
reliability of data can bo seriously questioned only in 
three cases. First, it was observed that some debt service 
data for 1963 were preliminary, but th* importance of this 
data is not sufficient to oast doubt over major disser-
tation conclusions. Secondly, in measuring fluctuations 
in the share of "growth" export commodities in total 
exports it was necessary to classify all items into two 
categories (i. e«, "growth" commodities and other 
commodities)• this categorisation was somewhat arbitrary 
because of the intangible definition of "growth" 
commodities as "those for which international demand may 
be expected to be fairly strong in the long run.*3-
Thlrdly, 192^ 8 and 191*9 price indices for specific Import 
items were estimated, again, however, as a result of the 
relative unimportance of these statistics, no major 
dissertation conclusions are vulnerable* 
•Wagoalav Avramovic, Debt Servicing Capacity and 
Postwar Growth in International inacfrteanesa {Baltimoret 
Johns Hopkins f * * * $ t i ^ B ) , p. iil+. ~ 
r 1 
CHAPTER I 
THE GENERAL PROBLEM 
The Inclusion of this chapter in the dissertation 
rests on the assumption that an examination of the general 
problems of external indebtedness among developing nations 
is necessary before Brasil*s special problems ean be 
properly understood* Of principal Importance in this 
chapter is the construction of an analytical framework 
within which both this general approach and the empirical 
approach of subsequent chapters can be developed* It 
should be noted that subsequent chapter headings reflect 
the basic outline of this first chapter* 
^Haior contributions to the development of this 
analytical framework were made by the following i 
Dragoslav Avramovie, Debt Servicing Capacity and Postwar 
growth In International Indebtedness (Baltimore*Johns 
Hopkins Press, X95tJ) I Dragoslav Avramovio and Ravi Oulhatl, 
Debt Servicing Problems of Low-Income Countries* 1956*1958 
(Baltimoret Johns Hopkins Press* I960); International Bank 
for ftceonstruction and Development* International Develop* 
ment Association* Recent Changes in the External Public 
Indebtedness of Latin American Countries (Washington, D # C.J 
IBRD, 19o3)| International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, International Development Association* Economic 
growth and External Debt. I-III (Washington* D. C*i IBRD* 
1964). These reports merely reflect the views of their 
authors and not the official view of the IBRD and its 
affiliated organizations. The IBRD does not accept 
responsibility for the accuracy or completeness of these 
reports* 
L -J 
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In the development of this general approach no 
inter-oountry comparisons are attempted although it la 
recognised that condition* relating to the central 
dissertation problem vary among different debtor countries 
at a similar stage of development. Generalizations are 
eased on the common factors and conditions affecting the 
external balance of debtor countries engaged in develop-
ment with foreign assistance. Areas of difference are 
noted but are not examined in full. 
Balanoo-of-Paymenta Disturbance 
In debtor countries today debt servicing problems 
are closely linked to balance-of-payments difficulties, 
the saving problem is minimized insofar as governments are 
able to supply local currency needs through central bank 
financing or through appropriate fiscal policy measures. 
Of greater concern is the %rm»tw problem involving the 
conversion of accumulated local currency into foreign 
exchange• 
Productive long-run utilisation of foreign capital 
is no guarantee that the debt service burden will be 
bearable tn the short run. International receipts can 
contract sharply, rendering the repayment of external debt 
Insupportable even though a country's long-run investment 
L _1 
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 program* based on imported foreign capital may be 
successfully productive. Regardless of the productivity 
of foreign capital over the long run, the obligation to 
service this debt outstanding in the short run introduces 
an element of inflexibility into the country's balance of 
payments. As the level of income through produotive 
investments risesf it is essential for the country to 
produce sufficient additional goods for export or 
sufficient import substitutes so that the resulting increase 
in demand for imported goods plus debt service can be met 
1 from available foreign exchange receipts* If income 
increases too rapidly, import demand may become excessive 
with a resulting foreign exchange gap. 
Economic growth, financed through foreign capital 
imports, must include those particular kinds of goods and 
services including exports and import substitutes which 
the economy requires to earn or retain sufficient foreign 
exchange for debt repayment. In the short run it Is clear 
that the transfer aspect of debt service overshadows all 
other considerations. An adequate supply of foreign 
1 
*0erald M. Alter, ®fhe Servicing of Foreign Capital 
Inflows by Underdeveloped Countries," Economic Development 
for Latin America, Proceedings of a conference held by the 
international Economic Association (lew York: St. Martin's 
Prase, 1961), p. 153. 
L J 
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Exchange is, undeniably, the key to the successful n 
servicing of short-term external obligations regardless 
of long-term growth patterns. "It la this confrontation 
of an inflexible supply of foreign exchange and an equally 
rigid demand for foreign exchange to pay debt service that 
la the essence of the problem,"1 
The successful maintenance of a continuously 
adequate supply of foreign exchange depends to a great 
extent on the skill of government authorities in managing 
the country's balance of payments. Failure to acquire and 
maintain adequate exchange for debt servicing commitments 
naturally leads to periodic liquidity crises and creates 
conditions of potential default. Usually, the initiating 
factor In the occurrence of liquidity crises is dis-
equilibrium la the balance of payments. When the latter 
d&^m arise, the success of the country to withstand the 
shock and to meat its external commitments depends on the 
relative strength of elements of balance-of-payments 
rigidity (i. e.t the contractually fixed external debt 
obligations, minimum tolerable level of Imports) and 
countervailing elements of adjustment (1. e., adequacy of 
the supply of reserves, availability of compensatory 
^Avramovle and dulhati, op. clt., p. XV. 
L J 
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finance, percentage of inessential items in respect to 
total imports, governmental skill and spaed in the 
Imposition of trade and payments barriers). 
An economy characterised by chronic balanee-of-
payments disturbance caused by structural weaknesses most 
likely would lack sufficient flexibility to overcome 
existing rigidity and would be extremely vulnerable to 
default• Shis default may be of the straightforward typei 
namely, the failure on the part of the borrowing country's 
government (or with the connivance of the government, the 
failure on the part of some private individual or insti-
tution) t© meet the contracted obligations to repay the 
debt. On the other hand, "it may take less obvious forms, 
such as the regulation of the rate structure of public 
utilities financed from abroad, or the imposition of taxes 
which discriminate against the income of non-residents »*3 
Temporary disequillbria, of course, could result in the 
postponement of debt service or the temporary imposition of 
^International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, International Development Association, Economic 
growth and External Debt: An Analytical Framework, I, 7. 
% • 0. Kemp, "Foreign Investment and the national 
Advantage,*1 The Economic Record, XXXVIII (March, 1962), 61 • 
%bld. 
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 discriminatory taxes* Regardless of the degree of In- ~i 
flexibility in the debtor country1 a balance of payments, 
however, liquidity crises leading to debt default may not 
arise at all if balance-of-payments disturbances are mild. 
Disturbances arising from fluctuations in exports 
There are sound reasons why a debtor country in 
the process of development should attempt to maximize the 
total value of its exports* The ability to export will 
always be the main determinant of its capacity not only 
to successfully service external debt but also to import 
the capital goods needed to support domestic growth and 
development.* 
Sharp drops in export earnings and resulting 
balance-of-payments deficits frequently lead to diffi-
culties in financing import requirements and in repaying 
accumulated debt* Balance-of-payments difficulties can 
arise from either declines in the volume of exports or 
from drops in export price levels. Both are destabi-
lising In their effect on rigidly established debt 
servicing commitments and import requirements. 
A decline in export earnings can be seasonal, 
iit*m»mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm ' 
^Ounaar Myrdal, An International Economyi Problems 
and Prospects <ITew Yorks karper and Brothers9 I950) * |_ p . 22 V. j 
1? 
r
 oyolioalt ©* sooular in nsturo. Supply dofioionsy seuld 
emanate from natural phonomona such as crop failure or 
inclement weather, from a reallocation of reaourcee in 
favor of Industries produoing for domestic consumption, 
or simply from increased domestic demand for aa inelastic 
supply of exportable products. With reference to this 
last point, however, if tho country controls a suffi* 
ciently largo ssgasnt of tho market for a particular 
product, tho unfavorable decline in tho supply might bo 
off sot by a favorable riss in tha price of tho product. 
In contrast to this, short-term declines in export 
earnings could result from an unfavorable price drop 
caused by cyclical declines in international demand. A 
similar situation could, of course, originate trm excess 
production of primary products in relation to demand. 
Furthermore, "export declines say be caused by domestic 
policies which adversely affect tho incentives to produce 
for exports or to soli on tho international market."1 
Since tho growth of external earnings is essential 
to provide foreign exchange both for service payments and 
for import m*&*9 efforts should be made to minimize 
international Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, International Development Association, Economic 
Growth and External Debtt An Analytical Framework, I, lb. 
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disturbance arising from dealings in export values. If, 
ID the face of export stagnation, import requirements are 
satisfied at the expense of debt service, the resulting 
lose of oredlt worthiness would most likely hamper and 
Impede developmental plans, assuming the continued need 
to finance sueh plans externally. IfB on the other hand, 
external debt is faithfully serviced, but, as a result, 
insufficient resources remain to satisfy growing Import 
requirements, 
the country is likely to experience difficulties In 
assuring a sustained long-ran growth In inoome and 
savings, which provide the Internal base for con-
tinuing debt service. Except in those eases in which 
net Import substitution can be achieved, external 
earnings have to Increase sufficiently fast to 
provide resources for inoome growth after service 
payments have been met.l 
Thus, from both the long-run and the short-run point of 
view there is little doubt that rising external earnings 
are necessary for a successful debt servicing program. 
A country's success In attaining and maintaining 
an adequate flow of external earnings depends to a very 
great extent on the structural characteristics of its 
export market. The structure should be flexible with a 
maximum degree of export diversification and a minimum 
%ragosiav Avrmmovic, op. cit.. p. loij.. 
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 degree of eeaoaodlty concentration. A danger associated ~> 
with undue concentration is that through the exportation 
of one or a few types of products, the economies of 
debtor countries remain subject to substantial changes in 
foreign exchange earnings caused by minor fluctuations In 
economic activity in advanced countries. Bxtrerae con-
centration of this type ties the fortunes of the debtor 
oountry closely to market conditions in major importing 
1 areas. 
Export diversification can he statistically weighed 
by measuring over tisie the proportion of tha two or three 
principal commodities in total exports. Clearly, the higher 
the proportion, the less is the diversification, further-
more, as a debtor country 1B the process of development 
increases in its industrial capacity and output, structural 
changes in exportation are expected. Gradually, there 
should be less dependence on agricultural products and 
raw materials. Progress in this regard can be evaluated 
by the measurement over time of the share of manufactured 
goods in total exports. This is also an indicator of 
inoreased diversification and reduced vulnerability. 
% a x $• Wasseraan and Oharlea W# Hultiaan* Modem 
International Economicst A Balanoe of Payments Approach 
(Hew fork? Simaons-Boardman Publishing Corporation* 1962)t 
L p . 14.15* J 
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Although export divereifioation is useful in 
reducing undesirable fluctuations In external earnlnga, 
it* effectiveness should not be over-emphasized. 
It le laaikely that either instability of export 
earnings O P the disutility arising froa aruoh in* 
stability will be completely eliminated by simple 
policies euoh as producing * wider range of exports. 
To the extent that the disutility created by 
fluctuations in exports is intensified by the low 
incomes of the primary producing countries, the 
problem la basloally a manifestations of poverty, 
^wejpww eswis* e^ e^wsjMp«a * ' - • • ' IPMP^ ^ ^ ^ F e^Ne^ eTpwe>ewwe^ WTe?^ p^ (je wFwr pit V ' S i W r W ' e *ws^ ^psw^^ 
country achieves economic development.* 
Adaptability to changing conditions of world demand should 
be the primary goal of any export program. A program of 
this typo should bo baaed on the production of •growth* 
ooraoodities, defined as "those for which international 
demand may be expected to be consistently strong in the 
long run,*2 Quite clearly, the success of an export 
program of this type la ultimately dependent upon 
roapeot cannot be overcome h^ a simple willingness to 
^Benton F. Mas sell, ^ Export Ooncentration and 
Fluctuations in Export Earnings? A Cross-Section Analysisfn 
The American Economic Review, LIV (March, 1964), Itf* 
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The volume of exports is by no means under the 
exclusive control of government policy? it depends to a 
great extent on vorld market conditions, on which indi-
vidual debtor countries usually have little influence. 
"Increasing the total value of exports Is virtually 
impossible In a period when world market prices of major 
exports are falling."1 Also, measure* to increase 
exports are likely to operate rather slowly in debtor 
countries In the early stages of development; It is a 
matter of introducing or refining nev industries and 
Institutions and of improving production techniques, 
labor skills, and managerial methods from relatively low 
levels of achievement.2 
Disturbs^** ayis3LnB from fluctuates in imports 
Liquidity crises in debtor countries can be produced 
by sharp increases in the volume of Imports* Over the 
long run inoreased importation may Indeed be necessary to 
support developmental aspirations# If such increases are 
anticipated, however, resulting balanoe-of-payments 
disturbances should be minimal since such problems can be 
L ^Xbld» -1 
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 alleviated through proper developmental planning* The ~i 
danger of balanoe-of-payments disturbance is much greater 
in the case of emergency- or inflation-induced increases 
in importation. 
If inflation accompanies development "within the 
framework of pegged exchange rates,"1 sharp increases in 
importation may produce chronic balanoe-of-payment8 
disturbances.2 
In debtor countries it Is becoming increasingly 
recognized,••that fixed exchange rates in the face 
of continuing inflation are bound to give rise to 
excessive imports.-* 
If foreign exchange is scarce and if inflation-Induced 
importation persists, the debtor country may be forced to 
choose between reducing imports through currency de-
valuation^ or alternately postponing or defaulting on 
Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, International Development Association, 
Economic Growth and External Debt: An Analytical 
Framework* I, lo. 
2Theee balance-of-payments disturbances would 
be compounded, of course, by the effect of inflation 
on the prices of exports, 
^international Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, International Development Association, 
loo, olt> 
^This adjustment measure would not be necessary• 
of course* within a framework of flexible exchange rates. 
The effect of inflation on import demand would be 
i_ neutralised by market changes in exchange rates* j 
23 
r
 external obligations* Of course, the country could n 
temporarily avoid this decision by attracting compen-
aatory financing or by drawing down reserves (if available), 
but, clearly, these are stop-gap measures that do not 
solve the basic problem created by persistent inflationary 
pressures* 
It is also true that the debtor country faced with 
unfavorable inflation-induced imbalances requiring re-
adjustments in Its consumption and investment levels, as 
well as in its balance of payments, could circumvent the 
problem by the imposition of artificial trade and payments 
barriers* In effect, it could choose to spur development 
by tolerating inflationary pressures rather than attacking 
the real causes of the internal instability and external 
imbalance* 
Inflationary pressures and resulting inter-
national payments and transfer problems may result from 
overly ambitious developmental planning* Preoccupation 
with the maintenance of excessive target rates of income 
growth achieved through external borrowing and through the 
often unwise willingness to accept resulting debt 
servicing obligations can create rapidly rising domestic 
demand which outstrips both domestic productive eapa* 
L blllties and the capacity of the country to import* -J 
2k 
The debtor country may Indeed be reluctant to employ n 
public policies of restraint aimed primarily towards the 
goals of internal stability and external balance because 
of the risk of growth retardation* 
Balanoe-of-paymente disturbances arising from 
sharp increases In Imports are not caused by inflationary 
pressures alone, however* Such Increases may be 
emergency-induced , 
Crop failures and bad harvests may lead to signifi-
cant Increases In the Import of food and other 
agricultural commodities* While, in terms of the 
domestic consumption of these commodities, these 
Inoreased imports may be marginal, in the balance 
of payments they may lead to large swings «* 
Since emergencies cannot be anticipated, balanee-
of-payments disturbances of this type cannot be avoided* 
The debtor country's success in honoring Its external 
obligations during such emergencies would depend on the 
appropriateness and efficacy of offsetting measures of 
adjustment. 
Disturbances arising from shifts in the terms of trade 
apart from the question of fluctuations In export 
and import quantum acting as elements of disturbance in a 
^International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, International Development Association, Economic 
Growth and External Debts An Analytical framework, I, 17* 
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country*8 balance of payments, changea in demand/supply 
conditions can produce adverse shift* in the country's 
terms of trade which set in exactly the same way. Liquid* 
ity shortages oan result from the effect of these adverse 
shifts on export and import values. Secular declines in 
the ratio of export prices to import prices are quite 
clearly intolerable if sufficient foreign exchange 
reserves are to be maintained for the successful servicing 
of external debt over the long run* 
It Is true that countries specialising in the 
exportation of primary products are particularly vulner-
able to short-term balance-of •paymente disturbances 
arising from sharp declines in export prices in relation 
to import prices* 
fhe prices of primary products are notoriously vola~ 
tils and the damaging effects of this volatility on 
the economies of the exporting countries arc beyond 
question•* 
This is not to say, however, that debtor countries 
in the process of development are necessarily more likely 
to suffer external disturbances of this type than more 
higjhly developed creditor nations. 
It is quite wrong to think of the world as if it could 
be divided into two sets of countries, the advanced 
1&# K, Cairn cross, Factors in Economic Development 
L (Hew York* Frederick A. Eraeger, I%£), v? 213> ^ ~ J 
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and the less advanced, with primary produce 
following exclusively in one direction. On the 
contrary, international trade brings the primary 
producers of every oountry into competition with one 
another, and the margin of advantage does not 
necessarily shift steadily in one direction,1 
Any generalisations concerning the inevitability 
of terms-of-trade trends and patterns are indeed of 
questionable validity. 
Every under-developed country is unique and Is affected 
by the market conditions and prices for its own 
products and not by the movement of index numbers. 
To aggregate or average the experience of the group of 
countries that we think of as under-developed Is to 
presume common elements that may have no real 
existence.2 
Thus, any assessment of disturbances arising from shifts 
in the terms of trade must be conducted on a country-by* 
country basis. 
Disturbance* arising from swings in the flow of capital 
Export stagnation, import expansion, and terms-of-
trade deterioration can all frustrate a debtor country*s 
attempts to honor on schedule rigidly contracted external 
debt commitments. However, balance-of-payments disturbances 
leading to debt service problems need not necessarily 
emanate from within the current account, A debtor country 
1Ibid.f p, 22£. 
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 cannot hope to attract an even flow of capital year after"1 
year nor can It hope to avoid periodic speculative in-
flows and outflows of capital which have obvious balance* 
of-payments implications. 
Expanding developmental needs and growth aspir-
ations in debtor countries require an increasingly heavy 
inflow of foreign capital. With the advent of a 
liquidity crisis, however, capital inflows decline, some-
times quite sharply. Interest payments on old loans 
thereupon are no longer offsetf at least to the same 
degree, by the inflow of new loans. If the former does 
eventually surpass the latter, it becomes a net charge to 
be met by the borrowing country, A reversal takes place in 
the debtor country* s balance of payments. "At the outset 
the transactions lead the lending country to make remit-
tance to the borrowing| in the end it is the borrowing 
country which has to remit.1'2 
The likelihood of this occurrence in debtor countries 
today is considerably less than in pre-World War II days. 
^International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, International Development Association, Economic 
growth and External Debts An Analytical Framework, I, 16. 
2F. W. fausslg, International trade (Hew Torks 
fhe MacKlllan Company, 19331* p* 125. 
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 Speculative capital movementef although still In evidence,"1 
arc relatively less significant today and are clearly less 
volatile. Private capital movements, based on sounder in-
vestment planning and on more accurate and complete infor-
mation of investment conditions, are much less sensitive 
to oyclical fluctuations. Direct Investors, in particular, 
seen much more willing to ride out the economic storms in 
debtor countries today than in previous periods* 
The growth in significance of national and inter-
national lending agencies as large suppliers of foreign 
capital also has served as a stabilising factor Insofar 
as they lend for developmental not for speculative 
purposes, To avoid speculative capital movements from 
private sources, debtor countries today can also rely with 
a fair degree of assurance on other forms of capital in-
flow from other sources. 
For example, disbursements on project loans will 
continue so long as work on the project goes forward 
and any other conditions of the loan are complied 
with. Suppliers* credits are usually available un-
less the country is considered to be in very severe 
balance-of-payments difficulties, but the terms may 
become progressively disadvantageous as the liquidity 
crisis approaches.1 
^-International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, International Development Association, 
loc, c i t , 
wmmmmmmmmmmmmm 
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 Long-term loans for either general use or for special n 
projects emanating from national or international 
agencies are, for the moat part, insensitive to short-
term balance-of-payments disturbance. In fact, some 
loans from suoh agencies as the International Monetary 
Fund and the Bxport-Import Bank of the United States are 
clearly anticyclical by nature j they are intended to act 
as stabilising factors in times of liquidity crisis. Of 
much greater importance in the irregularity of capital 
flows from public sources are recurring conditions of 
political, not economic, instability* 
Historically, private direct investments have 
tended to fluctuate in response to changes in the export 
fortunes of debtor countries* However, recent trends 
toward foreign investments in manufacturing industries, 
producing for domestic markets, have produced greater 
insensitivity in this regard. Investments of this type 
are somewhat immune from the influences of export 
stagnation and are much more dependent upon healthy 
sustained growth of domestic markets* 
On the other hand, traditional direct foreign 
investments concentrated in export sectors remain as 
potential sources of balance-of-payments disturbance. 
L J 
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During periods of export stagnation both the reinvest- n 
ment of retained earnings and the Injection of new 
investment funds are discouraged. Furthermore, If the 
products of Industries In which direct foreign capital 
Is Invested account for a major proportion of the total 
exports of the country* greater sensitivity of Investment 
decisions to export fluctuations can be expected. Clearly, 
as a debtor country develops Its manufacturing productive 
capacity for both the domestic and the foreign market* the 
resulting diversification will reduce the disturbing 
effects of sudden swings In the flow of capital reacting 
to external fluctuations. 
Balanoe-of-payments problems can arise from swings 
In short-run capital outflows as well as Inflows* Debtor 
countries suffering from Inflationary pressures and other 
conditions of Internal stability are especially vulnerable 
to capital flight, as are countries which are forced to 
devalue their currencies frequently. Furthermore* since 
Inequitable Income distribution In debtor countries leads 
to the concentration of savings In the hands of the few 
and since domestic Investment opportunities are usually 
limited and risky* those who control the national 
resources commonly have high propensities to Invest 
L j 
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abroad. 
A recant report on economic conditiona and 
developments in South America confines the conviction 
that at least lis this area there Is considerable private 
capital flight from debtor countries, much of which is 
obscured by knovn omissions in balance-of-payments state* 
1 
meats and by unrecorded transactions* This phenomenon 
is, of course, undesirable for two principal reasons; 
first, it drains the country of needed capital funds and 
necessitates costly capital importation; and secondly, 
it worsens the country*a balance-of-payments position 
and v^nd%r» more difficult the repayment of fixed service 
obligations* 
Balance-of-Paymenta Rigidity 
A debtor country's capacity to withstand the 
effects ef fluctuations in those elements of disturbance 
discussed above depends on the degree of rigidity in the 
balance of payments* With sufficient flexibility in both 
the external debt and the import structures* liquidity 
crises can be averted despite substantial disturbance. 
%• S» Congress9 Joint Economic Committee, 
Eoonomic Developments in South America, 87th Congress, 
21|tn Session (Washington,B. 6*s #•&. Government 
Printing Office, 1962), pp. 1-12, j 
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 On the other hand, a mild disturbance could conceivably n 
precipitate a oriels with a high degree of Inflexibility 
In this regard* An analysis of liquidity problems In 
debtor countries Is not complete without careful consid-
eration of both* 
Rigidity In the debt structure 
Two prominent eoonomlsts who have investigated 
the problem of external debt accumulation In developing 
countries, Herman Buchanan and Jacob Viner, assert that 
long-term borrowing will in almost all instances pass 
through two stages. Buring stage one, the stream of new 
lending exeeeds the interest remittances and the repayment 
of principal, whereas during the second stage, the latter 
catches up and surpasses the former. 
In support of the contention that stage two must 
eventually arrive, Viner declares that 
debt service on amortization and Interest account 
reaches and exceeds the annual amount of a constant 
gross outflow of new capital after a period 
surprisingly short for those like myself who are 
still capable of being startled by the wondrous 
working of compound interest.1 
1
 Jacob Viner, "International Finance in the Post-
war World,* Journal of Political Economy. LY (April, 19U-7) • 
106. 
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 Speculating on how soon this stage will be n 
reached, Buchanan adds that 
it depends principally upon the rate of interest and 
amortisation schedule stipulated in the loan contract 
and the volume of fresh lending per time period, 
assuming no defaults by the borrowers. The lower the 
rate of interest and the longer the amortisation 
period the greater the time interval necessary to 
reverse the flow of payments on capital account with 
any given rate of fresh lending* With a given 
interest and amortisation schedule, the flow will he 
the sooner reversed the smaller the volume of fresh 
oomrni tmen ts • <** 
Although Viner and Buchanan are reluctant to be dogmatic 
concerning the length of time required for step two to be 
reached, there appears to be no hesitancy In affirming the 
inevitability of this eventuality* 
A dissenter In this regard is Ivsey Domar. 
Approaching the problem mathematically, he observes that 
the ratio of the inflow of funds to the outflow will 
gradually approach as a limit the expression: 
amortizationrate + interest rate 
amortisation rate + rate of new lending* 
Gorman Buchanan, International Investment and 
Domestic Welfare (Eew Yorki Henry Holt and Company, 191*5), 
p# 1 6 ? / 
% v s e y Bernar, Essays in the fheory of Economic 
Qroitfth (lew Yorki Oxford University tress, 1 9 5 ^ * p. 131. 
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Whether or not an excess of the outflow of funds over 
the Inflow will at all appear depend* on the relative 
magnitudes of the rate of new lending and of the Interest 
rate. If the rate of new lending exceeds the Interest 
rate, this ratio will be less than onef and the outflow 
excess will never arise. If, on the other hand, the rate 
of new lending falls below the rate of Interest, the out-
flow exoess will become Inevitable—Its timing depending 
on the magnitudes of the three variables Involved, He 
concludes that stage two need never arrive If the rate of 
new lending Is always greater than the Interest rate* 
He does concede, however, that this rate of new lending 
would have to reach "fantastic* levels to remain above 
the compounded Interest rate, 
A detailed analysis of any country's external debt 
service problems should clearly Include such critical 
variables as the rate of new lending, the existing rates 
of Interest and of amortisation on borrowed capital, and 
the scheduled time periods of repayment. This is sta-
tistically difficult in part since repayment rates and 
periods of repayment on different types of capital imports 
vary considerably, not only in respect to the distinction 
between capital acquired on hard terns and on soft terms 
L J 
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 but even within each of these general categories* "i 
These difficulties oan be overcome, however, by 
the computation of effective rates and of effective 
periods of repayment. By employing this method, approx-
imate values of changes in interest and amortisation 
changes can be calculated by expressing actual interest 
payments and actual amortisation payments made during a 
particular year as percentages of the average of debt 
outstanding at the beginning and at the end of the year* 
Measurements of effective periods of repayment may be 
obtained by dividing the average of debt outstanding at 
the beginning and at the end of the year by the amount 
of amortisation payments during the year* One signal 
disadvantage in the computation of effective rates 
concerns the danger of understating real interest and 
amortisation charges. An understatement of this type 
could arise from the fact that Interest and amortisation 
payments are related to debt outstanding, which includes 
undisbursed as well as disbursed amounts of loans** 
Apart from this, effective rates can serve as adequate 
indicators of changes in the aforementioned variables 
over time* 
36 
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Although the real burden of debt service over 
the long run is difficult to measure end is not a subject 
of unanimous agreement among economists, the role of 
these obligations as rigid claims against a debtor 
country*s foreign exchange holdings during liquidity 
crises is undeniable. Regardless of the fluctuations of 
other items in a debtor country*s balance of payments, 
the pre-seheduled obligation to pay interest and amorti-
zation on loan capital remains fixed* 
Interest obligations on loan capital as recurring 
charges on the debtor country's economy are unquestionably 
elements of balanoe-of-payments rigidity. These obliga-
tions must be met, regardless of the productiveness or 
utilisation of the loan capital or of the debtor's 
fortunes In general.1 Amortisation payments, on the 
other hand, cease to be a burden if they are regularly 
turned over or refunded. Although debt refunding is 
eertalnly feasible, particularly over the long run, this 
is unlikely to happen during liquidity crises* 
When a debtor country Is faced with liquidity 
problems, necessitating delayed or deferred payments of 
^International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, International Development Association, loonomic 
growth and External Debts An Analytical Framework, I, 2l±* . 
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debts, creditors are not likely to be well-disposed 
towards the turning over of old debts and the extension 
of new credit. The unpaid or delayed bills should, in 
fact, be Justification for Increased skepticism con-
cerning the future credit worthiness of the debtor 
country in question. Thus, it Is logical to assume that 
external credit will be tightest and debt refunding most 
difficult during those periods of foreign exchange 
shortages when the need is greatest. In this sense, 
amortisation payments would certainly qualify as elements 
of rigidity In the short-run balance-of-payments position 
of debtor countries.1 
The concentration of maturities in relatively 
short periods of time is a source of acute liquidity 
crises in debtor countries* If a large proportion of debt 
reaches maturity within a short span of time, the resulting 
pressure on existing foreign exchange reserves could 
Indeed become severe* Furthermore, if this phenomenon 
happens to coincide with external conditions of export 
stagnation, unfavorable shifts in the terms of trade, 
Inflation* ox* emergency-induced importation, or specula-
tive outflows of short-term capital, then the country 
*|bld., p. 26.
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 could clearly be faced with only one feasible escape n 
from the preasuree of the liquidity orisis—that of debt 
default. 
When chronically faeed with the problem of 
burdensome concent rat ion of maturities in the short run, 
debtor countries should attempt to lengthen their debt 
structure by attracting longer-term credits* Of course, 
if the immediate investment climate is tainted by recent 
defaults or even delays in the repayment process, 
creditors could Tory logically be reluctant to grant new 
long-term credits or even to reschedule existing debt 
over a longer repayment period. In fact, the debtor 
country might be forced to further shorten the debt 
structure to avoid default—a step which would only 
serve to compound the problem at some future time. 
Furthermore, the debtor country might very well be forced 
to accept this short-term financing at prohibitive in-
terest rates. A nearsighted policy of this type designed 
to relieve Immediate liquidity pressures would ultimately 
lead to Increased rigidity in the country's debt structure. 
Sustained economic growth with expanding domestic markets 
revealing new horizons of long-term investment oppor-
tunities is no guarantee against short-term liquidity 
L -J 
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 arises compounded by shortening of the debt structure. 
Indeed, a country may be an extremely good credit risk 
ere* the long run and at the same time a very poor risk 
from the short-run viewpoint. Debtor countries today 
faeed with this dilemma do hare assess to the compensatory 
financing facilities of the International Monetary Fund 
designed to assist in short-term liquidity problems of 
this type. Furthermore, debtor countries today have the 
additional advantage of being able to obtain "soft" 
loans*1 from such international and national lending 
agencies as the International Development Association of 
the International Bank and the Development Loan Fund of 
the United States* Relatively recent trends toward 
expanding operations by these "soft* lending institutions 
oan be interpreted as the result of growing skepticism by 
^Although loan capital contracted on "soft" terms 
involves far less rigidity in the debt structure of the 
borrowing country allowing more flexibility in adjusting to 
conditions of external imbalance, the available supply today 
is far from sufficient to accommodate the growing needs of 
debtor countries, nor are "soft" loans good substitutes for 
well-organised, efficiently managed debt programs* Further-
more, sine* the terms are easy the incentive on the part of 
borrowing countries to make maximum productive use of funds 
so acquired is often lacking, the same argument, of course, 
has been utilised in respeot to the over-dependency of 
grants-in-aid in Investment programs among the underdeveloped. 
Reluctance by responsible borrowing countries to aeoept 
charity in the form of grants-in-aid is often forwarded as 
the rm»m for the surprising unpopularity of suoh programs^ 
L 
these and ether publio landing authority*, as wall as 
by aany private landing sources, oonoarning tha ability 
of debtor countries to servioe loans contrasted on bard 
terns la tha long run and to withstand tha praaauraa of 
periodic liquidity crises In tha short run» 
Traditionally, raturns on aquity capital have not 
boon oonsidarad elements of rigidity In tha balanoo of 
payments of dab tor oountrlos Insofar as Investment Incase 
of this typa Is assumad to vary diraotly with axport 
earnings. Thus, during liquidity orlsas, whan axport 
aarnings ara daolining, It Is axpaotad that raturns on 
aquity capital will fall In a corresponding manner. This 
traditional assumption of built-in flexibility in tha 
debt structures of debtor countries Is based on the pre* 
World War XI concentration of foreign capital in export 
industries. In such oases it Is logical to assume a 
direct relationship between fluctuations In axport 
earnings on one hand and In returns from investments in 
this sector on the other. 
An exception to this direct relationship would be 
the case in which direct foreign investments were con-
centrated in the axport sector of the debtor country but 
wars quantitatively insignificant compared to domestic 
L investments in this particular sector. In such a case, _J 
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It la conceivable that profit* and dividend remittances 
could decline is that part of tho export sector dominated 
by foreign oapital even though total exports vera 
expanding and total export earnings were Increasing. 
Thus, it becomes necessary to include a second condition 
in order to posit a direct relationship between the two 
variables in question* Not only must the foreign invest* 
ment he heavily concentrated in the export sector of the 
debtor country, but also production from that part of 
the export sector dominated by foreign capital mist 
acoount for a major percentage of the total exports of 
the country in question.1 If these two conditions do 
hold, it is logical to assume that returns on equity 
capital would fluctuate pari passu with, and in the same 
direction as, total export earnings* "As a matter of 
fact, these fluctuations should he even more intense, since 
profits generally show wider amplitude of movement than 
gross sales."2 
^International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, International Development Association, 
Economic Growth and External Pebtt Essays, III, 1-7. 
international Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, International Development Association, 
Economic Growth and External Pebtt An Analytical Frame* 
work, I, 2k* 
r "i 
A close examination of direct foreign investment 
today will reveal an increased willingness on the part of 
investor* to look beyond the export sector for profitable 
opportunities in debtor countries, This willingness to 
invest in productive enterprises for domestic consumption 
In developing countries is a product of the development 
process itself* Preoccupation with enclave investments 
involving only export activities disappears as develop-
ment proceeds and as foreign Investors begin to compete 
for shares in the growing prosperity of domestic markets* 
Consequently, as investments of this type expand, the 
direct relationship between returns on equity capital and 
export earnings disappears* Investment income becomes 
dependent on Internal market conditions and independent 
of external balance or imbalance, export expansion or 
contraction* Even though diversified investment of this 
type Is advantageous to the debtor country from the stand-
point of balanced growth, it does introduce an element of 
rigidity into the country* s balance of payments* When 
investments are concentrated in export industries, profits 
fluctuate as exports fluctuate j however, when investments 
are directed toward production for domestic consumption, 
resulting investment returns become fixed charges In 
L
 relation to foreign exchange fluctuations* dependent 
upon Internal not external condition** n 
On* final modifying aspect of this question 
involving the affect of reinvested foreign earnings on 
balance~of-payments rigidity should be introduced at this 
point* Insofar as investors are willing to re-channel a 
part of investment income back into productive activities 
in the debtor country, pressure on scarce foreign exchange 
reserves ia relieved. Of course, this action can be 
encouraged by government recourse to the imposition of 
artificial payments barriers, Nevertheless, insofar as 
Investment income is not reinvested, it remains a rigid 
claim against the foreign exchange holdings of the debtor 
country in question. 
In summary, as a result of more diversified and 
better balanced foreign investment programs in debtor 
countries today, it Is reasonable to assert that balance* 
of-payments rigidity is created by the debt service 
obligations arising from the accumulation of both loan 
capital and equity capital, increased external rigidity 
is to be expected in debtor countries in early stages of 
development insofar as critically needed external funding 
produces conditions of rapidly accumulating external 
debt with resulting increases im the proportion of 
L external earnings absorbed by debt service. As the J 
1* 
developmental process matures* however* an Increased ~i 
capacity fox1 internal financing and an improved invest-
ment olimate fox* the retention of previously acquired 
equity capital should result In greater flexibility in 
the adjustment process during periodic liquidity crises. 
Even though external debt outstanding may not be reduced 
in absolute terms (and, In fact, may increase) as 
development proceeds, It should become more manageable 
within the country's limited oapaoity to earn foreign 
exchange. Of course, excessive debt accumulation in the 
absence of adequate structural adjustments could destroy 
the credit worthiness of the debtor ammtvf and could 
result in eventual debt default undermining the entire 
growth process* 
althou^a governments may attempt to carefully 
and cautiously pre-aehedule debt accumulation and debt 
repayment, 
there Is nothing inevitable or automatic about the 
progression of debt over time because there is 
nothing automatic about the process of economic 
growth. Many things can go wrong, and the country 
may never leave...the stage In which its debt 
continuously tends to inorease.l 
^International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, International Development Association, 
Economic Growth and External Debt: Essays. Ill, 87. 
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 In the face of such uncertainty the country must attempt 
to minimize risk by maximizing inherent balanoe-of-
payments flexibility. 
Rigidity in the import structure 
The degree of inflexibility in a debtor country1 s 
import structure is broadly determined by the country's 
pattern of growth and path of development. Adaptability 
within the structure depends on the degree of determin-
ation with which income growth la pursued. If a debtor 
country attempts to sustain a rate of growth beyond Its 
domestic resource capabilities, rigidity will be intro-
duced into the import structure consisting of those 
growth-required imports necessary to fill the gap between 
developmental m*&9 end domestic resource limitations. 
Since external receipts must provide resources 
for external debt servicing as well as for Import require-
ments, the inability or the unwillingness to reduce 
imports during periods of foreign exchange shortage may 
readily lead to default* Contractually fixed debt 
service obligations afford officials little opportunity 
to adjust to periodic foreign exchange shortagesj thus, 
the ability to compress Imports becomes very essential 
during these times of crisis. 
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IB countries where the ratio of exports to 
total income is very high import levels may adjust 
automatically to periodic liquidity crises through 
internal income and price effects. This, of course, 
assume* that countercyclical public policy is not applied. 
If a reduction in income should follow declines in ex-
ternal receipts, an automatic downward adjustment in 
imports will occur with a given propensity to import. 
Moreover, if it could he assumed that a country does 
not have any objeetivo other than to restore ex-
ternal equilibrium, the whole burden of the decline 
in external receipts could be absorbed by a decline 
in imports brought about through a deflation in 
income and prices to whatever extent required.1 
It is true, however, that in debtor countries today 
growth targets are vigorously pursued and domestic de-
flations stubbornly avoided by the application of counter-
cyclical public policy. With fixed exchange rates* there 
Is clearly no automatic mechanism to adjust the level of 
imports to changes in the capacity to import* Since It 
is not a question of automatic adjustment* it becomes 
one of choice by appropriate public policymakers* 
To determine the degree of rigidity In the import 
structure a minimum tolerable level of Imports based on 
^Avramovie* op. olt.» ppt 138-39* 
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subsistence and developmental needs must be clearly 
defined. By f w the most difficult choice confronting 
policymakers Involve* the determination of the compo-
sition of imports within the minimum tolerable level* 
The priorities of the selection are likely to depend on 
policy objectives baaed on prevailing economic and social 
philosophies* If the country la growth-oriented, high 
priority will probably be given to fuels, raw materials, 
and capital goods Imports at the *xpmn* of consumer 
manufactures and food Imports, However, if domestic food 
production is deficient or export-oriented, it may be 
necessary to satisfy subsistence needs through Importationj 
In such a ease food Imports would be given * high priority 
even at the expense of developmental m*&** 
Xvramovio asserts that 
two general assumptions can be made with regard to 
these objectives, the first is that a country will 
attempt io maintain a minimum living standard; this 
Implies that food imports will not be curtailed. 
The second Is that a country will try to avoid 
severe unemployment. fhia Implies that Imports of , 
fuels and raw materials will ajeo enjoy a priority.x 
According to Avramovic, consumer manufactures and capital 
goods Imports arc the most likely categories for Import 
curtailment In periods of lictuidlty shortages* Howevor, 
1JMd.f p* 139. 
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since curtailment of the former would adversely affect 
the standard of living in the debtor country and since 
curtailment of the latter would hamper long-run develop-
mental aspirations, it is clear that both should serve 
as stop-gap measures only—designed to relieve pressure 
on temporarily defioient foreign exchange reserves. 
The key question focuses on the willingness of 
the debtor country to delay the attainment of pre-
established developmental goals, thereby achieving 
sufficient flexibility in its import structure to with-
stand the pressures of liquidity shortages* Assuming 
that external sources of compensatory financing are 
exhausted or unattainable in the short run, built-in 
inflexibility in the import structure will force the 
debtor country to channel scarce foreign exchange 
reserves from the payment of pro-scheduled debt service 
to the payment of required imports. Default in such a 
case would direotly be the result of the foreign exchange 
shortage but indirectly would be a product of the 
country* s inability or unwillingness to temporarily 
compress imports to * level within its mesne* 
^These sources will be examined in full later 
in the chapter* 
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r Although the difficult choice between import n 
requirements and debt servioing obligations could be 
avoided by deferring payment on imports, this may simply 
serve to compound the problem at tome future time* 
However, such a measure would be advisable if a future 
upswing In external receipts were expected which would 
afford the country the opportunity to meet payments on 
both deferred and current debt* 
The Relationship Between Elements of Balance* 
of-Payments Disturbance and Rigidity $xt the 
Formation of Liquidity Crises Indicators 
Since it la important from the standpoint of both 
the lending and the borrowing country to be able to 
accurately assess the capacity and capability of the 
latter to withstand the pressures of periodic liquidity 
crises when the need arises, reliable measures of the 
degree of pressure applied during the crises should be 
fully utilised* Faced with the inevitability of 
periodic external imbalances caused by the balanoe-of-
payments disturbance, the debtor country must be prepared 
to apply offsetting or compensating policy measures; 
successful action in this respect depends, first of all, 
on the degree of disturbance and secondly, on the degree 
of inherent rigidity or Inflexibility within the balance- _, 
5o 
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of-payments structure. Through the proper utilisation 
of liquidity crisis indicators, the debtor country should 
be able to accurately measure the degree of intensity of 
1die former in respect to the degree of rigidity of the 
latter* This relative measure should produce the proper 
guideline* for action• 
oo loan capital to external earnings 
(tee of the most frequently uaed liquidity orlela 
indicatora la the ratio of fixed debt service commitments 
to external earnings. In effect this ratio signifies the 
proportion of foreign exchange earnings on current account 
(1. e«« exports of goods and services) absorbed by 
contractually fixed debt service payments (1, e.# Interest 
and amortisation) • It is a "measure of the rigidity Intro* 
duced into a country* a balance of payments by the obli-
gation to pay a predetermined amount, although external 
receipts amy be subject to great vacations»*^ In the 
numerator of the ratio is included what is commonly 
considered the most rigid elements In a debtor country's 
balance of payments, and in the denominator is included 
what is commonly considered the moat volatile* 
lAvramovio and Gulh&ti, on* elt., pp. l|£«4j.9* 
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 Of great** significance in the applicability of n 
this ratio it the feet that debt service payments (the 
numerator) ere claims against a country's external 
receipts (the denominator) and compete against the 
country*s capacity to finance needed imports* Since the 
numerator can he expected to remain relatively rigid ever 
time, particularly over the short run, cyclical dips in 
export receipts, either due to reductions in external 
demand o* because of domestic supply problems, will 
result in a rising ratio* the higher the ratio and the 
greater its rate of increase, the greater the strain which 
a debtor country will experience in respect to its 
capacity to import. It imports cannot be compressed 
because of inherent inflexibility in the import structure, 
and if other aforementioned adjustments are not immediately 
feasible, a rising ratio may result in tee necessity to 
default en debt obligations. Thus, the ratio itself 
measures the degree of pressure to which debtor countries 
will he exposed by focusing on inherent balance-of-
payments rigidity in tee face of destabilising influences 
arising from fluctuations in external receipts* 
Bote the magnitude of tee strain and the capacity to 
meet the crises will,..depend on the extent and the 
duration of tee decline in external receipts, on 
L J 
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 the availability of monetary reserves and of n 
compensatory borrowing abroad, and on the flex-
ibility of the Import structure,1 
Although this debt service ratio is much more 
reliable in appraising the burden of oyelloal or short-
run deolines In external receipts in respect to fixed 
debt obligations. It does have some—although admittedly 
limited—long-run relevance. If deolines in export 
receipts In a debtor country are secular by nature, 
caused, for example, by chronically low price elasticity 
of demand for the country's export product or by stag-
nating supply conditions md resource depletion, a 
steadily rising debt service ratio would signal a 
corresponding long-term reduction in the country's 
capacity to import, She country would find it Increasingly 
more difficult to service external debt if faced with 
chronically stagnating external receipts. Although it 
Is true that stagnating conditions of this type would be 
reflected In a high debt service ratio, It Is not true 
tost the latter phenomenon would necessarily indicate the 
f ormer* 
from the short-run point of view, "cash squeeze" 
problems and liquidity shortages are of critical concern; 
^Avramovlc, op, eit,, p, 103* 
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thus. It is most appropriate to employ liquidity crisis 
indicators In order to measure the impact of balanee»of-
payment a rigidity within the context of cyclical or other 
short-run declines in external receipts# Since foreign 
exchange la perhaps the scarcest Input for the debtor 
country in the process of development and since rigidly 
established debt service Is a continuing charge against 
this soarce resource, the measurement of their relative 
fluctuations over tlmo la analytically useful • Apart 
from the value of the ratio as a true indicator of 
liquidity pressure In the short run, it also serves as 
a psychological factor in the determination of a debtor 
country's credit worthiness. It is trusted as a useful 
rule-of-thumb in investment decision-making by most public 
lending agencies such as the Export-Import Bank of the 
United States and by many private landing agencies and 
agents} it is also used by borrowing countries in assessing 
whether or not investment plans to be financed by the 
accumulation of additional external credits are expedient 
and financially sound** 
^International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, International Development Association, 
Economic Growth and External Debts An Analytical Frame-
work, 1 $ 3^-*33* 
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At a measuring device* it can be computed on a 
firm statistical basis without guesswork or approximations, 
and it is relatively simple to apply, to interpret, and to 
evaluate* It is not, however, without limitations even in 
short-run analysis. The basic inadequacy of the ratio 
Involves the difficulty in pinpointing that critioal level 
beyond which the debtor country will find the debt burden 
unmanageable* History provides little guide either in 
estimating the amount of foreign borrowing a country can 
properly undertake for purposes of domestic growth and 
development or in determining the maximum supportable 
1 
ratio of debt service to external earnings. 
Historically, defaults have not occurred at any 
given absolute level of this ratio* In some oaaea it was 
the sharp rise, even from low levels, resulting from 
sudden drops in export earning* that brought about default. 
Hence it is not just the absolute level of the ratio, 
but the ability to adjust to sharp changes, which 
determine debt service capacity. There is, in fact, 
no theoretical reason why nations could not support 
investment service ratios of fifty par cent or mora, 
provided the economy and the balance of payments were 
adjusted to the level of investment service* On the 
other hand, the hi$aer the investment service ratio, 
^David finch, "Investment Service of Underdeveloped 
Countries," 1W Staff Papers. II (September, 1951)t 70• 
L _1 
55 
r -i 
the more difficult "will be the adjustment to a sharp 
decline in export earnings or an unexpected rise in 
import requirements. 1 
The ratio of interest on loan 
oapltal to external earnings 
Over the long run it is expected that a debtor 
country will be able to substantially turn over external 
debt. Thus, the inclusion of amortisation in the 
numerator nf the debt service ratio as a potential element 
of rigidity is somewhat misleading* Debtor countries do 
not expect to finance total debt, including amortization, 
solely from their annual income in the form of external 
receipts. Assuming that debtor countries are able to turn 
over external debt over the long run, the real burden on 
external resources arises from fixed Interest claims not 
from total debt service. 
Since the debt service ratio previously described 
is a cash flow rather than a profitability or productivity 
concept, it includes amortisation as a charge and is, as 
such, inappropriate as a long-run analytical tool; a more 
accurate indicator of long-run rigidity$ therefore, would 
include only Interest as a charge against external receipts. 
^-Raymond Mikesell* U, S. Private and Government 
Investment Abroad {Eugene, Oregoni University of Oregon 
L ****** 1962)* p# 303* j 
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 Even with this variation, however, there la skeptic ism n 
concerning Its applicability. The current cash position 
of a debtor country is not the most critical concern from 
the standpoint of long-term investment. It is doubtful 
whether conditions of temporary liquidity shortages would 
deter either lender or borrower from engaging in capital 
transactions in instances where the investment climate was 
bright with prospects of long-term profitability. In the 
denominator of the aforementioned debt service ratio 
appears the debtor country's annual income from external 
earnings} this is comparable to a corporation's annual 
gross sales figures* Clearly, this is by no means the 
most critical factor to be considered in assessing the 
long-run soundness of the corporation's financial structure, 
The decisive factor in determining the credit worthiness 
of either a debtor country or a private corporation over 
the long m m is the degree of productive utilisation of 
accumulated capital, 
gxtcraal receipts remaining after debt service 
Of greater relevance and applicability from the 
long-range point of view is the absolute quantities of 
^International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, International Development Association, Economic Growth 
and External Debt; An Analytical Framework, l, 35-^b, j 
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external receipts whioh remain after debt service n 
obligations have been successfully met. A high ratio of 
debt service to external receipt* may go hand in hand 
with an increasing supply of remaining external receipts. 
In such a ease the latter la naich more indicative of a 
debtor country's oapaoity to satisfactorily finance an 
increasing volume of Import requirements. It can be said 
that a high ratio in this instance HIndicates primarily— 
although in a crude manner—that the role of foreign capital 
1» f « * « * H g M « « l o growth h*. *.«, e a n . i d . r m ^ l 
In assessing the liquidity problems of any debtor 
country care should bo taken to account for any changes 
in the "real* value of external earnings remaining after 
service payments. The adequacy of such flows to satisfy 
import requirements Is affected not only by changes in 
the volume of importation but also by changes in Import 
prices. Therefore, in order to measure the "real* increase 
or decrease In the purchasing power of remaining external 
earnings It Is necessary to adjust for changes in the 
latter over time. Only in this way can an accurate 
estimate of incremental changes in a dsbtor country's 
capacity to Import be made. 
iAvramovic, op. olt«. p. 101. 
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The ratio of total debt service including 
transferred earnings from equity 
capital to external receipts 
As was previously mentioned, transferred earnings 
from equity capital qualify as elements of balance-of-
payments rigidity only if two conditions are met*1 First, 
foreign direct investment must not be heavily concentrated 
in the export sector of the debtor country* Secondly, 
production from that part of the export sector dominated 
by foreign capital must not account for a major percentage 
of the country1s total exports. If these two conditions 
are observed in a particular debtor country, transferred 
earnings should be included in the numerator of the debt 
service ratio if total liquidity pressure is to be 
accurately measured. 
However* if these conditions are not met, a more 
meaningful indicator of this type should include in the 
numerator only rigidly contracted debt service arising 
from loan capital since transferred earnings would most 
likely tend to vary directly with the total exchange 
earnings of the country in question. 
^mmmmmmmmmmmmmimmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm^ 
*See pages 1*.04£. 
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Furthermore, If foreign investors engaged in 
producing for the export market 
make their own purchases of commodities and services 
from abroad and make foreign exchange payments to 
monetary authorities in debtor countries by means of 
royalty payments, taxes, and the purchase of 
currencies for local expenditures,...it would seem 
desirable to exclude the investment service payments 
of foreign-owned companies entirely from the 
numerator and include only the net foreign exchange 
payments by the oompaniee to the monetary authorities 
In the denominator** 
The ratio of public debt service 
to external earnings 
Since governments of debtor countries commonly 
grant priorities to the repayment of public and publicly 
guaranteed debt during periods of liquidity shortage, it 
Is reasonable in asaesslng the severity of liquidity 
problems to completely exclude from the numerator of the 
debt service ratio all privately contracted debt* Under 
such a priority system, public and publicly guaranteed debt 
service become the major elements of rigidity in aggregate 
debt service*2 A ratio including only these types of debt 
service clearly has the advantage of statistical accuracy 
Inasmuch as debtor countries are often remiss in maintaining 
^Mikeaell, op. olt.« p. 3S1. 
2Avramovic and ftulhatl* op. clt** p. lj.8* 
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couplet* statistical records on other debt service 
figures* 
The relationship between Inflexibility 
in a debtor country's Import structure 
and balanos-of-payments dlsturbanoe 
the most difficult element of rigidity to sta-
tistically measure and to incorporate into an analytical 
framework of this type Is the Inherent inflexibility in a 
debtor country's import structure* The problem can be 
attacked, however, by measuring trends and deviations from 
trend. If a pattern of short-term import fluctuations Is 
discernible in a debtor country, and if a commodity-by-
commodlty breakdown reveals a pattern of import compression 
within these deviations from trend, it is possible to 
estimate the degree of flexibility in the import structure 
as a whole and also to quantify this estimation for use in 
the development of liquidity crisis indicators. 
When a debtor country experiences sudden declines 
in external receipts or sudden reductions in foreign ex-
change holdings, the pressure exerted on balance-of-
payments adjustment may emanate not only from rigidly 
established debt service obligations but also from non-
oompressible imports* A high ratio of debt service to 
L external earnings is supportable If sufficient -J 
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flexibility exists is the import structure* On the 
ether hand, a lev ratio may become intolerable if this 
flexibility does not exist. Complete assessment of short* 
term liquidity problems is possible only if an accurate 
measurement of the degree of import compressibility is 
included in the analysis. This can be accomplished by 
measuring deviations from Importation trends in the past 
and by applying the results to the future extrapolated 
trend values in order to assess the response of imports 
to declines In external earnings. In this nay a more 
accurate assessment of balance-of-payments rigidity in 
relation to periodic destabilising fluctuations is 
possible.4' 
A second supplementary indicator la useful in this 
regard. If a commodity-by-commodity breakdown of past 
import fluctuations in a debtor country reveals that 
certain import categories are compressible (e. g.f capital 
goods and consumer manufactures), Import flexibility can 
be measured by observing changes over time in the proportion 
of these items in the total Import bill. A rising ratio of 
^International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, International Development Association, Economic 
growth and External !>ebtf Essays, lllf 8-lS. 
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this typs would, of course, indicate an Increasing 
degree of built-in flexibility in the Import structure. 
the Relationship Between External Debt Service and 
and public Revenues 
From a strictly long-range point of view any 
analysis of a debtor country's debt service burden should 
include a close examination of the direction and the rate 
of change in national income, domestic savings, and public 
revenue* remaining after debt service. The remaining flows 
should be statistically measured in order to ascertain 
whether the rates of growth could be considered satis-
factory. Adequate rates et growth of these variables 
wouldf of course, indicate that the growing debt »0vria% 
burden of a debtor country with resulting balance-of-
payments rigidity is proceeding pari passu with the 
strengthening of the country's long-run economic posture.x 
afrfofflm, tWfff,., m»fgf f Iff.,- TflvlfSf 
Two of the basic long-run conditions for a success-
ful long-term debt service program art healthy rates of 
growth in national income and in domestic savings. Although 
h.<nmmf, op, ott.,
 P. 60. 
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periodic liquidity crises can be avoided over a shorter 
period simply by the maintenance of adequate foreign 
exchange reserves, a focus on foreign exchange avail-
ability alone is not Justifiable In assessing the 
i burden of external indebtedness over the long run*4* 
There is a elose relationship, both In theory and in 
practice, between the long-term growth in income and 
internal savings, on the one hand, and the increase 
in the capacity to transfer externally a part of 
domestic income and savings on the other hand* A 
sustained growth in Income is dependent on growth in 
savings, and the growth in savings Is dependent on 
frowth in income. Similarly, a sustained growth in noome cannot be achieved unless the foreign trade 
sector of the economy develops fast enough to provide 
external earnings needed to satisfy growing Import 
requirements and to finance other external outlay, 
She required rate of export growth will, of course, 
vary from country to countryf It will be smaller in 
the economies with a diversified natural resource 
base. But In any case, a high rate of over-all 
income growth, maintained over a long term, almost 
automatically implies an adequate rate of Increase 
in the supply of commodities which either actually 
enter international trade or are capable of being 
internationally traded, Growth In income and savings 
and growth In transfer capacity are interdependent 
in the long rm and represent only different aspects 
of the process of economic growth, although the degree 
of interdependence will not be the same in all cases ,2 
Since the operation of both the savings and the 
transfer mechanism depends on adequate growth In income and 
3*11 Is recognized, of course, that foreign exchange 
availability Is of critical importance regardless of the 
length of the time period under analysis. 
2avrsmovict op, cit,» pp. 57-58, ^ 
6k 
savings over the long run, an Inereaslngly heavy * » 
tarsal debt service burden in the faee of other competing 
claims under conditions of internal stagnation could 
clearly become unsupportable. 
Unless a debtor country unreal!stioally expects 
to be able to attract an increasing supply of foreign 
capital ad Infinitum, done8tic savings wist grow to assume 
a progressively larger role is the financing of internal 
n**&* and external commitments.*1 The competing claims of 
external debt service and demestie investment needs must 
be reconciled. 
In the early stages of development it is, of course, 
normal for a debtor eeuntry to depend upon capital imports 
not only to fill the gap batmen domesti© savings and 
investment requirements but also to finance debt service 
is not to say that the growth of domestic 
savings ii mora important than the availability of foreign 
exchange. Furthermore, no causal relationship is inferred 
in this section with reference to the gap between domestic 
savings and domestic investment on one hand and the gap 
between imports and exports on the other. Conceivably, 
the causation could run either way. Specifically, an 
internal bottleneck could conceivably produce an Import 
balance on current account, but it is also true that an 
external bottleneck could just as readily produce a 
savings problem domestically. See John P. Lewis, 
Quiet Crisis In India: Economic Development (Washington, 
B# 0*1 fhe Brookings Institute, 1962), pp. 38-45• 
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 obligations.1 Ho contributions from domestic savings n 
should be expected with respect to the lattar. Since 
extamal indebtedness would naturally grow rapidly under 
these circumstances, the income growth process must begin 
to generate an increasing supply of savings so that just 
such a contribution would begin to take place. If this 
step in the developmental process of the debtor country 
fails to take place—that is, If the transition la post-
poned by the country*s continual dependence on now 
borrowing not only to finance Investment projects but 
alao to pay service on debt previously inourred-~the 
resulting burden of compound Interest would rander the 
debt structure increasingly vulnerable to default* 
Savings out of newly-generated income must be suffi-
cient to enable the economy to finance an increasing 
proportion of Its own investment requirements out of 
domestic resources. At some point of time, aggregate 
domestic savings must exceed aggregate domestic In* 
vestment by a margin that la sufficiently large to 
meet at least interest charges on the previously 
lmmxv*& debt* If that point la never reached, funds 
would have to be continuously borrowed and indebted-
ness would have to increase continuously Just to 
meet interest; and as new borrowings would also 
mmmm»mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmimmmmmm 
3-$mls entire discussion of the major stages In the 
growth-with-debt prooess was taken from International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International 
Development Association, Economio growth and External 3>ebtt 
An Analytical Framework, I , 3?-70. 
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carry interest, the debtor would be caught In the 
familiar trap of the compound Interest law. Debt 
service would tend to peach the limit In which it 
la equal to national income.1 
If, on the other hand, an Increasing supply of domestic 
savings is generated from sustained income growth so that 
the savings~investment gap is gradually filled, the 
country would no longer find it necessary to borrow abroad 
for investment puj^oses but only to meet service commit* 
ments on previously accumulated debt. Then as domestic 
savings begin to exceed investment nmm&s, a positive 
domestic contribution could be made to the repayment of 
interest on external debt. As long as domestic savings 
are insufficient to cover all interest payments, external 
Indebtedness would continue to rise but at a decreasing 
rate. Finally, as domestic savings grow at a sufficient 
rate to cover and then to exceed domestic investment needs 
and the entire interest cost of accumulated external debt, 
the process of total debt amortization could begin* From 
this point on, of course, external indebtedness would 
begin to decrease absolutely* km the developmental 
processes mature, however, it would be highly illogical to 
expect external Indebtedness to fall to zero. The improved 
«««iMWi»MMBI>«»»li»M«0MWMM*l^^ ••' t w o — — — — 
Ibid»» p* 65* 
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investment climate resulting from sustained growth 
from within would most likely attract an increased 
inflow of private speculative and investment capital 
••en though developmental capital from public lending 
institutions becomes completely amortized. 
Although there is nothing automatic about this 
progression of debt repayment because of the uncertainties 
of development itself, the necessity of maintaining and 
sustaining healthy rates of growth in national income 
and domestic savings is undeniable* To evaluate a 
country's performance in this regard, various indicators 
should he utilised* 
Conceptually, the effectiveness of resource mobil-
ization policies can be judged by studying the 
behavior of the marginal savings ratio (i. e., the 
proportion of the increment in income which is 
ploughed back as savings), the higher the marginal 
rate of savings* the greater the likelihood that 
the borrower can service foreign capital and simul-
taneously reduce the savings-investment gap.l 
A related aspect of this same problem Involves the 
debtor country's capacity to contribute to external debt 
service over the long run from domestic savings arising 
from the fruits of forei$» investment programs* Pertinent 
variables in the assessment of this aspect of the larger 
^JMd** p* kO* 
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problem include the volume of foreign capital involved 
in domestic investment (i* e*# the degree of indebtedness), 
the terms of repayment, and the aggregate flow of domestic 
savings arising from growth in national income. 
One indicator which is useful in measuring this 
contribution focuses on domestic savings remaining after 
external debt has been periodically serviced. An alter* 
nate method, of course, is the measurement mw time of 
the ratio of debt service payments to savings. Since the 
generation of domestic savings is necessary not only in 
providing returns to foreign capital but also in creating 
investible funds for Investment needs net of foreign 
capital inflows* a high ratio of service payments to 
savings implies that a large proportion of currently 
generated savings are committed to the former and are, 
therefore, unavailable to the latter. A rising ratio 
would clearly imply an increasing need for new foreign 
capital inflows to supplement deficiencies in domestically 
generated savings* If domestic investment needs receive 
top priority in respect to scarce domestic savings, the 
net result will be basically the same* In order to meet 
service payments on previously accumulated debt* the 
debtor country would again have to accelerate gross foreign 
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 capital inflows. The country would then bo placed In ~i 
the tenuous position of debt accumulation at compounded 
rates of repayment, this latter phenomena would also be 
reflected In a rising ratio of debt service payments to 
denestic savings. 
Although a high ratio of this type does imply a 
relative reduction in the debtor country's capacity to 
service debt or to invest out of its own resources, it 
does not adequately indicate whether the quantity of 
savings remaining after external debt has been serviced 
is large or small in relation to total product* This, 
however, can be taken into account by measuring changes 
in the ratio of remaining savings to gross national product. 
A rising ratio of this type would indicate, of courset an 
increasing capacity of the debtor country to finance 
investment needs from domestic resources and a decreasing 
dependency on foreign borrowing for this purpose* Since 
the rate of income growth that can be realised with 
domestic resources primarily depends on the level of 
remaining savings and the relation they bear to total 
product, and since a given ratio of service payments to 
savings can be associated with either a low or a high 
level of remaining savings, attention should be 
L J 
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 directed to the latter variable and to its changes over n 
time.1 
Although the statistical measurement over time of 
income remaining after debt service is perhaps the moat 
suitable indicator of the burden of the latter on the 
former, analysis based on the ratio of debt service to 
income can also serve as an alternate. 
As a short-run tool of analysis, however, the ratio 
of debt service to income leaves much to be desired• In 
assessing the pressures of periodic liquidity crises the 
ratio of debt service to external earnings is a far 
batter indicator of inherent balance-of-payments rigidity. 
Short-run fluctuations in national income figures can be 
deceiving in this regard insofar as income growth may be 
forced by sacrificing both internal stability and external 
balance. There are significant differences among debtor 
countries in the extent to which public policy measures 
are used to stabilize income levels or to stimulate growth 
rates* These measures may successfully maintain and 
sustain growth in income, but they cannot alone solve the 
transfer problem; indeed, the problem may be compounded 
1 
Avramovlc, op. cit.. p. 7&. 
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If other countries fail to employ compensatory policy 
1 
measure* at the same tine* It is, therefore, clear that 
the use of the ratio of debt service to national income as 
an analytical tool in this regard is indeed of limited 
value* 
External debt service and the 
growth of nubile revenues 
la the special case of a predominance of public or 
publicly guaranteed debt in the debt structure of a 
developing country, the flow of nubile revenue and Its 
rate of increase become important considerations In 
analysing the capacity of the country to honor service 
obligations over the long run* Since public debt service 
la a direct claim on the revenue receipts of the country's 
government, the effort must be made through the mechanics 
of fiscal policy to tap real resources for public use* 
It la entirely possible to conceive of a ease in which 
rates of growth in national income and gross domestic 
savings seem highly inadequate in relation to total debt 
service commitments and yet due to governmental manipu-
lation of the tax structure, public external debt Is 
successfully serviced over the long run by controlled 
^ibid.f p» 63• 
72 
r ~i 
increases In the flow of public revenue. Clearly, there 
are limitations involved in the Implementation of such a 
practice, not the least of which are the political con-
sequence* of income redistribution in favor of the public 
sector. However, the point remains that the repayment of 
public or publicly guaranteed debt depends more directly 
on the flow of public revenue than on the flow of either 
national income or gross domestic savings. 
The governmental task of servicing external debt 
from public revenue receipts depends not only on success* 
ful application of fisoal policy measures, but also on 
the strength and priorities of competing claims on 
resulting accumulated resources• These claims Include 
scheduled payments on debt held internally as well as 
externally* 
In order to measure the strain Imposed by the 
latter which Is clearly more burdensome than the former 
since it Involves a not loss from the Income stream, not 
simply a redistribution from within, the ratio of external 
public debt service to public revenue should be utilized• 
Again, a rising ratio Indicates an increasing proportion 
of public revenue receipts are committed to providing a 
return to foreign capital at the expense of other 
L -J 
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legitimate claims Including the servicing of internal 
debt and the financing of social overhead capital in the 
fields of education, health, social welfare, and defense* 
For a more comprehensive measurement of the adequacy of 
public revenue remaining after debt service, fluctuations 
in national income or national product should be eon* 
aidered. the burden imposed on public twndB by rigidly 
established external debt service obligations can be 
weighed by the measurement over time of changes in the 
ratio of external debt service to public revenue and of 
revenue remaining after service payments to gross national 
product,1 
Balance-of-Payments Adjustment 
It has been shown that periodic liquidity crises 
are unavoidable in the short vm because of the nature of 
developmental needs in debtor countries. The success in 
minimising the adverse effects of such problems on external 
balance depends to a very great extent on the rapidity and 
the effloienoy with which appropriate public policy 
measures can be brought to bear* If properly applied, 
these offsetting or compensating measures will enable the 
L -I 
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sacrificing long-run developmental goals or aspiration8, 
The utilisation of monetary reserves 
A country's first line of defense in this process 
of adjustment Is Its stock of monetary reserves comprising 
gross official gold holdings, convertible foreign exchange, 
and the oountry«s gold tranche position with the Inter-
national Monetary Fund.1 During times of short-run 
liquidity shortages resulting from declines in export 
volumes, adverse shifts in terms of trade, inflation- or 
emergenoy-induoed Import increases, or speculative outflow 
of short-term capital, the stock of monetary reserves can 
be drawn down to cushion the effect of the temporary 
crisis. Of course, the continued successful utilisation 
of a country's mm*&r* stock depends on its faithful 
replenishment when the economic winds blow favorably and 
when external receipts are rising* 
Although there are practical difficulties and 
inherent dangers in implementing this policy, not the least 
of which la the complete exhaustion or depletion of 
^International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, International Development Association, Economic 
Growth and External Debt* An Analytical Framework, If. 18. 
75 
r n 
r#e«rv«B during time* of prolonged liquidity crises, it 
does have the advantage of enabling a debtor country to 
stabilize the level of imports, consumption, and invest-
raent despite annual fluctuations in foreign exchange 
receipts, while at the same time honoring debt service 
commitments.1 In other words, the adverse offsets on 
internal stability and on developmental goals are 
minimized while external commitments are honored. It is 
true, however, that debtor countries are somewhat 
reluctant to totally commit their supplies of monetary 
reserves to the cause of external stability, With the 
growing need of investible resources In debtor countries, 
there is a general unwillingness to maintain large 
reserves In anticipation of temporary disorder. It Is 
considered preferable to risk the disturbing effects of 
short-run setbacks rather than to incur the opportunity 
costs of maintaining foreign currencies and gold immweB 
for such eventualities. The allocation of accumulated 
monetary reserves to developmental needs Is often given 
top priority* 
The holding of a buffer reserve of International 
liquidity means that a country must abstain from 
Importing a certain volume of real goods and 
*Avraaovie, op, oit.. p. 137.
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 services. Just ate a poor man, in contest to a rich, 
will feel that he cannot afford, and will probably 
not desire, to hold a large idle cash balance, so a 
poor country is less likely than a rich one to abstain 
from ouch-needed imports and to tie up a part of its 
limited resources in an international cash reserve.I 
2he availability of IMF resources as a hedge 
against short-run balanoe-of-payments difficulties can have 
the effect of lulling a debtor country Into a false state 
of security concerning the maintenance of gold and foreign 
exchange reserves. She temptation is to use IMP funding 
as a substitute for the maintenance of adequate reserves 
rather than as a desired supplement, fhe danger of over-
estimating the resources of IMF credit facilities is a 
significant factor in assessing the vulnerability of the 
uninformed or the overly optimistic. 
la measuring the adequacy of a country* a supply of 
reserves, the short-run pattern of reserve fluctuations 
should be discerned, and changes over time in the ratios 
of gold and foreign exchange to total imports and of gold 
and foreign exchange to total debt service should be 
traced* necessary modifications in the numerator of these 
ratios mig^ it Involve the inclusion of the country* s gold 
*Ragnar Jfurkse, "Conditions of International 
Monetary Equilibrium," Readings in the theory of Inter-
national grade {Philadelphiat l&e Blakiston Company, 1950), 
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 tranche position with the IMP and the exclusion of any 
part of the gold supply that is idly maintained to back 
monetary or oredit creation* Clearly, reserve stocks 
cannot *9w* as oushions against periodic liquidity crises 
if frozen for these reasons* 
Compensatory financing 
A second avenue of adjustment travelled by debtor 
countries attempting to overcome short-run "cash squeeze" 
problems Involves the acquisition of compensatory 
financing. As was mentioned above, 
compensatory financing is an effective substitute fox* 
the maintenance of large reserves of gold and foreign 
exchange* As a general rule, countries which enjoy 
close and harmonious relations with the major inter-
national financial centers may be regarded as having 
a second line of reserves•«L 
The relative ease with which debtor countries are 
able to obtain compensatory financing today In contrast to 
pre-World War XX availabilities Is a product, for the most 
part, of the development and expansion of the International 
Monetary Fund* Within the Fund, of course, there are 
compensatory facilities operating for the sole purpose of 
^International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop* 
ment, International Development Association, Economic 
growth and External, pebtt An Analytical Framework, I» 21* 
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offsetting short-run condition* of external imbalance 
in debtor countries. Although INF fundi are readily 
available to debtor countries on the basis of a quota 
system,1 drawings are conditional and require substantial 
Justification in respect to the legitimacy of the request 
and the urgency of the need* 
Under the IMF compensatory financing facility, export 
deviations are measured against a * practical norm* as 
developed by the Fund, supplemented by estimates of 
the trend value based on market analysis for the 
country*s major export goods. Additional conditions— 
the shortfall has to be due to circumstances beyond 
the country* s control and of temporary character, and 
the country, if required, must be willing to seek 
means to remedy the situation—provide some assurance 
that the country would be in a position to meet its
 2 
repayments obligation without straining its resources* 
The purpose of IMF funding Is, clearly* to bail 
a country out of temporary disorder and not to support 
chronio structural imbalances over the long run* 
Recipients are required to employ the funds In such a way 
as to overcome the former and to avoid the latter* The 
conditions are stringent in order to avoid the mis-
allocation* misappropriation, and misuse of funds, and 
*Fund holdings of a country's currencies cannot 
exceed 22$ par cent of quota* 
%ertrude Lavaay, * Survey and Appraisal of 
Froposed Schemes of Compensatory Financing,* IMF Staff 
Papers» XII (July* 1965)» 201$.* 
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they become Increasingly stringent the closer drawings 
approach existing quotas* 
Short-term stabilisation loans are granted by 
national agenoles In developed countries as veil as by 
international agenoles such as the IMF* Although the 
lending processes and mechanisms In either ease are 
basically similar, loans from the former are usually In* 
fiueneed and tempered to a far greater extent by political 
considerations* As such, requirements to show need and 
to otherwise Justify loan applications are often relaxed 
If the granting of loans seems politically expedient. 
Another source of compensatory financing la short-
term borrowing In the private market, those debtor 
countries whloh have been able to attract financial 
representatives and branches from developed areas are, of 
course, In the best position to take advantage of available 
private funds • the flow of short*term capital from 
developed to developing areas Is particularly significant 
In those cases where close protectorate or colonial ties 
formerly existed* Funds are channeled through the branches 
of developed countries* financial Institutions still 
serving the debtor country* Familiarity with local con-
ditions and customs and the development of expertise In 
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handling «uch transactions art signal factors in the 
ease and facility with which funds flew in this dircotion.1 
In those oases where such time-honored famil-
iarity and trust do not exist, there is more reluctance 
on the part of investors to lend. When loans are granted 
high, often prohibitive, premiums are charged in order to 
compensate for the risk and uncertainty. Of course, the 
necessity of paying these high premiums, sometimes con-
siderably higher than the normal commercial rates charged 
in transactions between and among developed countries, 
places the debtor country In a most disadvantageous 
position as far as future balanee-of-payments solvency and 
debt service capacity are concernedj the threat of such 
transactions to future liquidity is quite evident. 
The practice of depending on compensatory financing 
to overcome periodic liquidity crises creates an additional 
problem in the form of debt "overhang." If a debtor 
country Is continually forced to secure credits with 
short-term or med!um*»term maturities in order to pay 
interest and amortisation on previously contracted long-
term debt, the debt structure becomes continually shortened. 
^International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment* International Development Association, Economic 
Orowth and External Debt: An Analytical Framework, i. 22. 
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Of course, the consequences of this phenomenon can be 
avoided by the attraction of sufficient long-term credits 
to compensate for those reaching maturity* However, this 
is both impractical and unlikely in the case of the 
country suffering frequent and severe liquidity crises in 
the short run. If as a consequence of such recurring 
difficulties the debtor country deems it necessary to 
resort to compensatory financing, thereby increasing the 
percentage of short-term and medium-term debt in the total 
debt structure, one undesired result will certainly be 
increased pressure in the future to turn over the debt in 
order to avoid becoming net capital exporters. To the 
aspiring country in the process of development this would 
be a most undesirable phenomenon* 
Compensatory financing is of questionable merit if 
imbalance is created between long-term goals on one hand 
and short-term or medium-term debt service commitments on 
the other, fo accurately assess the impact of changes in 
the composition of debt* the following questions should be 
consideredj 
How far is it appropriate to fborrow] at medium-term 
for financing projects whoso period of gestation is 
long and whose economic life is spread over two or 
more decades? Is a lack of correspondence between 
the duration of the loan and the life of the asset 
an important aspect of the moro general gap between 
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terms of International lending and the capacity of 
borrowers to repay? What la the imnaet of the terms 
of compensatory financing from public sources.on the 
aggregate debt position of primary producers?1 
If over the course of years amortization payments 
aooount for a steadily inoreasing percentage of the 
aggregate service flow fro» debtor countries, this Is a 
clear indication of debt structure shortening. If this 
situation Is allowed to continue, debt will become in* 
creasingly novo difficult to turn over, the drain on 
external reeeipte arising frost debt service obligations 
will become increasingly burdensome, and the external 
position of the debtor country will beoome increasingly 
vulnerable to imbalances created by periodic liquidity 
crises. 
Compensatory financing does not necessarily lead 
to shortening of the debt structure, fo the extent that 
new short-term and medlum-tena debts are incurred to 
replace those of comparable maturity which must be repaid, 
no debt "overhang" is created. Of course9 in order for a 
country to avoid undesirable shifts in its debt structure 
when long-term debts mature, emphasis should be placed on 
the attraction of long-term credits. Failure to accomplish 
^•Avramovio and Oulhati, op. .It., pp. XV-XVI. 
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this during liquidity oris*a oan result in these 
compounded liquidity problems 1B subsequent periods 
previously discussed. 
It weald therefore aa«m logical to expect that in 
tha futura both debtors and creditors would place 
mora reliance on long-term capital rathar than en 
abort- and medium-term operations and that necessary 
attention would be paid to the problem of estab-
lishing a greater oorraapondenoe between the life 
of loans and the ability of borrowers to repay. 1 
Import compression 
The extent to which policymakers in debtor countries 
can compress imports2 without serious Internal repercussions 
depends on the degree of flexibility (1. e,, on the per-
centage of inessential items in total imports in the 
*Ibld», p# 56* 
^Belated to the adjustment policy of Import com-
pression is that of Import substitution. the advantages of 
the latter are obvious in that reduced or eliminated 
imports are replaced by domestic products, thereby avoiding 
the necessity of sacrificing domestic consumption or 
developmental aspirations in the attainment of external 
balance* Import substitution can clearly contribute to 
the successful servicing of external debt over the lorsg 
run* It cannot, however* be depended upon to alleviate 
the pressures of periodic liquidity crises since the derived 
import demand for intermediate and capital goods to support 
the Increased domestic production may outweigh the ad-
vantages gained from the reduced Importation of finished 
goods. The time lag involved before a program of import 
substitution begins to pay off by reducing imports Tmd^rn 
it ineffective as a short-run policy tool. 
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country's import structure)* Conceptually, there it a 
limitation to tho utilisation of this adjustment measure 
over tine* Constant recourse to this policy can reduce 
Import flexibility to the extant that inessential items 
disappear from the import structure. Further compression 
involving subsistence items and items required to main-
tain current levels of domestic production would necessl-
1 tate sacrifices few debtor countries are willing to make* 
As a short-run tool of adjustment, Import com-
pression can effectively relieve periodic liquidity 
shortages. Temporary deficiencies in a country's capac-
ity to Import and to service external debt can be over-
come by reducing import demand artificially* Problems 
arise, however* If this policy is used to spur develop-
ment in the face of a chronically deficient capacity to 
import* 
Sustained income growth in the development process 
is dependent upon expansion of the country* a industrial 
base requiring, of cmx**, increased importation of fuels, 
raw materials, and capital goods* In order to maintain 
the proper momentum of growth as development proceeds, 
^Por a discussion of what comprises a country* s 
minimum tolerable level of Importation, see pages ij5-l|9. 
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^he capacity to import must grow at a rate which la i 
sufficient to aupport growing Industrial needs. If the 
oapaolty to import la mora than sufficient ovar time to 
cover import requirements for both development and sub* 
sistcnoe, than import compression may not be necessary. 
Few countries* however* develop without experiencing 
growing pains In the form of short-run Imbalances* ex* 
cesses, and shortages* Since developing countries are 
usually mora attentive %o and mora concerned with Internal 
problems of growth and stability than with external 
problema of balance, external receipts are usually char* 
acteriJBcd by rather volatile fluctuations* Imports, on 
the other hand, inasmuch aa they are needed to supplement 
domestic deficiencies, are characterized by steadily 
growing demand• Therefore, It la not unusual for a 
developing country to suffer periodic problema of ax* 
ceaalva Importation over existing oapaolty* 
Aa waa mentioned before, these periodic problems 
can be alleviated by the compression of inessential import 
items. The efficacy of this policy ovar time ^pm^B on 
the maintenance of sufficient flexibility In the Import 
structure* If during Intermediate periods (between 
liquidity crises) the importation of inessentials la 
L _J 
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permitted to rt.se, this flexibility «an indeed be main- n 
tained ore* the long run. However, overly ambitious 
developmental pleasing calling for substantial increases 
in the importation of growth-required items over* time 
can lead to chronic deficiencies in a country's capacity 
to import. The efficaoy of the continued use of import 
compression to spur development in the face of such defi-
ciencies would clearly diminish over time with the secular 
reduction of flexibility in the country's import structure• 
Artificial trade and payments controls 
If a debtor country has temporarily exhausted its 
various supplies of long-term credits, if the only funds 
available are of such short maturity that undesirable 
shortening of the debt structure is inevitable, and If, at 
the same time, gold and foreign exchange ******** are In-
sufficient to withstand the pr**mv** of a pmding ttcash 
squeeze*, the country may have no choice but to resort to 
direct controls either In attempting to stimulate the in-
flow of external receipts or in attempting to suppress the 
outflow of import or debt service payments. The con-
trolling mechanism would, of course, involve some form of 
artificial stimulus or barrier imposed for the purpose of 
Laohieving external balance. 
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I D the previous section, the efficaoy of 
policies designed to compress Imports during periods of 
liquidity shortages was evaluated, and potential problems 
associated with such measures vara examined. The manner 
and means of polioy implementation, however, whioh are 
subjeots with many diyeraified ramifications, were not 
discussed. To briefly place this complicated queation 
in proper perspective, it ia necessary to recognise the 
faet that all countries, developed or developing, have 
reoourae to the imposition of artificial trade or payments 
controls regardless of short-run liquidity considerations. 
Hiero are many well-known reasons for the imposition and 
maintenance of auoh controls. Desired balance-of-payments 
adjustments are attempted through exchange rate reval-
uation or devaluation, whichever la deemed appropriate, 
the uae of export subsidies and bonuses, the imposition 
of import tariffs and quotas, the imposition of exchange 
controls, and the manipulation of domestic tax structures 
relating to production for external markets* 
In the oast of a debtor country faced with a 
balanoo*of-.pa^i«nti deficit with resulting liquidity 
problems, trade and exohange controls can be effective 
methods of adjustment. 
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If the problem is rogardod as o on a i sting merely of 
the deficit, than by definition import and exchange 
control* are a corrective to the extent that they 
actually hold down the deficit. On the other hand, If 
the problem is regarded as conaiating of the imbalance 
in the economy that leada to excessive demand for 
imports relative to exports, oontrola are not a 
corrective. They merely a a sure that the of foots will 
manifest themaelvee primarily on the domestic side of 
the economy, •••The fast that import and exchange 
controls are sot a remedy for payments problems doos 
not moan that their use can never bo Justified. When 
reserves are small, or when other measures are being 
taken to eliminate the payments difficulties, the 
temporary use of restrictions can bo helpful in 
keeping the dofioit within the moans available to the 
monetary authorities.! 
If pressured to comply with the tenets of tv^9 trade and if 
forced to depend on tho processes of automatic internal 
and external adjustment, it is questionable whether debtor 
countries, burdened with tho high degree of inherent 
balance-of-payments rigidity, can successfully overcome 
recurring "cash squeeze" problems caused by short-run 
declines is exports, upward spirts in imports, adversely 
shifting terms of trade, or speculative outflows of short-
term capital. It is also questionable whether the unwritten 
rules of international fair play apply equally to developed 
and developing countries alike considering tho unique 
pr^»lm» faced by the latter* 
% • It* Bernstein, "Strategic Motors in Balance of 
faymonts Adjustment," IMF Staff Papers, V (August, 1956), 160 • 
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Apart from the question of artificial trade 
controls, debtor countries can directly avoid the re-
patriation of foreign capital through imposition of 
artificial payment a barriers* This is particularly 
effective In the ease of direct foreign investment, and 
it is used principally to induce foreign investors to 
reinvest earnings back into domestic enterprises. By 
establishing quotas on the amounts of earnings which can 
be repatriated, this measure has the advantage of reducing 
or at least directly controlling capital outflows from 
this particular source, but it has the disadvantage of 
worsening the investment climate with the potential result 
of reducing also tee inflow of new direct investment 
capital* If applied with discretion, this measure can 
successfully serve to relieve the pressure on scarce 
foreign exchange reserves during liquidity crises by 
directly attacking the heart of the problem! namely, 
capital withdrawal. 
Conclusions 
« « M I M I « I I I M M a M a W I M I H t 
As far as the borrowing country iu concerned, the 
first step in successful external debt service is usually 
considered the productive utilization of borrowed eapitalf 
this Is clearly a non-voluntary step since most lending 
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' institutions establish it a» the primary condition to n 
tha credit extension. From tha long-run point of via*, 
tha investment of borrowed capital la considered pro* 
duetive if induced growth in national income and domestic 
savings ia forthcoming; this la certainly consistent with 
both tha achievement of developmental goals and tha 
successful servicing of external debt* From tha short-run 
point of view, however, this sama consistency may not 
exist. Invested capital may be ultimately productive in 
tha BmB9 of inducing higher levels of income and savings 
but mora immediately nay raauit either directly or in-
directly in a earious drain on tha country's foreign 
exchange resources requiring tha imposition of stringent 
adjustment measures. Clearly, productive capital utili-
zation of this type would r%m^w tha country mora vul-
nerable to periodic liquidity &*&**** to encompass both 
tha long-run and tha short-run aspects of debt service 
capacity, a broader definition of productive capital 
utilisation should ba employed. 
Furthermore, tha direction of increased produc-
tivity should ha ascertained in analysing a country's 
capacity to service foreign capital. If foreign invest-
ment increases tha production of goods sold for axport 
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or sold OB the domestic market la place of goods pre-
viously imported* the country's capacity to service the 
resulting debt will bo enhanced. If# however, foreign 
Investment Increases the production of goods add OB the 
home aarkot in addition to those previously sold, and in 
excess of the Increase is demand owing to the rise of 
incomes, the capacity to service external debt will bo 
adversely affected Insofar as this typo of operation 
requires as much importation as the first but does not 
yield any foreign exchange in return* Finally, it 
foreign investment increases the production of goods 
•old on the home market replacing similar goods pre-
viously sold on the home market or goods sold abroad , 
replacing similar goods previously sold abroad, the effect 
1 f 
on debt service capacity will be relatively neutral* 
Whether the rapid growth of specific outputs arising 
from foreign Investment gives rise to import surpluses 
and chronic debt repayment problems depends on the 
exportablllty of these outputs* 
*£• J, Folak, "Balance of Payments Problems of 
Countries Reconstructing with the Help of Foreign Loans,* 
Readings In the Theory of International Trade (Philadelphia: 
The Blaklston Company. 1950) • pp* 2*68-69. 
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If exportabillty la hi#it growth will sot load to n 
balanoe-of-payments pressures and nay actually ba 
aooompanled by export surpluses* If
 # on the other 
band, the possibility of rapid growth la largely 
confined to aetivitlee whose outputa ara char-
acterised by low exportability—and this happens to 
be the oaaa In most underdeveloped countries today** 
than the development process will bo punctuated by 
recurrent tendanolea towards an import aurplua and repayment difficulties].1 
Although it la certainly desirable from the abort* 
run standpoint that foreign inveatments act to stimulate 
foreign exchange receipts or at leaat do not result in a 
net drain on these resources, the wisdom of channeling 
funds only into those investment areas which will contribute 
directly to such an end la indeed questionable, She 
longer range goals of foreign inveatments should not be 
ignored* In fact, 
foreign financing may be appropriate for projects that 
make no direct contribution to the expansion of exports 
or the reduction of imports* The effect of the project 
on the country*a total productivity is the sound 
economic criterion. This has been recognized, If only 
implicitly and indirectly by the International Bank 
which in several countries la financing industrial 
development banks* These banks mate* loans for 
domestic projects on the basis of their contribution 
to productivity in general and not merely on the basis 
of their foreign exchange productivity,2 
^Albert 0* Hlraohman* the Strategy of Economic 
Development (Sew Havent Tale tfniversxty wr***, i^odi
 # p* 169. 
%illard &* Thorp* trade, Aid or What? (Baltimore! 
The Johns Hopkins Frees* 195^)» p. 1 7 ^ 
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If An Investment project which will truly contribute to 
the developmental process can be financed by external 
means at a substantially lower eost than by internal 
means, foreign capital should not be screened out because 
of its immediate effect on foreign exchange resources. 
The long-term benefits say indeed outweigh the short-term 
effect on foreign exchange availability.1 
In essence, the problem of successfully servicing 
foreign capital imports is twofold-depending over the 
long run on whether the benefits in terms of increased 
national output exceed the cost of the transfer payments, 
while depending over the short run on whether the net 
changes in foreign exchange resources impede m enhance 
the country's capacity to withstand periodic liquidity 
crises* In actuality the attempt should be made to 
resolve both simultaneously by appropriate public policy 
measures. If the long-run costs of servicing a foreign 
investment program exceed the accrued benefits, then the 
program is a failure regardless of the country*s success 
in meeting short-run liquidity claims. If, on the other 
hand, the country Is unsuccessful in withstanding periodic 
^ifikesell, op. eit.» p. $00. 
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 liquidity pressures, then the long-run benefits will n 
never accrue. 
Although it Is acknowledged that all of the 
considerations discussed above are relevant In a complete 
analysis of external debt service problems In developing 
oountriee, It Is necessary in a dissertation of this size 
to limit the soops for purposes of comprehensiveness. 
Within the analytical framework developed in this chapter 
and employing the statistical indicators and measurements 
so outlined, subsequent chapters will empirically in-
vestigate the shorter-term debt service problems of one 
debtor country—the United States of Brazil* However, 
because of the artificiality of separating problems into 
short term and long term, the latter will bo incorporated 
into the study whenever deemed appropriate* 
CHAPTBB II 
TEE BRAZILIAH BALANCB OP PAmSITTS, 
19l|.8-1963 
Iho purport of this brief chapter is to broadly 
summarise the Brasilian balanoe-of-payments experience 
during the tine period of this study. It should he 
reiterated, however, that this dissertation is not a 
general balance-of-payments study. The Intention Is to 
focus In succeeding chapters on those elements of 
balance-of-payments disturbance, rigidity, and adjustment 
which significantly affected Brazil's capacity to aarvieo 
external debt* Since not all balance-of-paymenta elements 
were significant in this regard and since subsequent 
chapters do employ a building-block approach, a general 
frame of reference Is necessary from an empirical point 
of view* Otherwise, the attempt to Isolate and relate the 
pertinent balanoe-of-payments elements will appear quite 
disjointed. 
Balance on Current Account 
From Table 1 it is statistically evident that 
Brazil enjoyed surplus merchandise trade balances through* 
L « t »o.t of th. timo p.riod of this study with • » * « . . j 
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noted in 1952, I960, and 1962. It is else evident that 
the surplus** were generally larger from the late 19^0« s 
to the aid 1950* s than from the mid 1950*s to the early 
1960»s. 
Although It is trot la reference to this earlier 
period that a relatively amall surplus and a substantial 
deficit were experienced is 1951 and 1952 respectively, 
It cannot ho said that these developments reflected a 
weakening of Brasll's competitive trade posture at the 
time. Rather, they resulted tor the most part from the 
disruptive effects of the Korean War, which led to the 
accumulation of certain critical import Items in Brazil, 
Stocks vera accumulated since a breakdown is supply 
channels from developed countries involved in the war was 
anticipated, Apart from this isolated two-year time Span, 
substantial merchandise trade surpluses were consistently 
enjoyed throughout this earlier period* 
With reference to the later period, trade 
surpluses did sharply decline culminating In the deficit 
balances of I960 and 1962« this general trend was 
broken only by the Isolated recovery in 1961 and a 
similar recovery at the end of the period, 1963. In 
contrast to the difficulties experienced in 1951-1952, 
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this deterioration vat basically structural in nature 
and did depict a steady weakening of Bratil* a external 
trade posture •* 
Despite tha faat that Braall anjoyed merchandise 
trada surpluses throughout the sixteen«*year tlma span 
apart from tha thraa annual exceptions noted above* large 
defieit balances on current account vara nevertheless 
Incurred—again with tha exception of three small surplus 
balances in 1950, 1953, and 1956* Unilateral transfers 
abroad afforded a partial explanation, but for tha moat 
part, Braail'a ourrent aooount problems vara attributable 
to tha consistent and significant deficit balances 
ariaing from service transactions (fables 1 and 2), 
From 194$ to I960 unilateral transfers abroad 
exceeded transfers into Brasil from abroad, but these 
deficit balances were clearly of minor significance 
compared to the corresponding balances of service imports 
2 
over service exports* From 1961 to 1962 a reversal of 
Hations, Economic Commission for Latin 
America, "The Growth and Decline of Import Substitution 
in Braail,* Economic Bulletin for Latin America, IX, 13. 
2In the former case tha largest debit balance 
(I960) amounted to only $15 million, whereas in the 
latter tha largest debit balanoe (195D exceeded $500 
million (fable ! ) • 
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trend took plaoe with regard to unilateral transfera, 
but tha resulting surplus balances vera far from auf-
fioiant to offset the large service import balances• In 
reference to the latter, Brazil neither achieved nor oven 
approached a surplus during the entire postwar era. As 
such, service transactions acted as large consistent 
drains on Brasilia scarce foreign exchange receipts. 
As far as the deficits In total service trans-
actions are concerned, no meaningful pattern of flue* 
tuation is discernible for the postwar era. The else of 
tha deficits increased from 19£i9 to 1951* at which time 
tha postwar peak was reached j they generally declined 
from 1951 to 1958, increased again from 1958 to I960* 
and decreased again from I960 to 1963 (tables 1 and 2)* 
The more Interesting characteristic of this time series 
Is not the pattern of fluctuations Itself but rather the 
relatively narrow range within which the deficits actually 
fluctuated. 
The major components of this postwar deficit in 
total services were transportation expenditures and 
Interest and dividend payments on foreign investments 
(Table 3). Their combined contributions to the total 
annual deficits experienced during the sixteen-year 
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period at no time fall below Sl*k VV cent and actually 
ranged as high as 62.8 par cent (Table 4 ) . The annual 
deficits arising from the former vera the larger of the 
two from 1948 to 1955* *ut from 1956 to 1963 the rtwr** 
was true. Combining to produce this change in the 
composition of the "service" deficits vera the steady 
decline in transportation deficits from 1954 to 1962 and 
the general increase in the deficits arising from invest-
ment returns from 1955 to 1962.* 
Although the rising deficits from minor service 
transactions9 both public and private, did make increasing 
contributions to the large total serrice deficits during 
this later period (Tables 3 and ij.), the only major con-
tribution in this regard was made by the rising deficits 
from investment returns. The extent of this contribution 
is revealed by the fact that approximately $0 per cent 
of the $14.10 million deficit on service account in 1962 
resulted from the net outflow of interest and dividend 
payments on foreign capital. Because of the relevance of 
this observation with respect to the central dissertation 
^Although Tables 27 and 28 reveal a substantial 
reduction in the net outflow of interest and dividend 
payments in 1963# this statistic is a preliminary 
estimate and is most likely understated. 
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problem, the Impact of the same is fully investigated in 
Chapter IV. 
Balance on Capital Account 
The large deficit balances from service trans-
actions, experienced throughout the time period of this 
study, are particularly relevant in explaining the problems 
encountered within the capital account • During the 
earlier part of the period, the requirement to attract 
new foreign capital was not consistently great* Brasilia 
merchandlae trade posture was sufficiently strong to 
produce sisable trade surpluses generally offsetting the 
service deficits. Apart from the isolated difficulties 
encountered in 1951-1952, other years were characterized 
by either relatively small current account deficits or by 
actual current account surpluses. 
Deterioration in Brazil's merchandise trade posture 
froa the mid 1950f s to the early I960* s combined with the 
large service deficits mentioned above, did, however, 
result in consistently large current account deficits 
requiring an Increasingly large net inflow of foreign 
capital. Since non-compensatory capital was generally 
insufficient to fill the gap, Brasil was forced to depend 
L to an increasing extent on compensatory financing (fable 1). 
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Ho attempt li made In this chapter to compare 
the ratoi of change in the Inflow of non-compensatory 
capital to thoae of compensatory oapltal nor to assoss 
the implications of the same. The disturbing effect8 of 
the former on Brasil's external balanoo and debt service 
capacity are appropriately treated In Chapter III, and 
the role of the latter as a moans of external adjustment 
la similarly treated in Chapter IT* Furthermore, no 
attempt ia made to measure the outflow of amortisation 
on previously accumulated debt in relation to the inflow 
of new oapltal nor to aaaeaa the burden of the former on 
external balance. These considerations are organic to 
the development of Chapter IV. 
Bran before these critical analytical consider*-
ationa are investigated in subsequent chapters, however, 
it ia statistically evident from Table 1 that extensive 
increases in the net Inflow of foreign oapltal were 
required during this later period. From a simple sta-
tistical comparison &t the four-year time period from 
1956 to I960 to the first four years (19^8-1952) of the 
earlier time span (Table 5), the sharp structural change 
in Brazil's balance of payments comes clearly into focus* 
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The change In question was the substantial reduction 
Is the contribution of expert* to foreign exchange 
earnings and the considerable increase In capital 
flows
 f ibis means that during the first period 
development was based on the growth of the export 
sector, whereas in the seoond period the lack of 
growth in that sector had to be off set by a sub-
stantlal inflow of•••compensatory foreign capital.-1 
In the comparison of these two time periods in Table 5# 
the first characterised by a healthy export market and 
favorable shifts in terms of trade and the second by 
stagnating exports and termc-of-trade deterioration, it is 
also obvious that significant increases were recorded ixi 
both the gross inflow and the gross outflow of capital. 
Average annual capital receipts and expenditures amounted 
to $Jtf million and $80 million respectively during the 
earlier period and $483 million and #318 million respec-
tively during the later period. Sot only were the 
absolute increases in both levels noteworthy but also the 
fact that Bresil shifted from a net creditor position on 
capital account to that of net debtor. In producing this 
shift, clearly, the reversal of external fortunes during 
the intermediate period (1953-1955) i» the form of export 
stagnation and terms-of-trade deterioration was of 
^United nations. Economic Commission for Latin 
America, nfhm Growth ana Decline of Import Substitution in 
Brazil/ Economic Bulletin for Latin America, ix, 15. 
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fhe substantial Increase 1B gross capital receipts 
was not eolaly attributable to currant account datarlor-
ation, however—at laaat not directly* The necessity of 
attracting capital at commercial rataa tor purpoaaa of 
axtarnal adjustment aa wall aa for purpoaaa of continued 
davalopmont produced an increasingly heavy axtarnal dabt 
aarrlca burden, which* In turn, produced an Increasingly 
wide gap between groaa capital inflowa and net capital 
inflows* The algnlfioanca of the debt service burden In 
thia regard forma the nucleus of the analytical approach 
In subsequent chapters• 
Concluding Remarks 
The contention may be raised that a study of this 
type, focusing on Brazilt a external Imbalance in general 
and on the country*i external debt service problems In 
particular, is relatively unimportant since Internal growth 
and development vera impressive throughout most of the 
postwar era, despite these external problems* It Is true 
that Brasil did, In fact, make substantial progress in 
the attainment of these domestic long-term goals through-
out the late a$0*a* the 1950»at and the early 1960«s* 
L Growth in gross domestic product averaged £*8 per cent , 
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per annum during this time period, a phenomenon which 
lends support to the contention above* However* from 
1961, when the peak growth rate of 7#7 P « o*nt was 
attained, through 1963, the pendulum swung in the 
opposite direetion* In 1962 growth in average domestic 
produot dropped to 5.2 per cent, and in 1963 the lowest 
postwar growth rate (2.1 per sent) was experienced. This 
two-year period was also characterized by accelerated 
deterioration in Brazilta balance-of-payments position, 
with increased pressure exerted on scarce foreign 
resources arising from pre-scheduled external debt service 
obligations* 
Among Brasilia** policymakers evidence of stagnating 
growth did signal renewed interest in the country's ex-
ternal problems of imbalance. Also, it has prompted the 
United Nations to point out that although 
the external sector has been playing an increasingly 
minor role in the growth of the domes tie economy... 
this dees not mean that foreign trade has ceased to 
be a key factor in the country's economic development* 
on the contrary, its relatively stagnant state has 
been a serious obstacle which...was instrumental in 
stagnating the growth rate in 1962 and 1963 *nd 
hastening the inflationary process.1 
United nations, Economic Commission for Latin 
America, Soonomio Survey of Latin Americat 1963 
(Sew York: tfnited nations, 1963) * p» lo, 
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 fhe extent of this relationship between external n 
imbalance on one band and stagnating growth and chronic 
inflation on the other ia not the concern of thia paper. 
The significant point to be made front this observation 
above and from what follows in subsequent chapters is 
that Brazil* s external imbalance during the time period 
of this study is indeed worthy of concentrated study and 
that the extent of this serious imbalance Is host 
revealed by a focus on Brazil's external debt service 
problems* 
r
 CHAPTER I I I H 
BALAHCE-OF-PAYMENTS DISTURBANCE IN 
THE BRAZILIAN EXPERIENCE 
The objective of this chapter is to determine the 
degree of disturbance In Bra*ll»e balance of payment! from 
19UB to 1963• Souroee of diaturbanoe are examined, how-
evcr, only insofar as, and to the extent that, each affected 
Brazil's external debt service oapaoity daring this time 
period* 
Slnoe the adequacy of foreign exchange receipts 
determines whether a debtor country can successfully 
finance import requirements and external debt obligations 
over time, healthy export growth is essential if periodic 
liquidity crises are to be avoided* Although the actual 
determination of whether liquidity crises have occurred 
In the Brasillan experience is made in succeeding chapters 
after the Import and external debt structures of Brazil 
have boon thoroughly analysed, the empirical groundwork Is 
established in this chapter. Regardless of the else of 
the external debt burden, liquidity crises can be avoided 
if a debtor country*s export posture is sufficiently 
healthy. It Is the purpose of this chapter, In part, to 
L assess the health of the Brasillan export market from j 
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r19l*8 to 1963. To achieve this purpose, fluctuation* In n 
export volume and In export price* are statistically 
measured* Also, a commodity-by-oommodity breakdown of 
the Braslllan export structure la accomplished for the 
purpose of measuring the degree of export concentration or 
diversification over time. Finally, measurements are made 
of changes in the share of growth commodities (i. ©., 
those for which international demand may be expected to 
be consistently strong in the long run) in total exports. 
Regardless of the stability of the export market 
and the regularity of resulting external receipts, however, 
the capacity of any debtor country to successfully service 
a rigidly contracted external debt program is adversely 
affected by sudden increases In Importation arising not 
from preanticipated developmental or subsistence needs 
but from unanticipated Inflationary and/or emergency 
conditions. Thus, the pattern of short-term fluctuations 
in importation must bo discerned in order to Isolate the 
disturbing effects of this latter type. This is accom-
plished In this chapter by a category-by-category break-
down of the Braslllan Import structure and by a statistical 
measurement of import fluctuations in each category. The 
secular trends of importation are also measured in order 
Lto ascertain the adequacy of external receipts arising j 
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from the growth of exportation* Fluctuations In import n 
volume and la import prices are considered, and the 
lattor aro compared to changes in export prices for the 
purpose of measuring shifts in Brazil's terms of trade. 
Shifts is the terms of trade are properly treated 
as further sources of disturbance in Brazil*s balance of 
payments. It is clear that a debtor country could support 
a given level of Importation despite declining export 
quantum and rising debt service commitments if favorable 
shifts In the terms of trade were of sufficient magnitude* 
On the other hand, a given level of importation and a 
fixed schedule of debt service obligations could become 
unsupportable even during periods of expanding exportation 
assuming unfavorable shifts in the terms of trade of 
sufficient magnitude. It is also the purpose of this 
chapter to measure shifts in the Brazilian terms of trade 
from 194$ *o 1963 and to ascertain to what extent such 
shifts either favorably or adversely affected external 
debt service capacity. 
Swings In capital flows are the final sources of 
balance-of-payments disturbance considered In this chapter. 
The focus, of course, Is on fluctuations in non-compensatory 
capital. Sinee compensatory capital flows clearly qualify 
L J 
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as elements of balanee-of-paymsnta adjustment rathar 
than as elements of disturbance, they aro mora appro* 
priately treated in Chapter V. This chapter considers 
only those elements of disturbance which* whan combined 
with external debt service rigidity, produce liquidity 
oriaee necessitating adjustment. 
Disturbances Arising from Fluctuations 
H U M — * — • — i iimjjmmmmmmmmmmtkmmmmmmim « n i i i " » i ' i » n 
in Commodity Exports 
Inasmuch as production for export provides the indis-
pensable foreign exchange the country must have in 
order to satisfy essential Import requirements [and 
to service foreign debts J, this type of economlo 
activity Is, of course, desirable as veil as necessary 
for the proper functioning of the Brasilia© economy,! 
Since Import requirements and external debt service 
obligations did substantially increase during the time 
period of this study, as will subsequently be revealed, 
export growth was indeed of orltleal importance. XTnfor* 
tunately, this period was characterized by general export 
stagnation* 
A sharp decline In export quantum was experienced 
from 191$ until 195k, *t which time ttus postwar trough was 
reached. From 19$k *Q 1963 slow improvement was in evidence, 
4an American Union* Bconomio Developments In 
Brasil. 19k9~1950» A Report Prepared oy the bivision of 
Economic Research (Washington, D. O.f Pan American Union, 
L1950), p. 37. J 
no 
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ryet the earlier 19W> level was recovered only during the 
last year of the period, 1963 (Table 6 ) . 1 Despite the 
decline in quantum during the earlier period, however, 
export values actually rose. The quantum effect was more 
than offset by increases in export prices which advanced 
steadily, reaching a peak in 19£if« 
In contrast to this earlier trend, export prices 
generally declined from 1955 *® 1963, again more than off-
setting the slight rise in export volume; as a result, 
export values declined, although this decline was irreg-
ular, neither the 1951 »or the 195*1 P**& *** recovered by 
1963 (Table 6)» Clearly, during the entire postwar period, 
fluctuations in export prices were consistently more sig-
nificant than fluctuations in export volume in determining 
net changes in Brazil's capacity to import and to service 
external debt. 
Although the general export stagnation suffered 
between 1955 * M 1963 **&* primarily produced by deteri-
oration in Brasilta coffee market abroad, deteriorating 
markets for ths country1 s other two traditionally important 
because of the distinct and diverse conditions 
relating to both, it is convenient and analytically 
revealing to separately consider these two time periods, 
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export products (i. e.. cocoa and cotton) were Also 
significantly disturbing In this regard. She degree of 
disturbance arising from the combined market deterioration 
for all three should not be surprising, however, since at 
no time during the entire sixteen-year time span did their 
combined share in total export values fall below 60 per cent 
(Table 7). The disturbing effect of each on Import and debt 
service capacity warrants separate treatment as well as a 
measurement of the combined impact* 
Subsequent sections deal not only with the market 
difficulties suffered from 1955 to 1963 but also with the 
market expansions of the preceding period (1948-1951*) • 
This is done for parpo$»9 of contrast as well as for 
purposes of emphasising the strong link between Brazil's 
over~all export posture and the market performance of 
these principal export commodities* 
Disturbances arising from fluctuations 
in coffee exports 
In spite of the fundamental changes and extraordinary 
economic development which have taken place in Brazil 
during the last hundred years its export trade does not 
seem to have undergone any appreciable structural 
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 modification, and continues to depend basically on n 
coffee.1 
It ii statistically obvious that BraailU external 
trade fortunes continued to be eloaely tied to the coffee 
export market during the post-World War II era* Increase• 
in coffee prices from 19k$ to 1951; contributed greatly to 
Brazil's postwar improvements in its capacity to import 
and to repay external debt, and the subsequent deteri-
oration in coffee prices after 1951$. signaled the rapid 
decline in Brazil's capacity to finance Its import needs 
and to discharge its external obligation*• 
She phenomenal increase in coffee prices which 
substantially improved the nation* s export posture be-
tween 1949 *»d 1951*. resulted from th* fact that world 
demand outstripped world supply* The cause of this 
disequilibrium can be traced to earlier developments. 
With the restoration of world demand for eoffee 
between 19$$ *»d 19$9# the expected price recovery did 
not immediately materialise. Although new production did 
halted nations. Coffee In Latin America< 
Productivity Problems and Future Prospects* II
 f Fart lt 
A Report Prepared by the J^olnt Agricultural Division of 
the Economic Commission for Latin America and Food and 
Agriculture Organisation of the tFnited nations (Mexico* 
United nations, I960), 12. 
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lag behind the rise In world demand during this period, 
production deficiencies were offset by the depletion of 
previously accumulated stocks, particularly in Brazil. 
By 19^9* however, Brazilian stocks were exhausted and 
demand commenced to outstrip supply. 
Pespite the degree of the price rise between 19^9 
and 1951*.* oof fee output in Brazil, as well as in other 
producer countries, was surprisingly unresponsive* In 
part, the price inelasticity of supply reflected the 
peculiarities of coffee planting itself* Because of the 
time lag involved between the planting period and the 
period of fruitation, supply is unable to respond immed-
iately to price stimulation regardless of the Inducement 
factor.1 
For the most part* however* the unresponsive 
coffee output of this period reflected the unwillingness 
of coffee farmers to believe that the glutted world coffee 
market* which had persisted since the 1930's* had actually 
come to an end. From past experiences farmers were 
conditioned to expect deficient not excessive demand for 
^frees bear fruit in two to four years if planted 
as seedlings and in four to five years if planted from 
seeds * 
L J 
their produot.1 n 
If the coffee industrial of BraeII, and to a leseer 
extent of the other countries of Central and 
South America, had not been depressed for fifteen 
and more years, the farmers would have responded 
much quicker to a postwar rise in the price level, 
and to obtain a given Increase in production the 
price would not have needed to rise as much as it 
did.* 
Had it not been for huge coffee stockpile during 
the immediate postwar years (19^5-19if9), which, of course, 
resulted from excessive coffee production throughout the 
1930'• and early 19lf0's, "coffee prices would have re-
covered earlier and at a more gradual pace; an adequate 
increase In supply would have thus been facilitated •" 3 
Unfortunately, accumulated stocks only served to mask 
supply deficiencies during this earlier period leading 
the way towards the eventual price explosion between 
19^9 *»<* I9$k* 
*JT» V, F. Rowe, fhe World*g Coffee (London: 
Her Majesty* e Stationery Office* 19&3J* P« IS* 
%bid> 
^United nations, Analysis and Projections of 
Economic Development* The isconomic Development or Brazil. 
A Report Prepared by the loint Working droup of the 
Banco Haolonal do Desenvolvlmento Economico of Brazil 
and the Economic Commission for Latin America of the 
toited Nations (lew forks fnlted Nations, 1956), p# 96. 
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Because of the length and degree of the price 
rise, however, substantial increases in world production 
eventually followed not only in Brazil but in all coffee 
exporting countries (Table 8). In Brazil, in particular, 
this delayed rise in coffee production during the mid 
1950»s 
resulting from the sustained profitability of this 
crop was further stimulated by the successful 
introduction of new planting and cultivation tech-
niques and by the breeding of superior varieties of 
coffee types,1 
Unfortunately, Intensive land speculation and indiscrim-
inate coffee planting was encouraged to the extent that 
world supply again grew to exceed demand* Coffee prices 
were, therefore* depressed (Table 9), and Brazil suffered 
substantial reductions In the value of coffee exports, 
particularly from 1956 to 1958 (Table 10)* Although 
Brazilian coffee prices fell steadily from 195*4 to 1959, 
Increased export quantum offset the price effect on 
export values between 1954 and* 1956. From 1956 to 1958, 
however, declines in volume served to compound the effect 
of declining prices in this regard (Tables 10 and 11). 
ItJnlted nations, The World Coffee Economy, A 
Report Prepared by the Food and Agricultural Organization 
(Rome: tJnited nations, 1961), p. 12. 
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Despite the fact that overproduction persisted is 
Brasil and Is other producer countries throughout the late 
1950fs and early 1960fst a reasonable degree of price 
stability was achieved between 1959 and 1963. Price 
corrosion vas partially checked as a result of Braslllan 
stockpiling efforts.1 Although the holding operation vas 
successful In preventing substantial declines in foreign 
exchange earnings from coffee sales during this period, 
it is true that Brazil's coffee export values at the end 
of the period (1963) remained significantly below peak 
levels reached during the early and mid 19£0's (Table 10)• 
The failure of these stockpiling efforts to 
produce a stronger price effect over this period ia 
attributable to the lack of cooperation on the part of 
other producer countries. There was, in effect, a general 
unwillingness to follow Brazil's lead in this regard*2 
Bad these other producers withheld their output from the 
The extent of this effort Is reflected in the fact 
that approximately 55 million bags ware accumulated between 
1958 and 1962. See Howe, QP T clt». pp. 29*30. I*urther 
elaboration on coffee controi measures through domestic 
public policy or through international agreement would be 
Inappropriate in this chapter. These adjustment measures 
are# however, properly assessed in Chapter V. 
%bld. 
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world market to the cane extent, It Is likely that the 
world ooffee price would have significantly recovered from 
the 1959 trough* On the other hand, had Brazil * thrown 
all her supplies on the market, the price would certainly 
bar. ootpl.t.ly oollap..d.»l 
Is part, the foreign exchange difficulties of 
Brazil during the latter part of the sixteen-year time 
period resulted from "the failure of world demand to rise 
more than at a very moderate rate"2 in response to general 
prloe declines. Of course, the world demand for ooffee 
has been historically characterized by a high degree of 
prloe inelasticity. 
Consumption appears to he more affected by changes In 
Income and standards of living than by changes in 
price. Moreover, the price of exports of unroasted 
coffee Is but a small part of the retail price paid 
by the final consumer..,and thus even a large change 
In export prices results in a relatively small change 
in retail prices.3 
Although it Is true that coffee consumption Is a 
habit which does not respond elastieally to price changes, 
the effect of the phenomenally high prices of the early 
1950* s did prove to be the exception in this regard. 
%»lted nationst The World Coffee Economy, p. 7. 
^4**$ OP» olt.. p. 2ij.. 
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 Consumer habit a vera affected (i. e.# mora cups were n 
brewed par pound)1 and even though prices deolined 
sharply later In the decade, con Burners did not revert 
back to their former habit* that la to say, lower pricee 
did not load to a corresponding increase in the strength 
of coffee par oup. Since this change In taste resulting 
frost earlier price increases carried over to the subse-
quent period of declining prices, producer countries were 
adversely affected. 
Apart from conditions on the demand side of the 
coffee market, it la evident that Brazil's relative market 
position during the latter part of the time period under 
study was adversely affected by the reluctance on the part 
of other producer countries to cooperate in price stabil-
isation measures through stock accumulation and export 
restriction. Table 12 reflects the faet that Brazil's 
share of the world market generally declined during this 
period (i« e«, increases In the volume of coffee exports 
from other producer countries generally outstripped 
Brazilian coffee sales)• 
It la also statistically evident (table 7) that 
general declines In Brazilian coffee export values from 
*!!!£•* p* 25. 
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1953 to 1963 were aeeompanied by corresponding declines 
In the share of ooffoe in total Brazilian export values* 
From a level of 70*6 per cent reached in 1953 coffee*a 
share foil to 53.2 per cent Is 1963. This v&a in contrast 
to the sharp rise of this share during the earlier period 
frost ij.l«6 pw oent (19l*£) to the extraordinarily high 1953 
level mentioned above. 
Plsturbaneea arising from fluctuations 
in cocoa exporte 
The contribution of cocoa exports to Brasll* s ex** 
ternal earnings generally increased from the end of World 
Mar XI to 1954» Of prinelpal importance in this regard 
were the sustained increases is the priee of ooooa on the 
international market. After a long recession in ooooa 
prices, which lasted from 193? to 191*5* prices increased 
abruptly, and from 19Jj»? to 195U this high level was 
maintaln.d.l Only 1 B 1*9 did eoooa pric.B OP the Inter-
national market temporarily dip* 
On the strength of such price improvement, 'the 
share of ooooa exports in total export values rose from 
4.9 por oent in 1949 to 8,7 pw oent In 1954 (fable 7)« 
United Nations, Analysis _ and Provestlona of 
Economic Development I fhe loontolo development of Brasil, 
P» ®9» j 
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Since *a prlnoipal feature of the 0000a market la that 
the world demand la inelastic Its the high-income Importing 
natione, which are the main consumers," * the substantial 
prloe increase from 19k$ to I9k7 and the relatively high 
level maintained until 195k did not significantly affect 
export volumes exoept from 1950 to 1952* the decline 1B 
0000a exporta during this brief time apan la attributable 
to the degree of the 0000a prloe increase during the pre-
ceding period (19k5-19k9)* 
Vlth reapect to the degree of demand inelaetlclty 
for coooa on the International market, distinction muet be 
made between the two prlnoipal uses of the product. The 
world demand for 0000a as a final product la highly in-
elaatle ainee there are no oloae substitutes. However, 
aa a raw material, substitution for 0000a la poaaible and, 
therefore, demand tends to be more elaatle. In reaction 
to sustained prloe Increases, aa was evidenced between 1947 
and 1914-9. it la logical to assume that manufacturers who 
use 0000a aa a raw Ingredient were induced to replace the 
coooa content of their product with appropriate substitutes. 
the period from 1955 to 1963 was characterized by 
steadily declining 0000a prices. Other than the temporary 
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price recovery In 1957 # this decline proceeded without n 
exception (Table 9). Th* price effect on cocoa export 
values was significant, but unlike the coffee situation, 
price declines were accompanied by general but irregular 
declines in eocoa sales throughout this period. 
From the peak postwar level of $347.5 million 
(1954) «*port values declined sharply during the two 
following years after which they reeoveredj increases 
were recorded in 1957 a»d i» 195$ • Subsequent to this 
moderate recovery, however, export values again fell 
sharply to a trough of $41.1 million in 1962* Despite a 
slight rise in 1963, export value during this last year 
of the period remained below the level reached during the 
first year, 194®» Because of an isolated spurt in eocoa 
sales and a temporary price recovery in 1959, cocoa's 
share in total export values attained a peak of 9*3 
per cent* Subsequent price/quantum reductions reduced 
this share substantially to 3.4 P*** ©«nt in 1962* 
The fatt that ^mm^, did not respond to price 
reductions during this period is not surprising* As was 
mentioned before, demand for cocoa is price inelastic, 
Furthermore, althou^i the market for Brazilian eocoa is 
primarily in high income countries, this does not justify 
L J 
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the conclusion that It la income elastic. The consumption 
pattern of cocoa in these countries aeema to indicate that 
an early saturation point la peached beyond which Income 
demand becomes quite inelastic* In the case of the 
United States, statistics reveal that during the post-
World Mar II era* 
in spite of the considerable increase in the income 
available for consumer spending...» the pw capita 
consumption of cocoa remained almost constant; 
increased imports covered only the amount required to 
meet the needs of population growth.1 
World demand for Brazilian cocoa from 1955 to 1962 
failed to respond to price reductions* not only because of 
price and income inelasticity of demand but also because 
of the Inferior nature of the Brazilian product* Vest 
African cocoa, "which Is of better quality than 
Brazilian/2 increased its share of the world market 
through this period of cocoa price reductions. 
Encouraged by their competitive advantage, 
Western African cocoa growers expanded their operations 
towards the end of the 1950'a and contributed to the 
overproduction of cocoa which persisted through 1963 and 
Economist Intelligence tTnltf Quarterly Economic 
Review; Brasll* #©• 23 (September. 1957J» p» 5* 
L J 
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 which &mpv***& prices from their already low levels. 
Despite the fact that world demand for cocoa 1B 1959 
began to pick up In response to loir prices,1 overpro-
duction was such that the gap between production and 
consumption was not bridged by 1963. 
Since coffee was quantitatively more important 
than cocoa in Brazil's export structure during the time 
period of this study, the disturbing effect of sharp 
periodic declines in cocoa receipts on the country's 
capacity to finance imports and to honor external debt 
service commitments was less severe than in the ease of 
the former* However, whereas the effect of coffee price 
deterioration on coffee receipts was somewhat buffered 
between 1955 and 1963 as the result of general increase 
in export quantum (fable 11), cocoa price deterioration 
was accompanied by an irregular but general decline in 
quantum (Tables 9 and 11)• As a result, cocoa receipts 
during this period of chronic external imbalance did 
decline at a faster rate than coffee receipts. 
^-Economist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic 
Ravlewi Brasllf Ho. 33 (February, I960Jt p. 6. 
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Disturbances wising from fluctuations 
in cotton exports 
Brazilian exportation of agricultural and non-
agricultural raw materials has historically ranked second 
to food exports In earning foreign exchange* Haw cotton 
has historically ranked first among raw material exports 
and second among total exports. From 19I4B to 1952* how* 
ever, the quantum of raw cotton exports fell drastically 
by 89.1 per cent (Table 11)» fhis was the main con* 
trlbutlng factor in the decline of total Brazilian exports 
during this period (35*3 p^r cent from the 19lj.8 level). 
Also* as a result of this sudden drop in sales, the share 
of cotton exports in total export values fell from 15*6 
per cent in 19J|8 to 2*k pmr cent in 1952. Although 
TO1U>» .*!•. did r.oov,r 1» 1953 * * 19&* 1 the .ha*, 
of this critical export commodity in total exportation 
did not regain its 191*5 peak. 
In part, the decline in cotton exportation during 
this period can be attributed to decreased production 
(fable 13) • Of greater significance, howeverf was the 
substantial increase in domestic consumption which 
combined with the declining production to drastically 
% n 195if the volume of cotton sales exceeded the 
19^ fl level by 19.6 pw cent (fable 11). 
L J 
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reduce the exportable surplus. From the period 19i|.0~19i|£ 
to the period 19^9~1953# average annual cotton production 
decreased from i*29#000 to 1$,08,000 tons while average annual 
consumption increased from 205*000 to 292,000 tons, Shis 
latter phenomenon can be easily explained by the growth 
of the domestic textile industry in Brazil. Ironically, 
the birth of this same industry in other developing 
countries during this early postwar period was instrumental 
not merely it* reducing demand for Brazilian cotton exports 
but more importantly in reducing world demand for this 
commodity in general. Bather than stimulating the demand 
for raw cotton, •the development of ootton textile in* 
dustries in many underdeveloped countries led them to 
encourage the domestic cultivation of cotton."* 
Obviously, the impact of such extensive import substi-
tution vas felt not only in large exporting tenters of 
cotton fabrics such as Britain and Japan but also in 
primary producing countries such as Brazil, which his* 
torieally had supplied the raw material* 
The declining world trade in raw ootton and cotton 
fabrics during this postwar period was, in part, the 
^United nations* Analysis and Projections of 
Booncmic Development! the economic Development or Brazil, 
p« 88 « 
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 result of income inelasticity in demand for cottons n 
among high income countries. In the ease of Europe, 
recovering under the Marshall Plan, higher national 
income levels did not induce corresponding increases in 
the importation of ootton. In fact, despite this recovery 
in Brasll's principal cotton market, cotton sales fell 
from $l81j.,2 million in 19l$ to $3^-3 million in 1952 • 
In 195l~1952 cotton exports to Burope fell ao sharply 
that it became necessary for Brazil to accumulate stocks1 
despite increased domestic consumption, 
She progress of import substitution in developing 
OOI^Itries involving the growth of textile industries and 
the domestic cultivation of raw cotton only partially 
explains this phenomenon. For the most part, the income 
inelasticity in demand for cotton during this period was 
the result of the Increase in popularity of rayon, a 
synthetic substitute for cotton, among high income 
countries. Brazil suffered not only from this reduction 
in the demand for ootton In general but also from a lose 
1B its share in this declining market* In explaining 
Brazil*s reduced status in the international cotton 
United Kations, Economic Commission for Latin 
Amerie*, loosiomie Survey of leMn Amertea, 1951-1953 
{Hew Torfct trttiiod nations, 195ii)» p# 108. 
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n**fe*t during this time ipt&* partial blame should be n 
placed on United States trade polio? under the Marshall 
Plan* From 19^9 to the aid X950'» 
funda or eredit ware used to encourage exports of 
United States sotton. She of foot* of this polioy 
vera mainly apparent in Western Germany and Japan, 
whloh had been the principal markets for Brazilian 
ootton bef©ro the war.l 
Of toe three principal Brazilian export commodities 
only cotton la oharaoteriaed by a relatively high elasticity 
of supply. Stagnating cotton production from the and of 
World War II until the mid 1950' a was not the result of 
land soareity nor resource deficiencies of any type* 
Actually, the problem as was shown above emanated from 
the demand aide of the market* As &m#m& fell, the price 
level woo depreaaed and production was discouraged. 
From 1955 to 1963 the pattern of raw ootton ex-
portation from Braail was clearly discernible* Bxport 
values decreased steadily without exception from 1955 to 
1958 (Table 10). Accompanying this decline were corre-
sponding decreases in both the price and quantum of 
ootton exports (Tables 9 9^ ID* Etaring this time span 
oxport value fall from $131 *k million to $55.5 million
 $ 
^Unitod Rations, Analysis and Projections of 
Bconomio Development; The Economic Development of Brazil, 
L P* 8 8 - ' ' J 
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 and export volume f©11 from 17&#00© a i M e %m* to i&*00O n 
metric tens. Unlike comparable but less regular declines 
in coffee and cocoa export valuea, volume declines in 
cotton exportation were relatively more significant than 
the moderate price erosion. 
Got ton exportation during this time period in 
question was roatrioted to a limitod extent by prodmotioa 
problems arising from adverse seasonal and climatic 
conditions, pwtiwlarly it* 195? m& 1958 # ®Xt was 
necessary to prohibit exports during certain months of 
these years in order to give priority to domestic 
consumption."1 The significance of these supply problems 
should not be overstated, however. Cotton production 
did decline fraai 19%$ to 1958 but at * slower rate and 
to a lesser extent than that of cotton exportation. From 
1958 to 1963 the rate of increase in the latter out-
stripped that of the former only in 1961 (Table 13)* 
Price inelasticity of demand for raw cotton continued to 
characterize the market in that the price erosion had no 
appreciable effect on world demand fox* the product. 
-^United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin 
America, Economic Survey of Latin America: 1958 
(Mexiooi limited Nations, 1959) , p. 33* 
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A* a result of the rapid deterioration in cotton n 
imports between 1955 *nd 1958* cotton*a share in total 
Brasilian export values was drastically reduced. Prom a 
postwar peak of 14.3 par cent attained in 1 9 % this share 
fall to 2#1 par aant in 1958 • 
the effeot of prolonged price erosion in cotton 
prises* which actually began in 1951, was finally fait in 
1959» Demand raoovery produced a reversal of fraud* and 
Brazilian cotton export values increased steadily to 1962. 
Increased world importation of cotton did not appreciably 
increase prices during this time span—rather, demand 
increases induced corresponding increases in production 
end exportation. Brazilian export values increased from 
$36^6 million in 195f to $117*6 million in 1963* and 
export volume increased from 77.6 thousand to 221*6 
thousand metric tons (Table 13)« Cotton's share in 
total Brazilian export values increased from 2.1 pmr cent 
in 1958 to 9*5 p**» **»t in 1963 (ts&le ?)• 
Despite this improvement In both the value and 
volisao of ootton exports bstwean 1958 sjid 19631 the 
earlier peak levals reached in 195^ ****** »©t *v*n closely 
approached (Tables 12 end 13)* The observation made in 
the two previous sections relating to the sharp declines 
L in the valma of eoffas and eoooa exports between 1955 J 
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 and 1963 can also be made In the ease of cotton* Declines 
is external receipt* from cotton sales were of major im-
portance in contributing to the chronic external imbalance 
which persisted throughout this period* Whereas cocoa 
receipts declined most sharply from 1959 to 1963 as a 
result of declines In both prise and volume, cotton 
receipts declined most sharply between 1955 *&& 1956 for 
the same reasons* The effect of both on external balance 
lias strongly reinforced, of coarse* by the steady decline 
in coffee receipts throughout the entire time period* 
concentration in Brazil'a 
export structure 
Although Brazil remained heavily dependent upon 
export markets for coffee, cotton, and cocoa throughout 
the time period of this study* there was some evidence of 
greater export diversification. 
As far as food exports were concerned, diversi-
fication was limited* for the most party to the Increased 
importance of sugar exports during the latter part of the 
pariod.l Pro* 1953 to 1963 the quantum of sugar export* 
^-Gertrude S* Keare, Bra&il.j Information for 
H* ;§* Businessmen, A Report Prepared for the uY S* Depart* 
mmxi m lemmeree ^Washington* tJ* S. dovemment Printing 
Office* 196l}> p* 160* 
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 increased by 105 pa* cent and export value by 223 per cent> 
Thus, despite the fact that the share ot coffee and cocoa 
ID total export values declined from 75.5 par cent In 1953 
to 56.8 per cent ID 1963 (Table 7), the share of total 
food items in total export values declined only from 80.1 
per cent to 68#9 por cent during this period (Tables 14 
and 15) • Increased sugar exports acted to buffer this 
latter decline. 
With respect to the earlier period of interest, 
it is true that the share of food items in total export 
values increased sharply from 59.9 por cent in 1948# the 
postwar trough to 81.8 per cent in 1952, the postwar peak 
(Table 15)* Superficially, it would appear that the 
&*gv** of commodity concentration with respect to those 
export products inoreased substantially, reducing the 
degree of flexibility In Brasil's export structure to a 
very great extent. For the most part, however, these 
figures reflect the explosive price increases in the 
coffee market and to a lesser extent the steady rise in 
cocoa prices during this period* It does not refloat an 
increase in the share of food items in total export 
volume since the volume of coffee and cocoa sales both 
generally declined (Table 11)• 
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 Qbmm*B la the eharo of raw materials In total i 
exports.---The fact that the share of food itama is total 
expert valuaa declined aharply from 1953 to 1963# despite 
tha buffaring affaat of increased sugar Imports, did 
refloat* of course, tha substantial prloa deterioration 
of ooffaa and ooeoa exports experienced during thla 
period, out it also reflected the increased exportation 
of certain agricultural and non-agricultural raw materials 
apart from tha previously discussed case of raw cotton* 
Ike share of total agricultural and non-agricultural 
ran materials1 in total export values increased signifi-
cantly from lBmk par cent 1B 1953 to 28.0 per cent in 1963* 
Over thla same time span the share of Brasil» a principal 
raw material export item, raw cotton, In total export 
values increased only frost 6*6 pm^ cent to 8«!t per cent 
(Table ?)• Clearly, the contributions of minor raw 
material exports in producing the former were quite 
substantial. 
S-fhe Standard International frade Classification 
was uaed in the categorisation of export commodities in 
the statistical appendix. Although tobacco, fuel/ 
lubricants, and animal and vegetable fats and oils are 
segregated from crude materials In Table 14, they are 
Included in the broad definition of agricultural and non-
agri cultural raw materials above. 
L _J 
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Specifically* the most spectacular contribution n 
to expert diversification during the entire time period 
of this study was made by the Increased exportation of 
Iron ore. Both the volume and the value of tela mineral 
ran material increased steadily throughout this period 
(Table 16). This upward trend, which actually started in 
the 1930'e, was particularly impressive is light of the 
substantial outlays of funds required to finance sash 
increases in exportation. 
Although the rates of increase in the volume and 
value of nen-fcrreus ore and concentrates were more 
sporadic and were not generally as greet as in the case 
of iron ore, the oversell growth performance was neverthe-
less impressive. The sharpest spurt was experienced 
during Item aid 1950»s when food exports began to decline 
both absolutely and relatively in importance. 
Pinewood is yet another raw material export 
product which made increasing contributions to Brasil* s 
external receipts throughout most of the time period of 
IMS study. Xn the early postwar years the experts of 
pine doubled from prewar levels, reaching a peak in 1951 
and declining only slightly from 1952 to 195^ (Table 16J.1 
United nations, Analysis and Projections of 
L- Bconomie Development* The Economic Development of Brazil» 
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 Subsequently, the quantum o* pine exports increased until n 
19571 at which time a postwar peak waa reached • Prom 1957 
to 1963 export Tolume declined deaplte the faet that price 
remained quite stable* Fluctuation* in export valuea 
paralleled the aforementioned fluctuations in quantum 
because of this price stability. 
tho reduoed relume and value of pine exports from 
1957 to 1963 resulted sot from demand deficiencies out from 
aupply restrietlons. the possibility of exhausting 
forestry reserves by continued increases in exportation, 
as was evidenced before 1957* ***t a shadow of doubt over 
toe advisability of such a tread* 
One agricultural raw material which made a sig-
nificant contribution to export diversification in the 
post-World Mar IX era is sisal. Cultivation of sisal in 
Braail for the export market waa first undertaken on a 
large scale in 19kh^ Before this time, sisal waa grown 
only on a smaller scale mostly for the purpose of domestic 
consumption. In the postwar era exportation expanded 
rapidly, reaching a peak is 1951J it then declined until 
1 9 0 from which time it increased steadily is both volume 
and value to 1963 (Table 16). 
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the increased significance of raw materials In 
Brmsil*s expert structure during the postwar year* is 
•ran mora impressive if raw tobacco and vegetable oils 
and fata are included,1 
Although tha export value of tobacco did sot 
aubatantially increase from 191*8 to 195?# a sharp rise 
was subsequently experienced* Overcoming a long period 
of stagnation which persisted until 1959* tha export 
valua of tobaeao sales increased from $15*7 million In 
1959 to $2!|..6 million In 1963, reflecting for tha most 
World demand for tha produet Increased substantially 
daring this parted and production responded* since 
relatively lour Inveatment outlays are needed to support 
Increased export demand. This, of oourae, Is In direct 
contrast to the heavy outlays necessary to expand the 
export capacity of moat mineral raw materials—Iron ore 
being a aaaa In point* 
ejs^eji ajpaja <•'• ^ PSJP jhr^js^p as- ^STJS ^ppjSf^p ^s^^wiF^p^av ^p^m " 0 * l j p w * ^p^e* ^^ejse***sft^p»dS»: ^MS<a%a 
vegetable oils and fats, not only did export value and 
volume generally rise, but the share of these raw 
material products in total export values also rose despite 
%ee footnote on page 132. 
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tha faat tha exportation of aalaala and vegetables 
generally atag»atad (Tab la a 34 •fid *£)• ** !• t*uaf 
however, that the rate of inoraaae of tha former was 
retarded by the problems experienoad by tha lattop. 
Boil all raw material exporta, of eourae, eon-
tributed to tha trand toward export diversification noted 
abora* This waa particularly evident In tha caaaa of 
fuala and lubricants and hides and akin a. 
Although laolatad lnoreaeea In tha axport valua 
of fuala and lubricants were an Joy ad from 1956 to 1961, 
thaaa lnoraaaaa wera not sustained, from a poatwar paak 
of $29 million in 1959 axport valua daolinad wall bolow 
$10 million In 1962*1963 (Tabla 14)« Since tha domestic 
demand for thaaa products lnoraaaad rapidly In Brazil 
throughout tha poatwar parlod, and aistaa domaatlc pro-
duction waa generally lnaufflolant to satisfy thaaa 
growing raqulrementa,1 exportation waa eeverely restricted. 
During tha early poatwar period* hi das and skins 
were Important cowmodltlea in Braail*a export atructura. 
I&roughout tha entire period, however, their Importance 
rapidly diminished. The valua of exports fall drastically 
3*11 will ba subsequently shown that fuala and 
lubricants contributed greatly to the rigidity of Brazil's 
Import structure* j 
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rtrm $35*8 millidn In 191*8 td $7.7 million in 1963 n 
(Table 16). Unable to overcoat the competition from 
plastic• and other synthetic substitutes, Bra*ilfs 
export market for hides and akin a steadily eroded In the 
face of diminished demand. In 1963 hides and skins could 
no longer be numbered among Bra*il*s principal raw material 
exports* 
Despite the decreased importance of these two raw 
material categories, the share of total raw materials in 
total export values did increase sharply from 1953 to 
1963, substantially offsetting deolines in the share of 
food items* The share of food and raw material items 
together In total export values decreased only from 99 
per cent in 1953b the postwar peak, to 96«9 p*v cent In 
1963 (fable 1$)* Unfortunately, for reasons to be die* 
cussed in the following section, export diversification 
was confined for the most part within the raw material 
category. 
Changes in the Bhare of manufactured items in total 
exports.~-0no indication of the degree of export diversi-
fication in a debtor country* a export structure is the 
share of manufactured items in total exports* As was 
previously mentioned, export diversification la necessary 
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to protoet the oountry against sharp disturbing declines n 
la import and external debt service capacity*1 
In the Braaillaa postwar experience a high degree 
of vulnerability to fluctuations In external receipts was 
Indeed evident (fable 7). Proa the statistical breakdown 
of Brasllt* export structure by export categories this 
vulnerability was exposed, la part, by the extremely small 
share of manufactured goods la total exports throughout 
the period* 
The exportation of industrial produots—an almost 
nonexistent item la Bra*ilian commerce before the war-
expanded remarkably during the war years.2 In fact, 
* froa 19i*2 through 1945 oottoa piece goods followed oof fee 
at the second largest export Item** 3 Unfortunately, this 
ex^.ioa «a.
 B,tbl»g m**. Vm •• ******** m*.+ 
followed by a sharp decline during the early postwar years, 
xPor an assessment of this technique in measuring 
export vulnerability and diversification sea Avnuaovic, 
op, elt.. p« 114. 
United nations, Economic Survey of Latin America} 
l%ff* P* 237* 
Hm Wyth*# 1. 4. Wight, and H. X, Wdfclff, Bragjlt 
An Expanding Economy (Hew York? The twentieth Century 
Fund, 1 9 W , p. 315* 
With Spaolal R>f»r«no> to Br*mi (SronlBgea. DJakarta: 
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r From 191$ to 193>2 earnings from tha exportation of man* n 
ufaetured goods fall tram. $38.79 million to $7*03 million. 
During this same tima spaa the share of manufactured goods 
in total Brasilia* axport values fall from 3.3 p«r cant to 
O.k par cant (Tabic 18). 
Tha daolina in manufactured experts was not 
surprising in postwar B**sil, With tha reconstruction of 
industrialised countries devastated toy World War II, tha 
comparative advantage enjoyed by Brasil in tha production 
and exportation of manufactured goods gradually disappeared. 
Although tha daolina itself was expected, the magnitude of 
the daolina was not* 
A reversal of this downward trend commenced in 
1953* She export values of manufactured goods increased 
slowly from 1953 to 1963 (Tabic 17). Also, the share of 
manufactured goods %n total exports increased from 0.7 
per cent in 1953 to 3*0 per cent in 1963 (Table 18). 
Within this broad category of manufactured exports, 
chemical manufactures did expand rapidly from 1958 to 1961, 
declining only slightly in 1962 and 1963 (Table 17). How-
ever* in the peak year (1961) the share of chemical manu-
factures in total Brazilian export values was only l*k 
per tent (Table 18). The exportation of machinery and 
Ltransp©rt goods increased slowly and sporadically from _j 
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 191*8 to 1962 (Table 17). Only in the peak year (Again, n 
1961) did the share of this export category in total 
export ralues reach 1 p*r cent (fable 18). In postwar 
Brazil textile manufactures never approached the level 
attained daring the war year*. 
This relatively slow growth of manufactured goods 
in Brasil»s export structure certainly pinpoints a weak-
ness as far as the future growth potential of total 
exports Is concerned,1 Although the share of manufactured 
goods in total export ralues Increased rather steadily 
during this ten-year span, this rate of increase can he 
considered disappointing from two points of view. First, 
Brazil's rapidly expanding capital formation throughout 
this period created a productive capability for manu-
factured goods which by far outstripped the aforementioned 
%ecent data published by the Statistical Division 
of the United nations in its Monthly Bulletin (lev** 1965) 
seen to support the argument that export growth potential 
is dependent upon the share of manufactured items in total 
exports* Comparing export growth performances between 1950 
and 1964*., the statistical analysis reveals persistent in* 
creases in the value of manufactured goods and prolonged 
stagnation in value of exports from primary producing 
countries* In 196% the price level of primary commodities 
as related to that of manufactured goods was 22 p*r cent 
less than that of 1950. World exports of agricultural 
goods and raw materials, which Includes all of Brazilts 
principal export commodities, actually displayed a de-
clining trend* 
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 advanoes in manufactured exports* fhe second factor ~1 
relates to the base from which thla observed pate of 
lnorease 1B manufactured exports emanated• As previously 
mentioned, Brazil*s export fltruoture prior to World War II 
was so heavily concentrated is food and ran material 
exports that manufactured exports were practically non-
existent. 
The wartime expansion in manufactured exports was 
deceiving inasmuch as industrial facilities in countries 
closer to the combat cone were restricted or neutralised 
by the war effort. By 19§2 Brasilia manufactured export 
level had gravitated back towards prewar levels, fhe 
growth rate of manufactures from that low level to the 
level attained in 1963 was again deceiving in the sense 
that the small absolute changes appeared to be relatively 
significant. Considering the industrial growth experienced 
in Brasil during this time span and the resulting export 
growth potential for manufactured goods, the statistical 
record is not impressive. 
Changes in the share of "growth" ootamoditleg In 
total exports.»»The responsiveness of Brasll's export 
structure to the postwar demand pattern of International 
trade ©an be assessed by measuring the share of "growth* 
L -I 
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Commodities Is total export values.1 Since two of ~i 
Brasilia thro* principal export products (1. e., coffee 
and ooaoa) qualified aa "growth" oommoditles, this 
relative ahare remained well above $0 per cent throughout 
the postwar era. From a 191*8 level of S5#6 per cent, 
the postwar trough, this ahare increased to &k*k V* eent 
in 1953r the postwar peak (Table 19). the principal 
underlying caueea of this shift were the rapidly inoreaaing 
export values of coffee and eoeoa ("growth" commodities) 
and the sudden but temporary collapse of the Brazilian 
export market for cotton (non-growth commodity). 
From the aforementioned postwar peak of 8ij..l$. 
per cent reached In 1953* the share of "growth" commod-
ities In total Brazilian exports fell to 73*1 V** &**>* 
in 1963* Sh* decline was steady throughout this ten-
year time span, Interrupted only by small annual in* 
creases In 1956 and 1962. the principal problem under-
lying this general reduction in the snare of "growth" 
export commodities in total export values was the decline 
in Brazil's share of the world market for both coffee and 
on empirical evidence gathered during the 
postwar era, Avrsmovie has classified all export products 
as either •growth* or *no**-gr©wt&** For a oommodity-by-
oommodity breakdown see Avramovic, op, clt.» p. 20$ • 
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 cocoa, fhl* was particularly significant since Brazil "• 
has historically enjoyed a monopolistic advantage with 
respect to both* 
Of further importance in this regard was the 
failure of manufactured "growth" Items to substantially 
increase in volume or in value, Export diversification 
during this later period involved, for the most part, 
the increased exportation of certain raw materials, most 
of which did not qualify as "growth* items in this sense• 
Conclusions 
In summary of Brazllts export experience during 
the postwar period through 1963, it has been shown that 
stagnation in export values generally prevailed. Although 
export values did increase from 19l|B to 195^* this advance 
reflected neither an expanding export market for Brazil 
nor increased volume sales in established markets. 
Bather, it reflected extraordinary upward price movements 
of certain key export commodities resulting from postwar 
shortages. Beversal of this price explosion was in-
evitable, and when it eventually took place (1955)* 
export values were dragged down. Palling prices for 
Brasilia principal export commodities did not sufficiently 
stimulate sales to cheek this decline. 
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 By measuring the fluctuations of Brasil*a 
principal export commodities it has also boon shown that 
tha traditionally high degree of concentration inherent 
in tha Brazilian expert structure continued to bo burden* 
sona throughout this poatwar arm* although tha share of 
food exports is total exports generally declined from 
1955 to 1963, this decline was not sufficient to signif-
icantly reduea tha inherent inflexibility of the export 
structure. Furthermore, this shift within the structure 
resultedf for tha moat partf from tha increased exportation 
of crude materiala and not from the increased exportation 
of manufactured goods. 
Brazil's export fortunes war* unfavorably affected 
not only by export concentration but also by the behavior 
of International demand.1 From 1953 to 1963 the share of 
"growth1* commodities in total Brazilian export values 
decreased by a substantial amount. Also, as was mentioned 
above, during this period of price erosion for moat of 
Brazil's principal export commodities, price Inelasticity 
of demand prevailed. 
%r**il# Embaixada, V* &.* Survey of the Brazilian 
Boonomyi I960 {Washington* &• C.t Brazil Embaixada, 
I960), p* ?0. 
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Since it ii subsequently revealed that the period 
from 1955 to 1963 vat characterised not only by rising 
import needs but alao by rapidly accumulating external 
debt service obligations, the effect of thl« export 
stagnation on Brazil'a capacity to finance the same was 
particularly disturbing* 
Disturbances Ariaing from Fluctuations  
In gebaioltiy iTOorii f  
»mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmimmiimmmmmmimimmmmmm>m 
Since import8 compete with external debt service 
for a country*a export earningsf sharp increases In the 
former can produce liquidity crises, thereby adversely 
affecting the ©ountry*s capacity to finance the latter* 
Liquidity crises can be avoided, of course, if export 
receipts grow sufficiently to satisfy both competing claims. 
It is the purpose of this section to measure dis-
turbances arising fro® import fluctuations* Sinoe the 
previous section did reveal that Brazil suffered general 
export stagnation during the latter part of the postwar 
period, and since subsequent chapters ^0 reveal an in-
creasingly heavy debt service burden during this same 
time span, such measurements are particularly relevant* 
No attempt will be made, however* to use the same 
framework of analysis employed in the previous section* 
llj.6 
lifelike the discernible patter of general export flue- n 
tuation* whloh Allowed for a convenient division of the 
postwar era Into two time perl ode, import fluctuations 
vera generally irregular and did not produce dietinetlve 
trend* with reference to tha earlier and later parta of 
the period. Although import disturbances are measured, 
therefore, throughout the sixteen-year time span without 
attempting to contrast the two time periods, special 
attention la focuaed on the later period not because of 
the unique nature of observed diaturbanoes but rather 
beoauae of the foreign exchange difficulties experienced 
during thla period. Furthermore* because of the diveral-
fioation of oommodlties within the Import structure, 
again In contrast to the high degree of camaodity con-
centration in exports, intensive individual treatment 
of apeolfle Import products would he unwise and un-
fruitful. A* eueh, the atatiatleal breakdown of Import 
structure for analytieal purposm la properly baaed on 
a broader import oategorisatlon* 
Fluetuatlona in the valuea of 
Oft commodities 
the pattern of flu#tuationa in import valuea is 
reflected $m faole 20• total valuee deolined from 19^8 
L to 1950# f*om 1952 to 1953 # f^ osa 195^ to 1956, and frem j 
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 1957 to 1958 • An extrsmely sharp increase was esper* n 
lenoed 1B 1951-1952| subsequent Increases In 1954 &»<* 1» 
1957 vere moderate, and the general Increase from 1958 to 
the end of the period was slight# Apart from the 1951-
1952 Increase, Brazil*s total l«port figures do not 
reveal any sharp Annual fluctuations which could have 
served as paralysing elements of disturbance with un~ 
desirable balance-of•payments repercussions. Considering 
the period as a whole, a secular increase in import 
values is observable; however, the most outstanding 
characteristic of the period, excluding 1951*1952, Is the 
B « * o * ra»g. of m l fluctuation..* 
the categorization of import commodities in 
fables 20 and 21 reveals the significant absolute and 
relative changes In the contribution of each to the 
observed fluctuations in total import values. The most 
notable changes in this regard were the sharp increases 
in the contributions of two manufactured import categories 
(1* e«, chemicals/pharmaceuticals and machinery/equipment). 
The share of the former in total import values Increased 
3*11 is not the purpose of this chapter to ascertain 
how this stability was achieved* It will become obvious In 
Chapter V that public policy exerted a strong influence in 
this regard* 
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substantially from k*7 P** *•»* in 19^8 to 12.1 par cent 
In 1963* and the share of the latter increased as sharply 
from 17.1 p*v cent in 191*8 to 38.£ per oent in 1958, 
Although this latter share did decline moderately from 
1958 to 19639 the level reached during this last year of 
the sixteen-year time span (1963) remained substantially 
above the first year levelf 19ij.8. 
The import values of fuels and lubricants also 
increased both absolutely and relatively from 19U-8 to 
1963* However, unlike the cases of the two manufactured 
import categories above, fuel and lubricant Import values 
remained at a relatively constant level from 1952 through 
1963 # following a sharp rise prior to 1952• From a 1948 
level of 12.ij. p0V cent the share of this import category 
in total import values increased to 19.k P«* s*»t in 1952, 
then fluctuated within narrow limits to 17*6 per cent in 
1963. 
Declines in the import values of raw materials 
other than fuels and lubricants and in those of manu-
factured goods other than chemicals/pharmaceuticals 
and machinery/equipment served to generally, although 
not completely, offset the increases in those import 
values noted above* Despite the fact that the importation 
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 of other raw materials increased in value during the late n 
1940f« and early 1950*s, subsequent sharp declines reduced 
import value* by 1963 iubstantially below the earlier 1948 
level. Specifically, the share of other raw materials in 
total import valued Increased from 10.9 per cent in 1948 to 
1$.$ per cent in 195l# then sharply declined to 4*7 per cent 
by 1963• a reversal of this pattern was observed in the 
case of other manufactured imports. Import values declined 
absolutely during the late 1940fa and early 1950«s, 
remained relatively constant through 19f>8, and then in-
creased moderately to 1963 • Despite this late spurt, 
however, the earlier 194® l**el was not recovered by 
1963. From a relative point of view, the share of other 
manufactured goods in total import values declined from 
35«5 p*r cent (1948) to 13»5 p*x* ©#nt in 1953* fluctuated 
within narrow limits through 1953, then increased to 19.0 
pw cent in 1963. 
13hc effects of fluctuations in the import values 
of food and beverage Items were more neutral than in the 
case of any other import category discussed above. Food 
and beverage import values did decline both absolutely 
and relatively from 1948 to 1958, but the rates of decline 
were small and as a result of increases subsequent to 
I50 
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1956, the earlier postwar levels were recovered by 1963 
(Tables 20 and 21). 
Apart from this relatively neutral effect of 
fluctuations In food and beverages imports, It Is true 
that total Import values generally rose from 1948 to 
1963, since sharp Increases In the Import values of fuels/ 
lubricants, chemicals/pharmaceuticals, and machinery/ 
equipment were not completely offset by declines In the 
values of other raw material Imports nor by those of 
other manufactured goods Imports, Although these off-
setting effects were partial, they were nevertheless 
substantial} thus, the general rise In total Import values 
was Indeed slight. 
It might be superficially concluded on the basis 
of the slight and Irregular rise In total import values 
from 191^ 8 to 1963 that balanee-of-payments disturbances 
emanating from the Import sector were minimal. It is 
true that total import values rose sharply only from 1950 
to 195l*1952f however, since the previous section did 
reveal that export receipts actually declined during the 
latter part of the sixteen-year time span, and since 
subsequent chapters do reveal an increasingly heavy 
external debt service burden, it can be concluded that 
, even the small increases in Import values during this j 
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later period ware of a disturbing nature and did adversely 
affect Braailt* external debt service capacity. 
The relative price/quantum effects 
on Bragjl's import value* 
To isolate and properly analyse disturbances 
arising from the import section, a focus on fluctuations 
in import values alone is not sufficient* Beeper insights 
can be gained from an assessment of the relative price/ 
quantum effect on import values. 
It can be concluded from the statistical evidence 
in fable 22 that import prices generally declined through-
out the sixteen-year time span* Although the general rate 
of decline wag slower during the mid and late 1950»s than 
during the late 1940fa and the aariy 1950*a* and despite 
the fact that prices did reeover slightly during the early 
1960»s, it is, nevertheless, statistically evident that 
import price fluctuations contributed significantly to 
neither the deterioration in Brazil's trade posture nor 
to the country's decreased capacity to service external 
debt during this later period* In fact, just the opposite 
was true. Since total import price levels were sub* 
stantially lower during the early 1960*s than in the mid 
1950f« &» a result of general declines in the prices of 
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 all import categories listed in Table 22, a positive 
contribution was made in this regain. Declining import 
prices to an extant offset the disturbing effect of export 
stagnation on Brasilia debt service capacity. 
At was shown above, hovever, import values 
generally rose during the later p^Tiod» This, of course, 
can be explained by the fact that import price declines 
vera mora than offset by increases in import quantum. 
Since Chapter V does reveal a concerted effort by Brazilian 
policymakers to compress imports during this period, and 
since it ia subsequently revealed in this chapter that the 
volume of certain inessential items did decline sharply, 
this total quantum off oat ia that much mora interesting. 
Clearly, it oaa bo deduced that sharp increases in 
essential import items did occur. 
Brasii*a import structure 
Since the purpose of this chapter is to focus on 
disturbances arising from importation, it ia relevant to 
measure significant changes $M the composition of Brazil's 
import structure and to isolate those sharp rises In 
import quantum vhich produced the effects noted above* 
To achieve this purpose, fable 23 is useful, but a more 
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 complete breakdown of Brazil' s import structure Is n 
actually neoeeaary. To aupplament Table 23, therefore, 
the statistical findings of a 1961*. United Hat ions study 
are utilised** 
In this tJnited Hatlons study quantum changes in 
final coDSumer goods, fuels/lubricants, raw materials/ 
intermediate products, and equipment are statistically 
measured and compared. Durable and non-durable final 
consumer goods are distinguished, and raw Materials/ 
intermediate products are broken done into metals, non-
metals, and spare parts (Tables 21*. and 25). farther 
distinction Is made between spare parts to consumer goods 
and spare parts to capital goods* Although sample data 
are employed,2 the import items selected comprised more 
than 90 per cent of total Imports in the base year (1955). 
Fluctuations in the Import volume of final consumer 
goods»**»It is apparent from Table 23 that the most pro-
nounced declines in Brazilian imports during the sixteen-
United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin 
teerloaf *The drowth and Decline of Import Substitution 
in Brasll#M So, Bulletin for Latin America, ixf 21-23• 
^TMs faot serve8 to explain the minor dis-
crepancies between Table 23 and Table 2lj.. 
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year time span3- Involved manufactured goods other than 
chemicals, pharmaceutic ale, machinery, and equipment. 
This is consistent with the statistical evidence presented 
in the United Hat ions study (Table 24). Actually, the 
latter B*TV*B to shed light on the former in the following 
ways. The quantum of final consumer imports generally 
declined from 19l|£ to 1963 (Table 2l\,)$ a trend primarily 
produced by drastic reductions in consumer durables. 
Inasmuch as the aforementioned category of manufactured 
imports is comprised mostly of consumer goods, it becomes 
clear that declines in consumer durables were principally 
responsible for the negative trend of this general import 
category which served most effectively to relieve the 
pressure from Brazil's scarce foreign exchange receipts 
during the latter part of the time period, 1955*2.963. 
Of all major classifications of manufactured 
goods, only the importation of chemicals/pharmaceuticals 
and maehinsiry/equipme»t displayed a significant positive 
trend. The fact that the Irregular declines in the 
quantum of non-durable consumer goods imports from 1951 
to 1963 did not keep pace with general declines in durables 
^Although the entire sixteen-year time period Is 
subject to analysis in the section, the focus again is on 
the latter part of the period. 
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is obviously attributable to the off sotting influence of n 
increased chemicals and pharmaceuticals on the former. 
Fluctuations in the import volume of machinery 
and equipment,—It is normal for the importation of capital 
goods to enjoy greater flexibility than those of consumer 
goods. If a country*s capacity to import stagnates as a 
result of export problems, as occurred in the Brasilia?) 
experience during the latter part of the time period of 
this study, reduced demand for capital goods can afford 
immediate external relief. 
No such development occurs when imports are mainly 
composed of consumer goods, since in this case the 
levered demand is merely a concomitant of the 
contraction of income which is less than the drop 
in the value of exports and much smaller still than 
the reduction in investment.! 
Of course, the strength of such an effect depends on the 
contribution of the export sector to the country*s national 
Income level. In the case of Brasil it can be said that 
this contribution was rather small during the time period 
in question; the national income level was not greatly 
dependent upon the export sector. From 1951 through 19&3 
the former increased steadily while exports generally 
%nited Nations, Analysis and Projections of 
. * mmm»mwmmm*mm n IMIIII i i i i f c a n • n u l l u m WIIHMII iiiiinyiiii«nii 
Economic Development; The Economic Development of Brazil, 
p. 60* 
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Stagnated* 
Despite this weak relationship* the response of 
capital goods imports to changes in Brasil** capacity to 
import was surprisingly elastic—a fact which cannot be 
explained by the analysis above. Although fluctuations 
in oapital goods imports did parallel fluctuations in 
import capacity, particularly during the late 195Qf« and 
the early 1960«s, declines in the import demand for 
capital goods were buffered to an extant by sharp increases 
in national income throughout this later period. On the 
other hand, this income effect was, in turn, weakened by 
Increased Brazilian capacity to produce capital goods 
domestically, which, of course, led to import substitution, 
and also by changes in the pattern of demand with the 
growing economy. 
Specifically, the United Nations study reveals 
that the share of agricultural equipment in total impor-
tation of oapital goods slowly declined from 1951 to 1963 
after an explosive increase tr<m 1%B to 1950 and a 
sudden drop in 195l» *&** high and rising levels of 
imports during thjs earlier part of the postwar period 
were induced, in part, by relative increases in agricul-
tural price and the decline during the latter part of the 
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period reflected 1B the subsequent relative prlee deteri-
oration. Agricultural production became lees profitable! 
therefore, fewer pieces of agricultural equipment were 
Imported. 
The importation of Industrial machinery and equip-
ment declined gradually and unevenly during the postwar 
period, $his undramatic general decline resulted, for the 
most part, from a substantial drop In imported textile 
machinery and equipment—a phenomenon which was not quite 
offset by sustained increases in Imported capital for 
metallurgical industries* fhe rapid industrial growth of 
the latter and the stagnated market for the products of 
the former during the latter part of the time period In 
question combined to produce this shift in the demand for 
imports. As far as the other basic industries are con-
cerned, a rather constant volume of machinery and equipment 
Imports was registered. In the case of the pulp and paper 
Industry temporary spurts in import capital were recorded 
in 1955 and in 19571 otherwise, a constant level was 
maintained. Capital Imports for publishing companies 
generally declined from 195J|- to 1963 # but the rate of 
decline was slight. 
L -J 
158 
r n 
Imported electrical machinery and appliances 
generally declined from 192$ to 1959, but in I960 and in 
1961 sizable Increases were recorded, ©its late period 
surge Involved mostly Increased purchases of heavy equip-
ment which could not be supplied domestically. Subsequent 
declines in 1962 and In 1963 reflected an easing of this 
domestic bottleneck. 
The imports of transport machinery and equipment 
fluctuated sporadically throughout most of the time period 
in question, with the only discernible trend experienced 
during the last five years (1959*1963). the steady decline 
in this case was not the product of stagnated demand; 
rather, It reflected domestic replacement, 
the country*a increased self-sufficiency in motor 
vehicle production was the principal cause of the reduction 
of imports under this category. For example, "auto, truck 
and bus Imports which totaled $113 million in 1958 same to 
only $16 million in 1963# an 86 per cent decline .nl 
Fluctuations In the import volume of raw materials 
and intermediate products,—It is evident from Eable 25 
•^ Business International, fhe Kew Braslli Prospect 
for Stability and Profits; Beport (Sfew^ork* Business 
International Press, I965)f p. 28, 
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that the large share of raw materials and Intermediate 
products in total Imports fluctuated within extremely 
narrow limits throuj&out the sixteen-year time spam In 
reference to the later period (1955*1963)$ it is also 
evident that the absolute level of these import products 
remained consistently high and actually rose despite the 
faet that foreign exchange receipts generally declined. 
It is not surprising that the import level of raw materials 
and of intermediate products was maintained during periods 
of liquidity shortage even at the expense of capital goods 
Imports. The need for the former in supporting the 
activities of existing industries was realistically of a 
more Immediate concern than the long-term developmental 
Implications of Import reductions in the latter. 
She division of this broad import category into 
metals, non-metal a, and spare parts is useful in explaining 
these total fluctuations (fables 2k and 25). Non-metallic 
items comprised the largest share of total raw material/ 
intermediate products imports, uts^ fluctuations of the 
former closely paralleled those of the latter* Of all 
the non-metallic products Imported during the sixteen-
year time span, the highest degree of constancy was 
evidenced In the case of fully-processed Intermediate 
products—a category including chemical fertilisers and -J 
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pestieides, paper, asbestos and rubber manufactures, 
refractory products, sheet glass, etc. However, although 
the share of these items in total imports remained 
relatively constant, during the later period (1955*1963) 
absolute import levels did rise. 
A slow decline in import quantum was experienced 
in the ease of partially processed products including 
tanned skins and hides, pulp, textile yarns, cements, 
plastic material, and synthetic resins, etc. Also in* 
eluded in this category were soma organic and inorganic 
chemical products, the decline of which served to temper 
the general rise in total chemical and pharmaceutical 
imports, reflected In Table 23, Again, as was noted in 
the ease of other products in other categories, the 
decline in semi•processed import products resulted more 
from increased Brazilian domestic productive capabilities, 
rather than from demand stagnation, 
the import quantum of the last sub-group under the 
general heading of "non-metallic raw materials and interme-
diate products," including completely unprocessed goods such 
as wheat, raw rubber, natural textile fibers, natural fer-
tilisers, etc,, generally increased throughout the sixteen-
year time span. The rate of Increase was generally 
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sufficient to offset the aforementioned declines In semi- ' 
processed Imports—a phenomenon which ****** to explain 
the constancy In total volume figures* 
Fluctuations la the imports of metallic rav 
materials and intermediate products were more volatile 
than in the oase of non-metallic imports* In general, the 
import quantum of the former increased sharply trm the 
late 191*0* s to the early 1950* s* then dipped equally as 
dramatically in the mid 1950's, from which time to the 
end of the period sharp Increases were again recorded* 
These sharp Increases during the later period significantly 
contributed to the general rise in total imports and did 
serve to offset the import compression of other import 
items* 
Of the three subcategories in the general 
category of raw materials and Intermediate products* 
only the importation of spare parts deoreased substan* 
tlally during the postwar era* This decline was not un-
interrupted, however. From 19I4& to 1953 the share of 
spare parts in total import quantum fell from 9*k &*** **&t 
to l.lj. per ©ant (fiblo 25}
 9 but from 1953 to 1959 a 
complete reversal of trend wan experienced; this share 
increased to 13.ii- p*v cent (1959), exceeding all previous 
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levels, lb* sharpest drop was experienced during the last 
five year* of the period; from the postwar peak of 13.14-
per cent reached in 1959* this share dropped rapidly to 
1.2 per cent in 1963—well below the I9I4.8 level and even 
below the trough In 1953* As might be expected, the 
fluctuations of Imported spare parte for Investment goods 
responded more elastleally to changes In total Import 
capacity than In the case of spare parts for consumer 
goods* This Is not surprising since Imported Investment 
goods In general displayed a higher degree of elasticity 
of this type than did Imported consumer goods* 
Declines In the Importation of spare parts during 
the latter part of the postwar era did not, however, off-
set the sharp Increases In metallic Imports* As was 
mentioned above, total raw materials/intermediate products 
Imports generally rose* 
Fluctuations in the Import volume of fuels and 
mMmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm^^ 
lubricants»—Fuela and lubricants are considered In a 
separate category, not only because their share In total 
Imports remained consistently high throughout the sixteen-
year time span, but also this share generally rose* By 
offsetting declines in other Import categories, volume 
increases In the importation of these products contributed 
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significantly to the disturbing rite In total imports 
which, daring the latter part of the time period, did 
play a major role in the reduction of Brasilia external 
debt serrice capacity. 
Absolute and relative increases In the import 
quantum of fuels and lubricants are reflected in Tables 
22j. and 25* With respect to the former, the positive 
trend during the later period was broken only by email 
declines in 1957 end in 1959. With respect to the latter, 
declines in the share of these products in total imports 
were aleo experienced in 1957 &&& 1959* but subsequent 
increases from 19*3 pw cent in 1959 to 28.8 per cent in 
1963 ware particularly sharp. 
Increased domestic consumption of fuels and 
lubricants in Brazil throughout the sixteen-year time 
span was the obvious reason for the rise in import quantum* 
fhe latter rose, however, despite a concerted effort by 
the Brasllian government to stimulate domestic production* 
Although these efforts did not lead to reduced importation* 
it Is statistically true that the ratio of imports to 
domestic consumption did display a downward trend,1 In 
*fhis question will be more thoroughly investigated 
in Chapter ? under "Import Substitution*" 
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 1951 the ratio exceeded 98 per cent. "In 1955* however, 
It dropped to 97 per cent, in 1956 to 9k per cent, In 
1957 to 85.3 V** cent, in 1958 to...76 per cent,*1 and in 
1963 below 68 per cent. 
Clearly, without Increased domestic production 
the postwar rise in fuels and lubricants imports would 
have been considerably greater and the effect on Brazil's 
scarce foreign exchange receipts considerably more 
disturbing. 
Fluctuations in the Import volume of intermediate 
products in relation to those of end products.—In 
Isolating and assessing disturbances arising from impor-
tation it is also useful to classify items by type of use 
and by destination; in the former intermediate goods are 
distinguished from end products, and in the latter those 
goods destined for consumption are distinguished from those 
^Brasil, Babalxada, V, $., Survey of the Brazilian 
Economyi 1959 (Washington, D. C.s Brazil Embaixada, 
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destined for investment purposes.1 
In general, It can be seen from the statistical 
breakdown In Table 26 that over the sixteen-year time span 
intermediate products increased in relation to end 
products, She former comprised only 39.7 pw cent of 
total imports in 19lj.8* but by 1963 this share had in-
creased to 57*0 per cent. This shift was assessed as 
significant by the United Nations study and was said to 
reflect a normal modification of the Import schedule 
rendered necessary by a capacity to Import which became 
Increasingly inadequate to support both the demand for 
Imports needed in industry and the demand for Imports 
needed elsewhere. In this latter categoryt of course, 
are included not only final consumer goods but also final 
producer goods upon which the longer*term developmental 
aspirations depend. In such a case, the choice is not 
merely between satisfying the consumer or satisfying the 
Hffisd products Include finished consumer goods, 
machinery and equipment* and processed fuels while inter-
mediate products comprise raw materials, spare parts, 
and unprocessed fuels. Investment goods cover finished 
equipment, spar* parts for assembly of transport equip-
ment, metal intermediate products, and non-metallic 
materials for building industries* Consumer goods include 
all other noa-metallic intermediate products and raw 
materials, finished consumer goods, and spare parts for 
household appliances and all fuels and lubricants, 
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Industrialist In need of raw material* and Intermediate 
productsj it also involves the choice between meeting the 
shorter-term needs of the industrialist in support of the 
current level of economic activity or meeting the longer-
term needs of the industrial sector with respect to capital 
growth* 
In the Brazilian experience statistical evidence 
seems to support the contention that if such choices do 
become necessary, shorter-term industrial needs receive 
higher priorities in both eases* 
Since Brazil's capacity to import did fail to in* 
crease adequately to avoid such a dilemma, especially 
throughout the latter part of the 1955-1963 period (fable 
27), the aforementioned elastic response of capital goods 
imports to changes in Import capacity and the absolute 
and relative declines of consumer durables are under-
standable* In this category of end products only proc-
essed fuels failed to decline either absolutely or 
relatively during the time period in question. In the 
face of export stagnation consumer durables proved to be 
more expendable than capital goods and considerably more 
expendable than processed fuels as the result of the 
obvious priority placed on shorter-term Industrial needs* 
16? 
Sine* It la readily acknowledged that consumer ~1 
durables and capital goodi comprise the moat flexible 
Items In a country*e Import structure, the obvious con-
clusion la that the general decline In the share of those 
ltema In total Brazilian Imports from lflj.8 to 1963 com-
pounded the problem of balance-of-payments rigidity In 
the form of debt service commitments by producing addi-
tional inflexibility In Import structure* the total 
volume of Brazilian Imports Increased during the latter 
part of the period because increases in critically needed 
Import ltema more than offset declines In inessential 
import a. As will be confirmed in Chapter V, the efficacy 
of the adjustment policy of Import compression was 
steadily reduced aa the share of compressible ltema In 
total Imports declined. 
Fluctuations In the import volume of total consumer 
goods in relation to those of investment goods.--Surpris-
ingly, the classification of Imports by destination in 
the KOLA study reveals that the share of imports for 
purposes of consumption in total imports generally but 
sporadically increased during the time period In question 
(fable 26). Considering the period aa a whole, the 
X68 
degree or this relative Increase could only be described 
as slight (from 52*2 per cent in 191*8 to 60.2 per cent in 
1963)* Furthermore, this hardly could be described as a 
clearly discernible trend inasmuch as the opposite 
(relative increases in imports for purposes of investment) 
occurred in 1951-1952, in 195k# 1957* 1959# and again in 
1963* the relative increases in total consumer imports 
were particularly surprising in light of the substantial 
reductions in the imports of consumer durables. These 
declines were obviously more than offset by increases in 
the imports of consumer raw materials and intermediate 
products and particularly of fuels and lubricants. 
In general, it may be said on the basis of sta-
tistical evidence that there was not a shift in the 
Brazilian import structure in favor of the investment 
sector because relative increases in intermediate products 
imported for consumption more than offset relative declines 
in end products imported for this purpose. To say the 
same thing only in a different wayt the relative increases 
in mad products imported for investment were not suffi-
cient to offset the relative declines in intermediate 
products imported for this latter purpose, althou^i 
import flexibility was apparent in the case of fluctuations 
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in final consumer goods, the steady increases of inter- n 
mediate consumer Imports, notably wheat, petroleum, and 
certain ohemlcals reflected a high degree of inflexibility 
in the Brazilian import structure which aoted to limit the 
importation of investment goods in the face of scarce 
foreign exchange* 
Unfortunately, during the latter part of the period 
(1955-1963) the rate of increase in essential consumer and 
investment goods outstripped the rate of decline of in-
essential items in both categories. 
OonQluslona 
from the preceding analysis of Brazil* s import 
experience during the postwar period it is evident that 
sharp increases in the volume of essential import items 
mora than offsot declines in inessential items—the net 
effeot of which was sufficiently strong to more than off-
set general declines in import prices* Import values, 
therefore, rose, ftnd although the rate of increase was 
slight and irregular, the resulting effects on debt 
servioe capacity wars disturbing, particularly during the 
latter part of the period. 
In effeot, rising import values compounded Brazil's 
debt servioe problems, which were produced primarily by _, 
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the export stagnation, discussed in an earlier section. 
Although pressure on the country'a scarce foreign 
exchange receipts was relieved during this later period by 
substantial reductions in inessential import items, notably 
in the category of consumer durables, there was insufficient 
flexibility in the import structure to produce a general 
downward trend, fheee problems did not arise, however, 
from the requirement to support through importation the 
country* s longer-term development goals. Changes In the 
import levels of capital goods did respond elastioally to 
changes in foreign exchange receipts. Rather, these 
problems arose primarily from the increasingly heavy 
requirement to support rising levels of domestic production 
and to supply essential consumer needs. 
i^i?!8fflfi..<ffii...^ ffgffl 
the two previous sections of this chapter revealed 
that export and import fluctuations did MWTM as elements 
of balance-of-payments disturbance from 19l|8 to 1963* 
Resulting problems of external imbalance were particularly 
severe during the latter part of tfce time period as a 
result of stagnating export receipts in the face of 
accelerating import requirements. 
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fhe severity of this current account problem1 can 
be brought Into focus by consideration of shifts in 
Brazil's terms of trade, A complete analysis of the 
relationship between export and Import fluctuations 
requires the following* (1) * measurement of relative 
export/import price movements by focusing on the net 
3»Xt should be recalled at this point that Chapter IX 
did reveal large current account deficits on service items 
throughout the entire time period (19i|£-1965). Apart from 
the brief Korean War period, however, current account sur-
?luses on merchandise items during the earlier period 19&jB~195>6) were sufficiently large to generally offset the 
former* Current account surpluses on both merchandise and 
service items were actually enjoyed in 1950, 1953, and In 
1956, and although deficits were suffered during the inter* 
mediate years, they were quantitatively small, thus mini* 
mlsing the disturbing effects of resulting compensatory 
financing on the country*-* external debt structure* Sub-
sequent chapters will reveal that external debt was 
financed during this earlier period without difficulty. 
Debt service difficulties experienced from the mid 
1950fs to the early 1960*s resulted from sharp declines in 
current account surpluses on merchandise Items In the face 
of continued large deficits on service Items* Subsequent 
chapters will also reveal that during this later time span 
widening external imbalance required increasing amounts of 
compensatory financing which served to compound the ex-
ternal debt service problem through a shortening of the 
debt structure* 
By measuring fluctuations in the volume and prices 
of exports tm relation to fluctuations In the volume and 
prices of imports, it is the purpose of this section to 
pinpoint those current account difficulties which contri-
buted to tfce external imbalance observed earlier and which 
also Ber^m^ to compound the external debt service problems, 
discussed later* 
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barter terms of trade, expressed algebraically ae_ii.; *©. , 
(2) a measurement of relative export/import quantum 
movements by focusing on the gross barter terms of trade, 
expressed algebraically a i ^ i : " t and the measurement 
of changes in import capacity by focusing on the income 
Px ^ x P** °x 
terms of trade, expressed algebraically as ' ' «.__S 
Shifts in the net barter 
*«"*» frf t r a i ~ 
Relative export/import price fluctuations, 
divorced from volume changes, are best expressed by 
fluctuations in a country's net barter terms of trade* In 
the Brasilian experience tiro distinct trends are discernible 
within the sixteen-year time span (Sable 27)* She period 
from 192*3 to 195k was characterised by general improve-
ment in the net barter terms of trade—the only exception 
being a elicit deterioration from 1952. to 1952* However, 
from 1954 to 1963 a reversal of trend was evidenced. 
Subsequent to 19514* the pivotal year* general deterioration 
was experienced, with the exception of a temporary period 
of improvement (1957*1958)• 
In assessing the impact of general terms-of-trade 
improvement during the earlier period and general terms* 
of-trade deterioration during the later period on external 
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balance, It 1» clear that the relative price effects 
were strong In both Instances. With respect to the 
earlier period, Brazil did enjoy sizable commodity trade 
surpluses, with the exception of the 1951-1952 period, 
2hla elo»e relationship should not he overstated, however, 
since the steady improvement In the net barter terms of 
trade did not result in a steady Increase In trade 
surpluses. With respect to the later period, sharp hut 
irregular reductions In commodity trade balances did 
accompany the general terme-of-trade deterioration. The 
impact of this prolonged deterioration was particularly 
evident during the early 1960»s, inasmuch as commodity 
trade deficits vara experienced in I960 and again In 
1%2 (fable l). 
Shifts in the gross barter 
terms of trade 
Despite toe apparent correlations noted above, 
the question of ambiguity cannot be escaped with an 
isolated foous on not barter term© of trade. Favorable 
shifts In the latter do not necessarily product trade 
surplus nor do unfavorable shifts necessarily produce 
trade deficits* A new dimension can be added by consid-
eration of the gross barter terms of trade which measures 
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relative changes in export and Import volume. Consid-
eration of shifts Is both the net barter and the gross 
barter tents of trade are necessary for a full evaluation 
of disturbing Influences on Brasilia commodity trade 
balance. 
4s could be expected, the shifts of the above vers 
inversely related. Fro* 1948 to 195^ import quanta 
increased in relation to experts (fable 27) as export 
prices became dearer In relation to import prices, from 
1955 to 1963 the general but irregular deterioration In 
relative export prices produced the opposite affect* 
The only statistical exceptions to these inversely 
related shifts occurred In 19$2-19?3 *»<* in 1962*1963. 
As far as the offsets of these related shifts In 
net barter and gross barter terms of trade on Brasilia 
trade balance are concerned, no absolutely conclusive 
statements can be made on the basis of statistical 
evidence alone, this is true inasmuch as the ambiguity 
of such relationships oan be avoided only when a country9 s 
trade posture remains balanced throughout the time period 
In question and when productivity changes are absent or 
insignificant. Neither of the above assumptions can be 
made ulth reapoet to the Brazilian experience from 19I4.8 
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to 1963* However, despite potential ambiguity, con-
clusions of a limited nature can be derived from the 
aforementioned relationship of terms of trade to trade 
balance. 
From 19M* to 1950 Brasil was able to sustain large 
balance-of-trade surpluses despite deterioration in the 
gross barter terms of trade* Clearly, the latter was more 
than offset by improvements in the net barter terms of 
trade (Table 27)* Deterioration In the former continued 
from 1950 to 19511 however, without an offsetting improve-
ment in the latter, the trade balance was drastically 
reduced in that year* The destabilising influence of 
deterioration in both of the above during the subsequent 
year (1952) produced the largest trade deficit of the 
postwar period* Brazil again enjoyed sizable trade 
surplus from 1953 to 1956 despite the fact that relative 
price deterioration was experienced in 1955 and 1956. 
Improvement In the gross barter terms of trade was 
sufficient to support the trade surplus during this short 
time span, but the improvement was not sustained* Sub* 
sequent deterioration signaled rapid reductions In trade 
surplus throughout the latter part of the period cul-
minating in the deficits of I960 and 1962* As In earlier 
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 periods the relative price effacts outweighed the relative^ 
quantum effects, inasmuch as the latter did generally 
improve from 1958 to 1962 but was more than offset by 
deterioration in the former, fhe temporary balance-of-
trade recovery in 1961 waa an exception to this rule* 
In general, it oan bo aaid that the greatest 
disturbing Influence of shifts in terms of trade was fait 
during that one short time span (1951*1952) in which both 
the not barter and the gross barter terms of trade deteri-
orated. However, it oan also bo said in comparing the 
relative effects of the two that the former was generally 
the mora dominant influencing factor. This conclusion Is 
consistent with previous analyses of Brazil's export 
structure which established a high degree of commodity 
concentration rendering external receipts extremely 
vulnerable to export price fluctuations and which also 
established a high degree of price inelasticity of demand 
for principal export commodities, but It is less con-
sistent with the examination of Brestl* s import structure 
which revealed much more commodity diversification and a 
higher degree of price elasticity of demand* 
It can be finally deduced that export price 
fluctuations were more significant than import price 
fluctuations in producing shifts In the net barter terms _j 
177 
r n 
of tirade which were, in turn, mora influential than 
relative quantum fluctuations in producing change a In 
the trade balance. 
Shifts In the income terme of trade 
In aaaeaaing the adequacy of external receipts 
over time to finance import needs, it is useful to 
conalder changes in a country's income terms of trade 
(Table 27). Changes in the capacity to import can be 
weighed by relating changes in three pertinent variables: 
(1) prices of exports, (2) volume of exports, and 
(3) prices of imports. In effect, this tool of analysis 
measures, in the form of indices, changes In export values 
in relation to changes is import prices. 
Sinoa export receipts are m^40^ to finance 
external debt service as well aa imports, this measure-
ment is particularly relevant is aaaeaaing the severity 
of a country's debt servioe burden, to successfully 
service external debt over time, sufficient external 
receipts must remain after import requirements are 
financed. Bva» though a debtor country*a external 
receipts may be sufficient to finance import requirements, 
they may not be sufficient to repay external debt as well* 
L J 
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A deficient capacity to Import implies a defl-
oient capacity to service external debt* If increases 
In import quantum outstrip the capacity of the country 
to finance the same, additional external borrowing 
becomes necessary not only to maintain the excessive 
level of importation but also to finance the repayment 
of previously contracted debt* 
Before the adequacy of Brazil's external reoelpts 
can be subsequently assessed in relation to the country* s 
external debt service burden, it is necessary first to 
measure to what extent fluctuations In export volume, 
export prices, and Import prices affected the country* s 
capacity to finance import requirements during the 
sixteen-year time span* 
Brazil*s command over foreign goods, as reflected 
in changes in the income terms of trade, did increase 
significantly from 19if$ to 195l« Belative price 
fluctuations were clearly the principal contributing 
factors in M s regard* export prioes rose while import 
prices fall* the Isolated decline In 1952 was a product 
of three eomblnod effeets~~deereaaed export prices, 
increased import prioes, and reduced export volume* 
Subsequent improvements extending from 1952 to 1956 were 
sustained despite a sudden unfavorable shift in the net _j 
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barter terms of trade. Prom 195k to 1956 Import prieee n 
stabilised* tat export prieee foil, Demand response to 
tho lattor was uncommonly alaatio resulting Is a mora 
than proportional increase in axport quantum. 
In oontrast to tho substantial improvement noted 
above* tho period from 1956 to 1963 was oharaotoriaed by 
a general bat Irregular income terma-of-trade deterioration* 
She aharp deollne from 1956 to 1958 was unique in the sense 
that export quantum and export prices both declined—the 
offeot of which waa only partially buffered by reduced 
import prices. 
Although continued deterioration in the net barter 
terms of trade from 1959 to 1963 waa offeet by significant 
increases in export quantum in 1959, 1961, and again in 
1963* the peak levels of import capacity attained in 1959 
and in 1961 vera not significantly above the earlier peak 
reached in 1956. Furthermore, the subsequent decline in 
1962-1963 reduced import capacity well below this 1956 
level* 
Since import quantity generally increased during 
this later period with particularly sharp increases 
recorded from 1956 to I960 (table 27), it la clear that 
the Income terma-of-trade deterioration did adversely 
1
 affect Braail* a oapaoity to satisfy the competing 
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 claims of essential Imports and external debt service 
during this period. The extent of this adverse effect 
and the impact on external balance Is examined In sub* 
sequent chapters after the debt service burden has been 
carefully weighed. 
Disturbances Arising from Sitings 
It is true by definition that a country would have no 
debt servicing problem If capital inflow were always 
sufficient to allow it to meet its debt servicing 
obligations while at the same time maintaining 
imports at a level which the country considers 
minimum acceptable.1 
The maintenance of a minimum tolerable level of 
importation over time in the face of a chronically defi-
cient inflow of new capital can unavoidably lead to 
default on previously contracted debt* However, even 
though the rate of Inflow over the long run may be 
sufficient to avoid a complete collapse of a country's 
external debt structuret periodic downswings in this 
inflow can still produce liquidity &rl»0» in the short 
run, rendering the repayment of external debt impossible 
without immediate balance-of-payments adjustment. 
^-International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, International Development Association. 
Economic growth and External Debt* An Analytical Frame-
mmmmmgmm^tmgmmmmmmmmmlmmmmmmm 
work. 1 . 16. 
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Furthermore, those short-term problems can be compounded 
by speculative or Inflation-Induced outflows of short-term 
capital from the debtor country. 
Since swings in capital flows can clearly act as 
elements of balance-of-payments disturbance, thereby 
producing or contributing to external imbalance and external 
debt repayment difficulties, the following analysis attempts 
to ascertain to what extent these problems were encountered 
in the Brazilian experience* Before such a determination 
can be made, however, it is first necessary to distinguish 
between those capital flows which do act In this capacity 
and those which arise as a result of a debtor country1 a 
efforts to adjust to conditions of external imbalance* 
Although short-term capital movements are "some-
times defined as those which provide balancing or 
equalising transfers of funds to offset other transactions 
in commodities or capital,"1 It is true that these capital 
movements are often sources of external disturbance in-
duced not by external imbalance but rather by speculative 
motivations. Capital flows of this type clearly cannot 
be considered compensatory in nature. Furthermore, 
^Donald B. Marsh, World trade and Investment 
(Hew York: Harcourt* Brace, and Company, 1951). p. 1*0. 
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although long-term capital flows are sometimes defined 
aa those Initiating changes In commodity trade not 
adjusting to changes already made,1 it is also true that 
some types of long-term oapltal transactions {!« e#, 
security transactions) are used to effect adjustment In 
external balance and, as such, are in fact compensatory 
in nature, She aforementioned definition of long-term 
capital is, however, applicable in the case of direct 
foreign investments and reinvestments. 
In distinguishing between compensatory and non-
compensatory capital movements, It is also invalid to 
merely categorise on the basis of public and private use. 
Although compensatory financing Involves mostly official 
capital movements, non-compensatory capital is used to 
finance public as well as private investment needs. 
Long-term loans secured by public agencies or institutions 
for developmental purposes certainly are potential sources 
of balanee-of-payments disturbance. 
In order to distinguish between elements of 
disturbance and elements of adjustment in Brazil's balance 
of payments with respect to external capital flows, non-
compensatory capital movements, whether long term or short 
xXbld. 
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term, public or private, are segregated In fable 28, 
and compensatory capital movements are similarly 
segregated in fable 29* For the purposes of this chapter 
attention is focused only on the former; the latter# as 
was explained earlier, will he appropriately treated in 
Chapter V. 
Swings in the flow of equity capital 
In the Brazilian postwar experience, swings in the 
flow of equity capital did aot to disturb external balance. 
In reference to the entire time period In question (1948-
1963)* three discernible trends can be distinguished. Th© 
net inflow of direct investments declined from $25 million 
in 191^ 8 to $3 million In 1950, and In the subsequent year 
(1951) * »st outflow was actually experienced ($4 million). 
However, from 1952 to 1957 significant increases in the 
net inflow were recorded—a shift interrupted only by a 
moderate decline In 19f&* From 195? to 1963 a general 
decline was again experiencedj net direct Investment 
Inflows fell from the postwar peak level of $143 million 
(1957) tc $30 million (1963K ***• external liquidity 
problems suffered by Brazil during the later part of the 
postwar period (1955*1963}# produced primarily by export 
u stagflation a„d unfavorable ahift. ir» th. «.t bart.r f m . J 
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of trade, were certainly compounded by sharp periodic 
declines in the Inflow of now equity capital. The 
deollnes experienced from 19i|£ to 1951 were less dis-
ruptive in this regard because they were quantitatively 
smaller, and also, they were not accompanied by corre-
sponding export and tems-of-trade difficulties. 
In general, the periodic downswings in the inflow 
of new capital from direct foreign investments were 
buffered by the relatively constant injection of foreign 
earoinge front previous investments back into the 
Brazilian economy. Reinvestments increased significantly 
only from 1950 to 1951 and from 1961 to 1962| moderate 
declines were recorded only in 1953* 1958* &»<* 1963 
{fable 28), the disturbing effeets of the latter can be 
described as moderate, certainly in relation to the afore-
mentioned declines in new investments. Risking an a 
priori Judgment before a final determination can be made 
in Chapter IV, it would appear as though Brazilian 
authorities were more successful in retaining foreign 
capital of this type during the time period in question 
than in attracting new external funding* 
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 Swings la the flow of loan oaplt&l 
Balanoe-of-payments disturbance In the Brazilian 
postwar experience resulted from swings is the flow of 
loan ospltsl as well as from swings In equity capital. 
Private net capital inflows, insignificant before 1953, 
increased sharply from 1953 to 1961, from which time (to 
1963) equally as sharp declines were recorded (Tabic 28). 
The one exception to the former was the moderate decline 
in I960. The net Increases In loan capital from 1957 to 
1961 were not generally sufficient, however, to offset 
the aforementioned declines In new direct investments— 
the effect being a general decline in the new Inflow of 
total private capital. The latter declined from a post-
war peak ©f $356 million In 1957 to $176 million In I960* 
Set Inflows increased to $22$ million in 1961, hut this 
was far short of the peak level reached %n 1957* 
Although Increases In loan capital did to a 
&*$*** buffer the declines in equity capital during this 
period, the sharp declines in the former during the sub-
sequent period (1960-1963) acted to compound and intensify 
the disturbing influence of continued declines in the 
latter on Bresil1* external liquidity position. Hot 
inflows of private non-compensatory capital declined 
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 from %22$ Million in I960 to $191 million in 19621 in 
1963 a net outflow of %\ million was actually recorded. 
Amortisation paymenta on loan capital wore alio 
aignlfloant In reducing the net Inflow of private capital, 
particularly during the latter part of the period. 
Amortisation increased steadily from $4 million in 1954 
to $237 million in I960, out from that postwar peak to 
1963 e decline te $128 million was experienced. Despite 
the decline, the net outflow of this type of capital 
exceeded the met capital inflow from new loans in I960, 
1962, and 1963. During this later period amortisation 
payments declined hut not as fast as the inflow of new 
private loans.1 
Despite the declines In the net Inflow ot new 
direct Investment and the increased burden of amortisation 
on private loan capital, especially during the latter 
part of the time period in question, Brazil experienced 
mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmimmmmmmmm^ 
~En measuring the disturbing influence of swings 
in the inflow of new capital on external balance, the 
outflow of amortisation on previously acquired loan 
capital is considered in this chapter merely for purposes 
of comparison* Brazil's inability to attract a steady 
inflow of non-compensatory capital was particularly dis-
turbing In the face of the heavy burden to amortise pr*~ 
viously acquired debt* It is not the purpose of this 
chapter to assess the Impact of the amortisation burden 
on external balance. This will be appropriately aeeom-
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a net outflow of total private non-compensatory eapital 
only In 1963* With public non-compensatory eapital the 
oase was quite different, fatal figures (Table 28) reveal 
that outflow* exceeded loflews throughout the entire 
period, with exception* recorded only in 1952 and 1961* 
jkyCMs* 
Capital outflowe in the form of subscriptions to 
such intematioaal financial inetitutlona aa the later* 
national Monetary Fund, and tee International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development contributed to thie 
phenomena only la 19^8 and in 1960-1962. For the meet 
part, the net outflow of public capital wae produced by 
the heavy outflow of amort1action payment• oa previoucly 
acquired loan capital. The inflow of new loan capital 
did generally Increase during the time period in question, 
hut tee rate of increase was slight, particularly in 
relation to tee rate of increase of private and privately 
placed capital. Amortisation payments did not increase 
at a significantly faster rate than the formerj tela is 
net tee important consideration. tTnliko the eaae of 
private and privately placed capital, public loan capital 
acquired prior to 19W& produced a heavy burden of repay* 
meat which persisted throughout the entire time period 
L
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Ap**t from tho consideration of amortisation 
outflows* shifts in the inflow of pub 11 a loan capital 
were loss volatile than those of private loan capital* 
Since governmental officials can obviously hold tighter 
rains on ths former, it is logical to expect fewer sharp 
shifts with accompanying bala»oe-of-payments disturbanoes 
emanating from this typo of non-compensatory financing. 
Fluctuations in total non-compensatory capital, 
including both private and public flows, reveal only 
that private capital movements were quantitatively mors 
significant throughout most of the time period in question. 
Despite the fast that Bresil experienced net outflows of 
public capital, amortisation included, with exceptions 
noted only in 1952, 1961, and 1962, net outflows of total 
public and private capital were recorded only in 19%S-
1950 and 1963, During this initial three-year time span 
not inflows of private capital were insufficient to off-
set not outflows of the former* During subsequent periods 
they were more than sufficient in this regard. 1963 was 
unique in that mot outflows wore recorded in both 
categories. Again, considering the totals of both 
categories, it is clear that disturbing shifts were most 
pronounced from 1952 to 1954 a*>d f*om 1961 to 1963 
L
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Swinge lp the flow of short-term capital n 
In order to accurately assess the dagraa of 
balance-of-paymenta disturbance arising from swings in 
capital flows, it ia analytically useful to distinguish 
between short-term and long-term flows• Of particular 
importance in thia regard IB the measurement of swings in 
the flow of short-term speculative capital. Because of 
the sensitivity of this type of capital to conditions of 
internal instability and external imbalance in both 
creditor and debtor countries, volatile fluctuations are 
not unusual in the short run. For the debtor country, 
liquidity crises can result from sudden upswings in the 
outflow of short-term capital or from sudden downswings 
in the inflow of the same. 
In Table 30, unlike preceding tables, the basic 
categorising oriterion is the time length of the credit 
or debit commitment. Long-term private capital flows 
are distinguished from short-term flows, and official 
long-term capital movements are distinguished from 
shorter-term monetary movements* Apparent conflicts 
between Table 30 and Tables 28 and 29 can be explained 
by the following facts, i»ong-term private and official 
capital flows are usually, but not always, nen-eompens-
L atory. Short-term official monetary movements are _, 
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normally compenaatory, but ehort-term private flows can 
be both. In measuring tha disturbing influence of 
capital flows on a country'a external balance* tha 
isolation of thoaa short-term flews induced by speeu* 
latlon ia undeniably important but admittedly difficult. 
fhie aaparation ia at tamp tad isi Table 30 by excluding 
from the short-term private oapital category those 
private Institutional money Movements which were not 
speculative in nature but were, rather, balancing 
transfers of funis serving to offset other transactions 
in commodities or capital* 
In the Brazilian poatwar experience airings in 
the flow of short-term speculative capital were indeed 
volatile. In support of this statement, fable 30 
reveals that net oapital outflows were recorded in 19i+9» 
1950» 1952* 195k* 1955* 1959* and 1961 and net inflows 
during the other years, fen annual shift a from credit 
to debit status or the reverse were experienced during 
the sixteen-year time span* Clearly, no discernible 
pattern of fluctuation was established. 
let outflows of short-term private oapital 
exceeded #5$ million in 1955 ( $ % million), 1959 
($58 million), and 1961 ($53 million), and net Inflows 
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exceeded this figure In I960 ($68 million) and in 1962 
($6$ million). Fluctuations from 191$ to 195U *ere 
volatile but moved within narrower limit* than those of 
the subsequent period (1955-1963)• Unfortunately, the 
disturbing influence of swings in short-term capital 
during this latter period only compounded liquidity 
problems produced by export stagnation and unfavorable 
shifts in the terms of trade. During the earlier period 
the disturbing effects of these swings were more than 
offset by the sustained rise in export values # 
Swings in the flow of long-term capital 
Since long-term capital movements to debtor 
countries are less sensitive to conditions of domestic 
instability and external Imbalance than in the case of 
short-term speculative movements, it la expected that 
disturbances arising from swings in the former would be 
milder* In the Brazilian postwar experience It is true 
that fluctuations In neither private long-term nor 
official long-term capital were generally characterised 
by the same sharp shifts from credit to debit or from 
debit to credit status, as In the case of shorter-term 
speculative flows (Table 30). However, during certain 
key periods swings in the long-term capital movements 
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did advereely affect Bre«il»a capacity to eope with 
recurring liquidity problems, 
Thia disturbing affect waa particularly evident 
in the aaaa of private long-term movamenta of loan capital 
from 1959 to 1962 {Table 30}* From a credit balance of 
$153 million in 1959# •> sudden ehif t to a debit balance of 
$3 aillion waa experienced lit I960; from a aubsequent 
credit balanoe of $130 million in 1961, as equally aa 
sharp ehif t to a debit balanoe of $1© million waa ex* 
perleneed during the next year* With reapect to official 
long-term capital (fable 30), capital swinge moved within 
a range ae wide as that noted in the case of private short-
term capital, especially during the latter part of the 
period (1951^-1963). the shift front a credit balanoe of 
$3$ million in 195% to a debit balance of $73 million in 
1957 **» <*£ * particularly diaturbing nature* 
Conclusions 
In summary, it may be said that fluctuations in 
non-compensatory capital movements were disturbing 
throughout the entire time period of this study but were 
particularly so during the latter part of the period. 
Furthermore, it la evident that no one category considered 
L above waa aolely responsible, the fluctuations of j 
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private ihort-term speculation were generally the most 
volatile, but this wae not without exception as was noted 
above* The fluctuation a of private equity capital were 
generally the moat stable, and this wae particularly true 
of reinvestments. 
The Inability of Brazil to attract an adequate 
inflow of non-compensatory capital over time and to avoid 
the disturbing effects on external balance of sharp 
periodic downswings of the same necessitated an in-
creaaingly heavy reliance on compensatory capital, 
particularly during the latter part of the postwar period. 
Subsequent chapters will reveal that this led to a sub* 
stantial shortening of the external debt structure with 
accompanying increases in the effective rates of debt 
repayment—all of which *9rv*& to produce a serious debt 
service problem* 
This increased reliance on compensatory financing 
did not, of course, result from problems within the capital 
account alone. Earlier sections in this chapter revealed 
problems within the current account, again during this 
later period in particular. Ixport stagnation and pro-
longed deterioration in the net barter terms of trade 
adversely affected Brasilia capacity to import and to 
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 ssrvloe external debt. Had sufficient adjustments beau n 
mads within tha import structure, tha dabt serrioe 
problem could have bean alleviated? but, again, risking 
as a priori Judgmant before this mat tar can ba mora 
fully investigated in subsequent chapters, these adjust-
manta ware not adaquata in this regard* Reductions in 
tha Importation of inaaaantial Items were generally 
off sat by sharp inoraasas in tha importation of thoaa 
itams raqulrad for purposes of subsistence and for 
purposss of Maintaining rising levels of domestic 
protestion* 
Although this chaptar did reveal severe balance-
of-payment a disturbanoa during tha time pariod of this 
study* eonclusiona conoarning tha savarity of accompanying 
liquidity problams aro premature, fhaas el amenta of 
disturbanoa must first ba analysad In relation to tha 
balance-of-paymente rigidity and adjustment axpariancad 
during this period, fha analytical focus of Chapters IV 
and V nill ba directed towards thaaa considerations. 
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BALAKCS-OP-PAYMEKTS RIQIDITT IK 
THE BRAZILIAN EXPERIENCE 
She purpose of this chapter Is to measure the 
degree of rigidity in Brasilia balance of payments from 
19l|& to 1963* 2hs k*y chapter parameters are element a 
of rigidity in the form of contractually fixed external 
debt service obligations* Although attention is also 
directed towards the Inherent Inflexibility in Brazil's 
import structure, this phase of the analysis Is sub* 
ordinated to considerations relating to the country's 
external debt structure. In effect, import Inflexibility 
is measured only to the extent that debt service problems 
are compounded* 
In assessing changes is the degree of rigidity In 
Brasllt s balance of payments during the postwar period, 
the chapter focuses on the burden of debt service obli-
gations. Fluctuations in service payments are statis-
tically measured, and the impact of their claim on the 
flow #f Brasllts foreign exchange receipts is similarly 
weighed* A distinction is drawn between service obli-
gations arising from loan capital and those arising from 
L J 
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requity capital (particularly* ecjuity capital invested in n 
export industries) since the former, unlike the latter, 
usually carries with it a fixed service commitment regard-
less cf fluctuations in external receipts. As vas ex* 
plained in Chapter I, returns on equity capital do tend, 
under certain circumstances, to vary directly with 
fluctuations in external receipts• 
Since the proportion of foreign exchange earnings 
absorbed by aggregate service payments depends on the 
volume of past capital inflow, its rate of return, and 
the terms of repayment as well as on the flow of external 
receipts, all are pertinent in assessing balanoe-of ~ 
payments rigidity arising from the necessity of employing 
foreign capital, and all are included within the analytical 
framework of this chapter* 
For the purpose of deriving relationships between 
those elements of disturbance, measured in Chapter XIX, 
and these elements of rigidity arising from foreign capital 
accumulation, liquidity crisis Indicators are employed. 
Clearly, periodic crises of the type statistically 
evident In the Brazilian experience were protects not 
only of the degree of disturbance with respect to the 
former hut also of the degree of rigidity with respect to 
^he latter* _, 
19? 
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 Bit principal tool of analysis employed in this 
regard is the "debt service ratio* defined as the pro* 
portion of foreign exchange earnings absorbed by interest 
payment and amortization repayment on external debt. 
Other variations of this ratio and other combinations of 
variables in the form of ratios and residuals are employed 
(see Chapter I) since it is obvious that fluctuations in 
external earnings were not the only sources of disturbance 
in Brazil*s balance of payments, and interest and amorti-
zation vert not the only sources of rigidity* 
Effective interest rates are computed and utilized 
as appropriate measures of changes of time* These are 
obtained by expressing actual interest payments made by 
Brazil during a given year as a percentage of the average 
of debt outstanding at the beginning and at the end of the 
year* Effective amortisation rates and effective time 
periods of repayment are computed utilising the same 
techniques—the latter simply expressed as the reciprocal 
of the former, 
411 significant relationships between Brazil's 
periodic liquidity problems and its debt structure, 
broken down into the various component parts mentioned 
above* are derived in this chapter $ final conclusions* 
ihowrer* art deferred until all related variables*- _i 
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rspecifically, the aforementioned elements of balsaee-of- n 
payments adjustment—are fully evaluated la Chapter ?• 
Sinoe the ability of a debtor country to adjust 
to conditions of liquidity shortage depends* in part, 
upon the degree of compressibility within the import 
structure, a high degree of inflexibility in this regard 
can deny the country the extensive use of this effective 
tool of adjustment, fo determine whether this problem 
arose in the Brazilian experience, the Import structure 
Is appropriately examined. 
Utilizing the statistical breakdown of Brazil*a 
Import struoture accomplished Is Chapter III, differ-
entiation is made In this chapter between those Imports 
which were oompressible and those which were not* All 
Import Items required for subsistence or for the purpose 
of supporting domestic production levels are placed In 
the latter category* while all others are placed in the 
former. Clearly, the higher the share of the latter in 
total imports, the greater the degree of inflexibility In 
the struoture itself* Of oourse, this assertion that 
production-supporting Imports were non-compressible is 
based on the assumption that Brazil was unwilling to 
risk the consequences of reductions In domestic output 
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nad domestically generated income simply to relieve the 
preeaure on scarce foreign exchange receipt*, fo meet 
current external debt service obligations by sacrificing 
current output or income levels would have been par* 
tieularly irrational since sustained growth In both income 
and savings is essential in providing the internal bass 
for continuing debt service. The assertion that basic 
subsistence goods were non-compressible, on the other 
hand, is made on even safer and mors obvious grounds* 
It is not the intention of the chapter, however, 
to measure the degree of inflexibility in Br*sil* s import 
structure in isolation* It IB measured but only in 
relation to external dobt service rigidity and only to 
the extent that the country's external debt service 
capacity was affected* 
Blgldity in the Brazilian 
External Debt Structure 
mmmmmmimmmimmmmmmmimmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm 
The rigidity of contractually fixed debt service 
obligations in the form of interest payments and amorti-
zation repayments on loan capital is undeniable* Regard-
less of the external fortunes of the debtor countries, 
these commitments must be met* The only alternatives are 
postponement or cancellation under a new contract or 
L J 
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cancellation In violation of the existing contract. The n 
former, of course, is more accurately an alternative of 
the creditor not the borrower, and the latter ia quite 
clearly a measure of last resort with obvious undesirable 
implications* Is comparing the rigidity of interest pay* 
meats to that of amortisation repayments, the short-run 
implications on external balance are identical. Both are 
equally rigid with respect to periodic liquidity crises • 
However, assuming that external debt can he refunded over 
the long run, there is reason to exclude amortisation as a 
factor of balenoe-of-payments rigidity. Thus, in assessing 
the long-run implications of debt service rigidity, there 
is reason to measure fluctuations in Interest payments in 
isolation. 
It is true in reference to many debtor countries in 
the ym&*** of development that returns on foreign equity 
capital do tend to fluctuate pari passu and In the same 
direction as total export earnings* this direct relation-
ship arises from the existence of two conditions in these 
countries; first, the heavy concentration of direct 
foreign investments in export sectors and secondly, the 
large share of export products from those industries in 
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which direct foreign oapltal la invested in total exports.1 
Although these are common conditions among debtor 
countries, especially those dependent upon extractive 
export industries, they do not hold for Braail. Foreign-
owned export enterprises are of minor significance in 
Brazilj direct investments are diversified, producing for 
demostio as troll as for foreign consumption. Furthermore, 
the productive facilities for Bra*il»s throe principal 
export products—coffee, cocoa, and cotton—are almost 
exclusively internally owned. As a result, there is no 
justifiable reason to believe that transferred earnings 
from equity capital would tend to vary directly with export 
earnings} therefore, they must be considered as potential 
sources of balance-of-payments rigidity in this study. 
Two valid distinctions may be drawn, however, between 
returns m loan capital and returns on equity capital. 
The latter are more readily postponable and may mora 
readily be reinvested. If the central government of the 
debtor country places restrictions on the repatriation 
of earnings from equity capital, not only la the outflow 
^International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, International Development Association, Economic 
growth and External Debts Essays, III, 3. 
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of foreign exchange controlled, but involuntary rein-
vestments are also stimulated. 
In the Brazilian experience during the postwar 
period, total debt service Including returns on equity 
capital generally increased, but this was not without 
exception (Sable 31). From a level of $169 million in 
1948* debt serriee payments Increased to $211 million In 
1949} however, during the subsequent three-year period, 
payments declined to $197 million (1950)* to $136 million 
(19$1)» and to $158 million (1952)* thereafter, service 
payments increased sharply, apart from an isolated decline 
in 1955 # reaching a postwar peak level of $603 million In 
I960* Despite moderate declines to $514 million (1961) 
and to $1*36 million (1963), debt service at the end of 
the period remained well above the largest amount paid 
between 1%B and 195k ($278 million in 195W. Xt la 
obvious from Table 31 that the average annual debt service 
paid between 1955 *»©* 1963 wjta considerably larger than 
that of the preceding period* 
fhe general increase in total debt service during 
the time period of this study was for the most part the 
product of Increased amortisation and interest payments on 
loan capital* Amortisation on private loan capital, 
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although insignificant from 19^8 to 1952f increased 
sharply frem $4 million in 1954 to the postwar peak of 
$237 million In I960. Subsequent declines to $210 million 
(1961)* $168 million (1962), and $128 million (1963) were 
principally responsible for the apparent easing of the 
total debt service burden during this three-year time span. 
Amortisation on public lean capital generally increased 
throughout the sixteen-year time period although sharp 
declines were experienced from 1949 ($107 million) to 
1951 ($27 million) and from 1959 ($186 million) to 1961 
($117 million}* In general, the rates of increases were 
considerably less than those of amortisation on private 
loan capital, especially during the critical period from 
1954 to 1963* tTnlike the latter, amortisation on public 
loan capital reached a postwar peak in 1963 ($22$ million)* 
Despite the significant increase of this type of debt 
service from the 1961-1962 levels ($117 million and $122 
million respectively), total debt service payments 
declined* 
As might be expected, fluctuations of interest 
payments on loan capital (Table 31) closely paralleled 
those of total amortisation during the time period In 
question* Payments generally increased with the peak 
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rlevel experienced in 1%0 ($12? million)* Isolated n 
annual declines were quantitatively of minor significance 
with the exception of the sharp decline from $123 million 
in 1962 to $83 million in 1963.X 
She exception to the general pattern of fluctuation 
of debt service payments was the case of transferred 
earnings from equity capital * When the Brasllian external 
trade posture was strongest (1* e., during the early part 
of the postwar era, 19lj.8-1953># transferred earnings 
generally increased. The peak postwar payment was made in 
1951 (#137 million). However, during the latter part of 
the postwar period, when Brazil was troubled with export 
stagnation and terms-of-trade deterioration, a reversal 
of trend was observed* Transferred earnings steadily 
declined from a level of $120 million in 1953 t* $42 
million in 1958* When the external trade picture brightened 
slightly after 1958. small annual increases in transferred 
earnings were evidenced* 
Superficially, this might seem to support the con-
tention that this type of debt service tends to vary 
directly with external receipts. However* in Chapter III 
3-fhe reliability of this 1963 statistic is 
questionable. See page 10 In the dissertation Introduction. 
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-It was noted that reinvested earnings from direct in* i 
vestmenta remained relatively steady throughout the 
latter part of the time period In question, unlike the 
case of new investments. Risking again an a priori judg-
ment before the matter is more fully investigated in 
Chapter Vf it would appear as though earnings transferred 
abroad declined during those periods of export stagnation 
and terms-of-trade deterioration* not because of the 
aforementioned direct relationship but rather because of 
the official restrictions against repatriation which 
artificially induced reinvestment* It should be further 
noted, of course, that these declines in transferred 
earnings tempered the general increase in total debt 
service. If total debt service is computed excluding 
these returns, clearly, the rates of increases during 
those critical periods of external imbalance are larger* 
Changes in the Rates and in the 
Time Length of External 
Debt Repayment 
in H i! wi immmmmmtitmmmmmmmmmmimm 
fhe burden of debt serviee obligations depends, of 
course, on the rates of interest and amortisation and the 
length of the time period of repayment* to assess changes 
in this burden It Is meaningful to measure changes in 
these aforementioned variables* Close approximations can 
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rbe made by utilizing the concept of "effective* rates. 
As was explained in the introduction to this chapter, 
change* in interest charges can be derived by expressing 
annual interest payments as a percentage of the average of 
debt outstanding at the beginning and at the end of the 
particular year in question * Effective amortization rates 
are measured by employing the same technique with actual 
amortisation payments in the numerator, and the average 
effective time period of repayment is simply the inverse 
of this (1. e.* the average of debt outstanding at the 
beginning and at the end of the year divided by the value 
of amortisation payments made during the year)* 
Changes in the effective rates of public debt 
service in the Brazilian experience are measured in 
fable 32. It is evident that effective interest rates 
generally Increased during the latter part of the time 
period in question (1955*1963)* From an average of 
2.1 pmw cent paid during the preceding period (19ij.8*195t|.) 
the effective rate increased to k^ P** *«it by 1963, 
although declines were recorded in 1958 and 1961. 
Because of the chronic balance-of-payments deficits 
suffered during this period, It became necessary for 
Brazil to attract foreign capital in increasing amounts. 
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It is not illogical to assume that Brae 11 was forced to 
contract new loans after 1955 *t rates higher than those 
of the earlier period (19M**1954)« *he aforementioned 
Increases in effective rates reflect that necessity* 
Of equal significance was the sharp increase in 
the effective rate of amortisation during the latter part 
of the sixteen-year time span (Table 32)• Prom an average 
of 6.5 per cent paid during the preceding period (1943-
1954) t th* effective rate of principal repayment increased 
to a postwar peak of 12.9 per cent in 1958, remained at a 
high level through I960* and then after a sharp drop to 
8*9 p^v oent in 1961f rose again to 9*9 per cent in 1963* 
This acceleration in the tempo of principal repayment 
reflected, of course, a significant shortening of the 
effective period of maturity, from a 1948*1954 average 
of 15*3 yearsf a steady decline to 7»7 years was ex-
perienced by 1958. A lengthening of the debt structure 
commenced in 1959* but it was sfeert~lived* the effective 
time period of repayment declined in I960 and again from 
1961 through 1963* !»a sharp deellne from the average 
level of the earlier period to the low levels experienced 
during this later period is readily explainable. First of 
alif because of the aftermath of war*time disruptions it 
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was common practice In dispensing long-term credit* 
during the middle and late 192j.Ofa to grant a grace period 
before amortisation commenced.1 
These grace periods, of course, lead to abnormally 
long effective time periods of repayment. In Brazil, the 
shortening of the debt structure in the early 1950*» 
actually resulted in part from the discontinuance of this 
lending policy of deferred amortisation repayment. A 
farther reason for this phenomenon is related to external 
imbalance. It was necessary for Brazil during this earlier 
period to shorten Its debt structure by contracting for 
shorter-term compensatory capital. Although this earlier 
period was characterized by healthy export growth and 
favorable shifts in terms of trade, it was alio charac-
terized by import growth and chronic deficits on service 
account. Large deficits on current accounts (fable 1) 
requiring compensatory financing were experienced in 1951 
($k?0 million), 1952 ($709 million)* and again in 195k 
($135 million). 
The necessity of shortening the debt structure 
through compensatory financing continued throughout most 
of the latter part of the time period in question and 
•*Avramovic, op. clt., p. 35 • _j 
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actually became ohronic* Large deficits on current 
account were recorded from 1957 through 1963 without 
exception* Unlike the preceding period, Increases In 
merchandise Importation were of minor Importance in 
producing these deficitsi export and terms-of-trade diffi-
culties were* on the other hand, of paramount Importance* 
Deficits on service account were common to both periods* 
of course, but during the latter period Increased payments 
of Interest and dividends on accumulated debt had a 
telling effect (Tables 1 and 2). Although this require-
ment was partially relieved by Increased Inflows of non-
compensatory capital* particularly In relation to those 
of the earlier period, accumulated medium-term debt from 
the preceding period accelerated the repayment process* 
and the continued requirement to borrow in the medium and 
short term for compensatory reasons merely compounded the 
problem* 
fhe aforementioned slight lengthening of the debt 
structure towards the end of the latter period resulted 
primarily from successful attraction of longer-term non-
compensatory capital—a fact mentioned above* This 
phenomena afforded some relief to the pressure applied 
to external balance by debt service rigidity. As was 
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"noted before, this rigidity eased slightly after I960— n 
a contention supported by general declines in the 
absolute values of debt service outflows (Table 31)• 
Interestingly, the largest deficit on current account 
($5ij.8 million) and the largest inflow of compensatory 
capital ($1-30 million) during the latter part of the time 
period of this study were both recorded in I960* from 
these peak levels irregular declines were recorded. 
The external improvements experienced from 1961 
to 1963 AS reflected in smaller deficits on current 
account in general and on service account in particular, 
in smaller inflows of compensatory financing, and in 
smaller outflows of debt service payments were not of 
major consequence, however. The rates of decline from 
peaks reached in 1958-1960 were small, and the reduced 
levels at the end of the period (1963) were hitter, and 
in most cases considerably higher, than the averages of 
the period from 19i|.8 to 1951*. Also, it cannot be said 
that a trend was established, first of all, a three-year 
period is too short to clearly discern a trend of any 
type. Secondly, the declines of the variables, enu-
merated above, from 1961 to 1963 were irregular in all 
cases* 
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 External !>ebt Obligations at the Bnd 
of the Time Period of this Study 
The hoary debt accumulation during tho mid and 
lata 1950fa and tho early 1960»s la reflooted Is the debt 
outstanding and the repayment obligations remaining at the 
end of the time period. As of December 31, 1963, total 
debt repayment obligations amounted to more than $3 billion* 
77*8 per cent of which was scheduled interest payments. 
It le Interesting to note that over 9@«5 per oent of this 
total obligation was scheduled for payment In convertible 
currencies (Table 33). 
As an Indication of the severity of Brasilia 
external imbalance, particularly during the latter part 
of the alxteen«*year time span, it is also interesting to 
note that scheduled amortization and interest payments on 
debts incurred fo* the purpose of external adjustment 
amounted to more than hfi per cent of the total obligation. 
Despite the eritioal nature of the period from a develop-
mental standpoint, scheduled debt service on debts incurred 
for the purpose of development amounted to only 55.3 
per oent. Of the approximately $1.7 billion scheduled 
for repayment of this latter type of debt, 65.6 per cent 
was in return for private external financing, the residual 
£or official financing. Scheduled service payments on _J 
rpreviously consolidated debts amounted to approximately 
2.7 p*r cent of the total obligation (fable 3k)* 
Insights into previous discussions of the observed 
shortening of the Brazilian debt structure during the 
latter part of the sixteen-year time spas can be gained 
from a closer scrutiniaation of this repayment schedule. 
Of the total service obligation, a sizable !&•© per cent 
was scheduled for repayment by 1966, a three-year time 
span and 60 per cent by 1968, a five-year time span. Of 
service obligations on debt incurred for the purposes of 
external adjustment and developmental financing, ij.0.2 
per cent and lj.9.3 per cent respectively were scheduled 
for repayment by 1966 and $1 per cent and 68»li per cent 
respectively by 1968, In reference to this latter 
category, 3Z+2 per cent and 49.1 po* cent of service 
payments on official loan capital and 58.2 per cent and 
82.5 per cent of service payments on private loan capital 
were scheduled for 1966 and I960 respectively. 
The heavy burden of repayment in the three- and 
five*year time period* subsequent tc 196J is particularly 
evident in the case of these private obligations. A 
more liberal repayment schedule la, of course, to be 
expected in the cage of public financing, but the repay-
ment differential above is nevertheless noteworthy* J 
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Tha fact that the Immediate repayment burden of n 
capital incurred for developmental purposes exceeded that 
of capital incurred for external adjustment is not sur-
prising, Table 3J4. merely measures the external debt out-
standing as of December 31, 1963, and the burden of debt 
service subsequent to 19631 it does not reveal when the 
debts were incurred nor to what extent grace periods were 
permitted by creditors. In the Brazilian experience heavy 
inflows of developmental loan capital were noted through-
out the entire postwar period, while similar requirements 
for purposes of external balance were noted mainly during 
the latter part of the period (1955*1963)• It is logical$ 
therefore9 to expect a more rapid rate of debt maturity 
subsequent to 1963 in the former case* Furthermoref since 
Brazil was burdened with excessive debt service obli-
gations in the face of severe external imbalance through-
out this latter period, it is also logical to expect an 
easing of this burden by dispensers of compensatory 
capital (particularly the IMF) in the form of longer 
grace periods and even debt deferment* 
Of greater analytical significance is the sub* 
stantial contribution of debt service on compensatory 
capital to the total service obligation subsequent to 1963. 
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Shis intensification of the already heavy burden was a 
product, of course, of the chronic external Imbalance 
suffered throughout the latter part of the time period in 
question. 
Finally, inasmuch as new credits contracted after 
1963 are not Included In the repayment schedules presented 
In fables 33 and yl±0 the debt service burden, although 
heavy, Is clearly understated. 
Fluctuations In External Debt Service In 
Relation to Those In External Receipts 
Ultimately, the question of what constitutes a 
reasonable level of foreign indebtedness depends upon 
a country's ability to earn and save foreign ex-
change over and above the immediate requirements for 
consumption. 1 
In constructing liquidity crisis indicators, it is logical, 
therefore, to relate debt service to foreign exchange 
earnings* Of course, one important fact pointed out in 
Chapter X is that the ratio of debt service to external 
receipts on current account Is only a partial indicator in 
this regard. Since there are sources of external dis-
turbance other than fluctuations in external earnings, 
^Douglas A. Scott, "External Debt-Management 
Policy in a developing Country,* Financing African Develop-
ment (Cambridge, Mass.t fhe MIf Press, 1965)» p« 50. 
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the utilization of this ratio alone may involve a serious 
distortion. In evaluating the Brazilian postwar ex-
perience, however, greater emphasis can be placed on this 
one indicator than would be normally Justifiable beoause 
export stagnation was by far the greatest source of ex-
ternal imbalance. Perhaps more accurately It should be 
said that sharp declines In export values were the crux of 
the problem* Deterioration in the net barter terms of 
trade was primarily the product of steady declines in the 
prices of principal export products! Increases in Import 
prices were of relatively minor significance. By 
measuring changes in external receipts in the denominator 
of the debt service ratio, account Is taken not only of 
stagnation In export quantum but also of this type of 
terms-of-trade deterioration* 
Other sources of external disturbance (1. e.» 
increases In Importation and shifts in the flow of capital) 
were of minor quantitative significance compared to the 
above. Although Import quanta did increase moderately 
during the latter part of the sixteen-year period when 
liquidity problems persisted, import values increased 
only slightly (Tables 20 and 23). The effect of these 
latter increases on Brazilts external balance during this 
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critical period was, therefore, relatively mild* In-
creased Inflexibility In the Import structure did make & 
significant contribution In this regard, however. The 
extent of this contribution will be assessed in this 
chapter by a measurement of the impact of increased non-
oompressible imports in the Brazilian import structure 
on external imbalance• 
Although it was shown in Chapter III that shifts 
in capital flows were sources of disturbance throughout 
the entire period, of greater quantitative importance 
were the substantial increases in both capital receipts 
and capital expenditures from the earlier period {19i|8-
19$i|.) to the later period (19fJ5~19o3)* $ha chronic 
external imbalance during the late 1950* • and early 
I960* a necessitated an increasingly heavy inflow on new 
capital, but this merely »*rv*& to compound the in-
oreasingly severe debt service burden which, in turn, 
required additional external financing. Thus, Brasll*s 
external debt service problems contributed directly and 
indirectly to both increased capital expenditures and 
increased capital receipts. 
Apart from the Indirect effect on capital receipts, 
the amortisation burden is reflected in the sharp rise in 
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tha gross outflow of capital from the earlier to the 
later parlod* and tha interest and dividend burden la 
reflected 1B tha sharp riea In gross service expendi-
tures (Table 5). With raspact to the lattar, It Is 
furthar evident that not service expenditures also In* 
oraasad between thasa two time periods despite tha faot 
that substantial declinea wore experienced in other service 
items| notably, not transportation expenditures. In this 
light, tha increased debt service burden is even mora 
noteworthy. 
The ratio of interest and amortization 
on loan capital to external receipts 
Since debt service obligations In the form of 
interest and amortisation on loan capital were the most 
rigid elements in Brazil's balance of payments during the 
time parlod of this study and since declines in external 
earnings were the most disturbing elements, the ratio of 
the former to tha latter is Indeed most appropriate as a 
liquidity crisis indicator. 
If returns on acuity capital are excluded from the 
numerator, the debt service ratio displayed three dls-
oernible trends during the slxteen»year period (Table 31), 
From 11.3 P#** aent (191*9) the ratio declined sharply to 
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2.7 par cent In 1951* Inoreasea w«y« small in 1952 and 
1953* &»* aftar a sharp rise In 195k# tea ratio continued 
to rise ateadily and uninterruptedly to a postwar peak of 
37.2 par cent in I960. Although tha ratio remained at a 
high level through 1963 both In relation to aarlter 
Brasilia** experiences and in comparison to othar debtor 
countries at a comparable stage of development,1 declines 
were experienced In 1961 (33*5 par oant) and again in 
1963 (29»2 p%t cent), 
From an analytical point of view, it la clear 
that tha degree of pressure on external liquidity to which 
Braiil was exposed actually subsided during tha early part 
of tha postwar period, 191*8-1951 • The pressure increased 
slightly in 1952 and 1953 hut not to tha extant that 
ll<|ttidity crises W*T% produoad. Frost 195k ^o I960, 
however, sharp rises in debt service accompanied by 
dealinas in external raoelpta aignifleantly inoraaaad tha 
degree of pY*$mr* on Brasilia soaroa foraign exchange. 
It must ha remembered, of ooursa, that tha mag-
nitude of the strain and tha Intensity of the resulting 
liquidity crisis or crises cannot be ascertained by 
focusing on this ratio alone. 01aarly# tha strain ©an be 
^AvraMovio, op. olt., pp. 90-103. 
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relieved and the potential crisis averted by either 
automatic or policy-induced balanee-of.*paymenta adjust-
ments. The efficacy of adjustment policies determines 
Whether debt service obligations can be successfully 
honored over time in the face of crises which cannot be 
completely averted• The degree of inflexibility in a 
country9s import structure determines to a very great 
extent whether the adjustment policy of import com-
pression can serve effectively in this regard. Increased 
Import inflexibility over time can reduce the effective-
ness of this policy and can, therefore, compound and 
intensify the pressure applied by a high debt service 
ratio on external balance* On the other hand, reduced 
import inflexibility can have the opposite effect. It 
must be concluded, therefore, that although the high and 
rising debt service ratio from 195t to I960 indicated a 
prolonged liquidity crisis, final assessment must await 
not only tfee analysis of balance-of-paymente elements of 
adjustment in Chapter f but also the measurement of 
balanee-of-payments rigidity in the form of non-
compressible imports later in this chapter. 
It is also debatable whether a high or a 
rising debt service ratio Is a better indicator of 
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liquidity crises. Ho choice need be made in reference 
to the period from 195U to I960; the ratio was both high 
and rising* However, such a choice is necessary for the 
cubsequent period, 1960-1963; the ratio declined but 
remained high, fhe question is whether the decline 
actually relieved the pressure on scarce foreign exchange 
or whether these high ratios {1961*1963} continued to 
exert suffisient pressure on external balance to actually 
produce continued liquidity crises. The answer to this 
question must also await further analysis in this chapter 
and in the next. 
The ratio of total debt service, including 
transferred earnings from equity 
capital, to external receipts 
It returns on equity capital are included in the 
numerator of the debt service ratio (fable 31)# it is 
evident that fluctuations over the sixteen-year time span 
followed the same basic pattern as that of the preceding 
ratio. Since an additional variable is included in the 
numerator of the former, one obvious difference is that 
it nas consistently higher than the latter. Of a less 
obvious nature is the fact that the differential was 
%ee Chapter 1$ pages $0*55 • 
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generally greater during the earlier part of the period 
<19l*£-1953) than during the later (19$1*-1958). $hla, of 
course, reflected the reductions, apparently artificially 
lndueed, In the outflow of transferred earnings from 
direot investments. These reductions acted to buffer 
the deteriorating external liquidity posture of Braall 
during this later period (195ij.*19£8}» as sueht the debt 
service ratio, including transferred earnings* increased 
less sharply than the other* Surprisingly, a reversal of 
this trend was evidenced from 1956 to the end of the 
period* Wider fluctuations in transferred earnings caused 
a ah&vpBT inereaae from 1958 to I960 and a sharper decline 
from I960 to 1963 in the former than in the ease of the 
latter. 
In comparing these two ratios it becomes evident 
that their relative usefulness as liquidity crisis in-
dicators depends, in part, on the degree of control 
exerted by public authorities over the outflow of trans-
ferred earnings. If tight controls are enforced, the 
ratio including these returns will reflect the reaction 
to potential or actual liquidity crises and will serve 
less effectively as an indicator inasmuch as this 
phenomenon may not be readily recognizable. A liquidity 
L j 
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crisis may be concealed by the fact that an element of 
Immediate adjustment Is Included In the Indicator Itself. 
In the ratio excluding transferred earnings only ecu* 
traotually fixed debt service obligations arc measured 
with no immediate possibility of policy-induced adjust-
ment other than through debt default* The debt service 
ratio should be a measurement of the rigidity Introduced 
In a country* s balance of payments by the obligation to 
pay a predetermined amount} the rigidity of transferred 
earnings from equity capital is clearly considerably less 
than that of fixed Interest on loan capital. 
The ratio of interest payments on loan capital 
and dividend payments on equity capital 
to external receipts 
It has been pointed out that the weakness of 
Including amortization in the numerator of the debt service 
ratio involves the probability that the debt will be 
refunded. Assuming that thle is possible, then the real 
burden on external resources arises not from total debt 
service but rather from fixed interest and dividend-1 
claims* If the debtor country is not forced to finance 
amortisation from annual external receipts, then its 
^The same reservations apply here as before* 
Inclusion In the numerator of the ratio can be mis* 
leading. 
to avoid this potential bias In the debt service 
ratio It la useful to meaaure only interest and dividend 
payments In the numerator* Slnoe It has been acknowledged 
that interest payments are the most rigid elements In a 
debtor country's debt structure, It Is also useful and 
meaningful to measure them In isolation* 
In the Brazilian experience fluctuations in the 
ratio of interest payments to external receipts (fable 
35) followed roughly the same pattern as those involving 
total debt service (Table 3 D with a few Important ex-* 
captions* She former declined from 191+8 (2*3 pax* eent) 
to 1951 (1.2 per cent) but less sharply than in the case 
of the latter* The subsequent rise of the former which 
began in 1952 (1*8 p^r cent) reached the postwar peak 
level In 1962 (9*5 per cant) two years after the peak 
level of the latter* Unlike the latter* however, the 
general rise la the ratio of interest payments to ex-
ternal receipts was not uninterrupted. Small declines 
were experienced in 1955» 195$ # *»<* again In 1961* If* 
therefore* this type of ratio can be &Bm»&0d as the 
most meaningful in the Brazilian experience* it cannot 
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be concluded that Brazil suffered increased uninter-
rupted pressure on external resources during the latter 
part of the time period in question. However, because of 
the smallness of the aforementioned declines, the relief 
afforded oannot be assessed as substantial. More impor-
tantly, the general rise in this ratio, outlined above, 
merely confirms previous indications that "cash squeeze* 
problems were prevalent duritsg the latter time period. 
As might be expected, the ratio of dividend 
payments from equity capital to external receipts dis-
played an entirely different pattern of fluctuation than 
in the oase involving contractually fixed interest pay* 
ments (fable 35) • Respite healthy export growth from 
19Jj£ to 1953» the former generally rose (from 6 J* 
per cent to 7#3 P«r cent), and despite export stagnation 
during the subsequent period to 1958, the ratio steadily 
declined (from ?.3 p#* oent to 3#0 per cent). Fluctua-
tions In the latter were offsetting to the extent that 
the ratio of Interest and dividend payments to external 
receipts fluctuated within relatively narrow limits 
between 19k& (8.? per cent) and 195? (8.i|. per cent). 
Increased dividend payments after 1958, however, combined 
with continued Increased interest payments, produced 
L -J 
sharp rises in this ratio from 7*7 V* oent (1958) to n 
IS.9 par cent (1962). Again, as In the ease of the 
ratio including only interest payments, the postwar peak 
(1962) of this ratio was reached two years after that 
including total debt service. Although all ratios 
measured up to this point have displayed a sharp decline 
from 1962 to 1963, data pertaining to this latter year 
are preliminary and, therefore, unreliable. Apart from 
these questionable declines, all ratios measured, with 
the exception of the ratio including only transferred 
earnings on equity capital in the numerator, reveal a 
postwar trough between 1951 and 1952 and a steady sub-
stantial rise subsequently. 
The ratio of amortization repayments 
to external earnings 
She greatest postwar contribution to the rising 
ratio of total debt service to external earnings was made 
by Increased amortisation on loan capital. This is 
evident not only from the dissection of service payments 
in fable 31 but also from the measurement of changes in 
the ratio of total amortisation to external earnings in 
fable 35. Following the decline from 9#2 per cent in 19i|B 
to 1.5 par cent in 1951* this ratio increased sharply and 
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steadily to the postwar peak level of 28 .ij. per cent In 
I960* Subsequent declines in amortisation outflows 
reduced the ratio to 23,7 per oent by 1963. 
The significant increases during the critical 
period from 1952 to I960 were in direct contrast with the 
aforementioned declines in the ratio of transferred 
earnings on equity capital to external earnings* Further-
more, the rates of Increase of the former were con-
sistently sharper than in the ease of the ratio of 
interest payments to external earnings, and unlike the 
latter, the Increases In the former were uninterrupted 
throughout the period. 
The fact that amortisation on loan capital in-
creased faster than Interest payments reflected, of 
course, a shortening of the Brazilian debt structure. 
Further evidence of this phenomenon and an assessment of 
the implications are presented later on In this chapter. 
The ratio of public debt service 
to external earnings 
One final useful variation of the debt service 
ratio measures changes in public debt service in relation 
to external receipts. As was pointed out earlier, this 
measurement is extensively used by TJ. S. and international 
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lending institutions, particularly the World Bank, in 
assessing the credit worthiness of debtor countries* 
Its popularity as a liquidity crisis indicator is based 
on two considerations: (1) unreliable or unavailable 
data pertaining to service commitments on private debt 
and (2) the practice among debtor countries of giving top 
priority to the repayment of public debt. Since the re-
payment of publicly guaranteed private debt is usually 
given as high a priority as that of public, the numer-
ator of the ratio appropriately Includes both. 
As far as Brazil is concerned, statistical 
deficiencies or discrepancies are less of a problem than 
in the case of other comparable debtor countries, par-
ticularly in Latin America, The Superintendency of 
Money and Credit of Brazil*1 publishes comprehensive 
reports on past and present debt service commitments. 
However, since the Superintendency Is a relatively young 
institution, data relating to the latter part of the time 
period In question (1955-1963) are unquestionably more 
complete. The second consideration enumerated above most 
certainly applies to th# Brazilian experience, Priority 
systems for external payments, implemented by the 
*See the Bibliography, 
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Imposition of both quantitative and qualitative controls, 
were In effect throughout most of the time period of 
this study.1 
Assuming the appropriateness of excluding private 
debt service from the ratio, the postwar Brazilian ex-
perience did produce cause for concern with respect to 
external credit worthiness* From a postwar trough of 
2.7 per cent in 1951» the ratio of public debt service to 
external earnings rose generally, although not uninter-
ruptedly, throughout the remaining part of the sixteen-
year time spas (fable 35). the general pattern of 
fluctuation of this ratio roughly paralleled that of the 
ratio Including private as well as public debt service| 
however, there were some noteworthy differences. In 
the former case, increased rigidity was evidenced late 
in the period (22,? p^r cent in 1962, the postwar peak 
level, and 22.4 per cent In 1963) while in the latter, 
reduced rigidity was indicated (fable 31), More note-
worthy were the relative rates of Increase of the two 
ratios during the critical period from 195U to I960. 
fhe relatively slow rate of growth of interest and 
*fhe system will be comprehensively treated in 
Chapter ?. 
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amortisation on public debt compared to that of interest 
and amortization on private debt resulted obviously in a 
relatively slow rate of growth of the ratio of publio debt 
to external earnings* 
Sxtornal receipts remaining 
after debt service 
Ratios of the type measured in preoedlng pages 
are meaningful indicators of external liquidity problems. 
It is also analytically meaningful to measure absolute 
changes in this regard. To accurately assess the strain 
on liquidity produced by increased debt service in relation 
to external earnings* changes in the level of import 
requirements should be compared to changes in the level 
of import capacity. One traditional technique for 
measuring the latter excludes changes in debt service 
obligations, External earnings are adjusted for changes 
In import prices (by using price Indices to deflate the 
series) but not for changes in debt service* Such an 
exclusion can be deceiving.1 If debt service receives 
first priority on foreign exchange earnings—and this is 
highly probable especially in the case of contractually 
^Import capacity excluding adjustments for debt 
service was measured In Chapter III* See pages 177-180* 
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fixed obligations arising from public or privately 
placed capital inflows,—then obviously these funds 
will not be available to satisfy Import needs. 
In Tables 36 and 37 the attempt Is made to avoid 
this potential bias by considering the effect of changes 
in both debt service and Import prices on external 
receipts. Absolute changes in both the money and the 
real value of external earnings remaining after debt 
service are measured in Table 36, and relative annual 
changes In both are measured In Table 37* Although the 
rigidity of transferred earnings from equity capital is 
questionable, they are included in the adjustment for 
reasons stated above* Repatriated earnings, even though 
delayed, obviously affeot a country's capacity to import. 
The money value of external earnings after debt 
service declined sharply after the postwar peak of 
$1,645 million was reached In 1951* $h* decline to the 
postwar trough ($8l|.l million) in I960 was interrupted 
*It should be mentioned, of eourse, that a broad 
definition of a country1 s total capacity to import should 
include capital inflows as well as outflows. However, 
one purpose of this analysis is to isolate and relate 
those factors which necessitated the Increasingly heavy 
Inflows of capital observed during the postwar period* 
As such, Import capacity is defined here in a narrower 
sense• 
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 only by a moderate increase from 1952 ($lf329 million) 
to 1953 ($1,^4-0 million) and a small increase from 1955 
($1,287 million) to 1956 ($1,305 million). Bio impact 
of this decline on external balance can be beet assessed 
by a comparison of changes in import values to changes in 
these remaining external earnings* The former exceeded 
the latter in every year with only three exceptions— 
1950» 1953 # And 1956* Of greater importance was the 
widening gap experienced between 1954 *&& I960* In 
producing this phenomenon, continued sharp increases in 
debt service were more quantitatively significant than 
the sporadic annual increases in imports. The result 
was, of course* an increased requirement to attract 
foreign capital which acted to compound the debt service 
problem. The excess of import values over remaining 
external earnings in 1951 and 1952 was attributable 
primarily to the sharp riae in imports from the preceding 
period (1948*1950). Debt service payments actually 
declined from this period. 
By measuring fluctuations in the real value of 
external earnings after debt service and by comparing 
these to fluctuations In money values, the extent of the 
favorable import price declines during the postwar period 
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becomes evident. Although average price* rose from 1950 n 
to 1952 and from 1959 to 1963, considering the entire 
period as a Whole, prices did generally fall. The periodic 
increases were relatively small compared to the substantial 
declines experienced during other periods {i. e», from 
1948 to 1950 and from 1952 to 1959). 
Because of the well-known statistical bias involved 
in selecting a base year for the purpose of constructing a 
price index to be used in deflating or inflating a sta-
tistical series, it Is not too meaningful to compare ab-
solute changes in the money and real values of the series 
so constructed. Relative changes, however, can be more 
meaningfully compared, In fable 37 the relative annual 
changes of three series are measured (i. c,, the current 
or money value of external earnings before debt service, 
the money value of external earnings after debt service, 
and the real value of external earnings after debt service). 
It Is not surprising that annual changes In the 
first series above were less volatile than In the case of 
the second series. Substantial Improvement in the latter 
In 19i^9-1950 (26 per cent), 1950*1951 (37 v*r cent), 
1960*1961 (19 par cent), and 1962-1963 (36 per cent) out* 
stripped corresponding improvements In the former (20 
L
 per cent, 31 par cent, 5 P^r cent, and 15 per cent J 
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Respectively). Also, the sharp deterioration In the n 
latter from 1953 through I960 was quantitatively greater 
than the Irregular deterioration In the former. These 
relatively more volatile fluctuations of the latter 
reflected the Impact of debt service obligations on 
Brazil's Import capacity inasmuch as the aforementioned 
Improvements were supported by declines in debt service$ 
and the subsequent deterioration was compounded by increases 
in these outflows. 
In comparing the second and third series enumerated 
above the postwar picture was brighter (fable 37). 
Supported by declines in import prices9 the real value of 
external earnings after debt service Increased signifi-
cantly from 1948 to 1954* with the exception of the 
Isolated decline in 1951*1952 (21 pw cent). On the 
other hand, the money value of remaining external earnings 
declined not only in 1951-1952 (19 per cent) but also in 
1948-1949 (12 per cent) and In 1953-1954 (3 pa? cent). 
Furthermore, Improvements in the latter In 1949-1950 
(57 per cent) and in 1952-1953 (25 per cent) substantially 
outstripped those In the former (26 p&r cent and 8 per cent 
respectively)« 
During the critical period from 1954 to 1959, 
steady uninterrupted declines in import prices offset the 
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undesirable effect of increased debt service rigidity on ' 
Brasilia capacity to import. Although the money value of 
remaining external earnings deteriorated steadily through-
out this time period, the real value declined only from 
195& to 1958* Furthermore, this latter deterioration was 
significantly less than In the case of corresponding money 
values* 
From 1959 to the end of the period, rising Import 
prices produced a reversal of this aforementioned rela-
tionship. Inoreased prices compounded the effect of 
increased debt service on external receipts from 1959 to 
I960 and from 1961 to 1962 and offset the relief afforded 
by reduced debt service from I960 to 1961* As a result, 
the decline In the real value of remaining debt service 
exceeded the decline In the monetary value from 1959 to 
1960 and from 1961 to 1962, and the Increase In the latter 
exceeded the lncreaae In the former during the intermediate 
period. 
In summary. It can be stated that from 1943 to 1953 
Brazil's capacity to Import generally Improved not only as 
a result of Increases In external earnings but also as a 
result of decreases in import prices and in debt service 
rigidity* From 1954 to 1959 capacity to import was 
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 adversely affected by declines 1B export prices and in-
creases in debt service rigidity; however, datarioration 
was, in part, avoided and, in part, tempered by continued 
deolinea in import prices. From 195>9 to 1963 the reversal 
of the import priea trend negatively affeoted capacity to 
import* Despite this, increases in external earnings and 
deolinea in debt service payments did Improve the country1 s 
import eapaoity in 1961 and again in 1963. 
Although Table 36 reveals isolated periods of 
improvement, the real value of external earnings remaining 
after debt servloe generally deteriorated from 1955 to 
1963. It is true that the key to Brazil's sustained 
economic growth during this period in the face of external 
stagnation and internal instability was the substantial 
Inflow of foreign capital.1 Increased debt servloe 
rigidity was both a cause of this heavy requirement and a 
product of It, 
Fluctuations in External Debt Servloe 
in Relation to Those in *"** 
3Jmpor^  Expenditures"^" 
Since external debt servloe and Import expend!* 
tures are competing claims on a country*s external 
%ric Balclanoff, Hew perspectives of Brazil 
(Hashvllle# Temu* Vanderbilt university Frees, 1966), p. JL06. 
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 earnings, the measurement of changes in the ratio of the 
former to the latter Is meaningful* An increasing ratio 
implies* of course, an Increasing relative claim of debt 
service* la the Brasilian experience this ratio did in** 
crease sharply from 9*k p*r <*•»* in 19$2 to &1.2 per cent 
in I960, following an equally as sharp decline from 19*1 
per cent is 19^9 (Table 36)* Although the ratio sub-
sequently deelined from I960 (lp-#2 per oent) to 1963 
(29*1 par cent), this latter level remained considerably 
above the average of the earlier period (ll*.7 par cent 
for 19P<*195ij.). 
The analytical limitations of using this ratio 
are obvious. A rising ratio does not imply a scarcity of 
funds for purposes of importation nor does it imply that 
rising debt service forced a reduction in importation* 
However, since it was shown previously that Brazil's capac-
ity to import and service external debt stagnated during 
the time period in question, the rising ratio serves as a 
partial indicator of the burden of the latter on the former* 
auotuatlons in External Debt Service In 
Relation to those in yatlossai xneemcV 
Domestic Savings, and Public Revenue 
Although the focus of this dissertation Is on the 
short-term external liquidity problems of Brasil produced 
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rby disturbing fluctuations in certain elements of balance-"1 
of-payments disturbance in relation to certain elements of 
balanee-of-payments rigidity, the longer-run implications 
of these relationships cannot be ignored* Complete ad-
herence to a short-run focus is undesirable because of the 
unesoapable artificiality involved in distinguishing 
between short-run and long-run phenomena. The effort will 
be made, therefore, to integrate the two without straying 
beyond the limits of the dissertation topic. 
In successfully overcoming external rigidity in the 
form of debt service obligations, foreign exchange avail-
ability is of paramount importance in the short run. 
Temporary spurts in export Quantum or in export prices may 
provide sufficient foreign exchange to service external 
debt despite stagnating growth in income or in savings. 
In fact, even if the debtor country is faced with sharply 
declining external receipts, liquidity crises can be 
temporarily overcome by the depletion of previously 
accumulated reserves. Over the long run, however, healthy 
growth of income and savings, as well as of external 
earnings, is essential if debt default is to be avoided.1 
^For a complete discussion of the Importance of 
the savings problem, see Chapter I, pages 62-71. 
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 To assess the burden of debt service from a ! 
long-run point of view, comparisons should be made to 
changes in pertinent national accounts. Postwar Brazilian 
growth of national income and product, gross domestic and 
national savings, and gross domestic investment are, there-
fore, presented in Tables 36 and 39. Measured in cruzeiros, 
the unadjusted figures reveal the severe inflation which 
was characteristic of the entire postwar period. Never-
theless, adjusted figures do reveal a healthy rate of real 
growth with a few notable exceptions. Annual increases 
in real OHP during the earlier part of the period (191+8-
1954) exceeded 5 pvt cent, with the exception of 1953 
(3*2 pax* cent) and during the latter part of the period 
(1955-1963) axeeeded 6 per cent, with the exception of 
1956 (1»9 par eent) and 1962-1963 (5*2 per eent and 2.1 
pw eent respectively), The real annual growth of 
national income fell below 5 pax* eent only in 1951 (3*3 
per eent) and in 1953 (3#8 per cent) during the earlier 
period and only in 1956 (1.0 p^v cent) and in 1963 (2.1 
pmr cent) during the later period (Table 38). 
Furthermore, it is statistically evident from 
Table 38 that growth in real income outstripped popu-
lation growth throughout the entire postwar period. 
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Prom 191^ 8 to 1954 the average annual growth rate of 
per capita income was 2*2 per cent, ranging between 0.6 
per oent (1951) and 3.6 per cent (1952). Only in the 
former year did the growth rate fall below 1 per eent. 
During the latter part of the time period in question, 
growth wae more sporadic. Annual declines were ex-
perienced in 1956 (2.8 per cent) and again in 1963 (1.0 
per oent) 1 also, positive growth rates fell below 2 
per oent on two occasions—1958 (1.1 per cent) and 1962 
(1.9 per cent). However, despite these isolated instances 
of stagnation, the average annual growth rate of this 
period (2*3 p**» oent) actually exceeded that of the pre-
ceding period {Z.Z per cent). 
Of additional interest is the fact that the period 
characterised by the most rapid growth of per capita 
income (1956-1960) was also characterised by the largest 
increases in external debt service. Furthermore, during 
the subsequent period, 1960-1963* progressively slower 
rates of pw capita income growth were accompanied by 
general reductions in debt service rigidity. 
As might be expected from the previous analysis, 
the postwar growth of domestic investment in Brazil was, 
for the most part, impressive (fable 39). From 19I4B to 
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T>954 tks real value of domestic Investment (at 1949 n 
prices) increased by 57 P«r cent and from 1955 to 1963 
by 49 par cant. Annual rates of growth vera not steady, 
however; relatively constant real values were invested 
from 1954 through 1957 **»<* from 1959 through 1963. 3fc« 
over-all impressive growth performance was primarily a 
product of investment spurts from 1948 (26.9 billion 
oruaeiros) to 1952 (40.4 billion cruzeiros) and from 1957 
(42*0 billion oruseiros) to 1959 (60*3 billion cruzeiros). 
the postwar Brazilian growth of domestically 
generated savings was equally as impressive as that of 
domestic investment (fable 39)* From 1948 to 1954 gross 
M « M 1 «YlBg«l « d gro« taurtl. ..Tlng.2 < « * * * . 4 
at 1949 prices) grew by 44»2 P e r °s»t and 42*9 par cent 
respectively and from 1955 to 1963 by 46*3 P#*» e*»t and 
42*0 per cant respectively. These rates were achieved 
despite isolated declines experienced in 1949» 1951, 1957* 
and I960 with respect to both. As depleted by the above 
statistics, the growth rates during the latter part of the 
time period wars neither significantly larger nor smaller 
^Defined in an "ex poet" sense as gross domestic 
investment plus (or minus) the balance-of-payments surplus 
(or deficit; on current account* 
%efin«d as gross national savings plus investment 
income payments (public and private) abroad. 
than these daring the earlier period. n 
To measure changes In debt service In relation to 
the national growth rates it isf of course, necessary to 
convert the former expressed in dollars into cruseires. 
The resulting ratios are measured in Table I4.0. Since 
expanding external commitments in the form of debt service 
can retard the growth-with-debt process by competing 
against domestic consumption and domestic investment, 
measurements of changes is debt service to ehanges in 
national account are indeed relevant* 
External debt service In relation 
to national income 
In the Brazilian postwar experience the strain of 
rigidly scheduled debt service on the income growth process 
did not greatly Increase throughout the time period in 
question (Table I4.0). Moderate Increases in the ratio of 
total debt service to national income were recorded from 
1952 (1.0 per cent) to 1958*1960 {2.9 per cent}} however, 
declines from this latter period to 1963 (1.8 per cent) 
dropped the ratio below even the early 19^8 level (2.0 
per cent). Furthermore, the peak level reached in 1958-
1960 was not significantly above this aforementioned 
1<&8 figure. Of course, as was cibemrre^ earlier, the 
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analytical value of this ratio is indeed limited* n 
a rise in the ratio indicates that debt service is 
rising more than proportionately to income; it does 
not show whether the relatively faster increase in 
debt aervioe has led to a stagnation in remaining 
per capita income or has, in fact, been accompanied 
by a rise in this economic variable.1 
Of greater pertinence and relevance in this regard is the 
measurement of changes in remaining real income* Whether 
increased debt service rigidity was accompanied by in-
creased capacity for domestic consumption and investment 
or by stagnation in this regard is a determination which 
can be made from the observation of such changes. 
Changes in both remaining real income and remaining 
real per capita Income are measured in fable ij.0. With 
respect to the former, the rate of increase from I9I4.8 to 
1952 was 2l± per cent. During this same period, real 
income before debt service grew at a rate of ZZ per cent, 
fhe difference, of course, can be explained by the fact 
that debt service outflows from Brasil declined during this 
period. Sharp increases in these outflows produced the 
opposite effect from 1952 to I960, however. Remaining real 
income increased by 53 ¥>*? ®*nt compared to a rate of 
increase of real income before debt service of 56 p»? cent, 
•*-Avramovlc, op, elt,, p, 63, 
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Front I960 to tfcie end of the tine period in question, a 
reversal of these relative growth rates vat experienced. 
Since debt service outflows declined frost the i960 peak 
level, the rate of increase of the former (approximately 
Ik v** oent) again outstripped that of the latter (approx-
imately 13 per oent). Vo animal declines in either ease 
were recorded during the sixteen-year period* 
With respect to the postwar growth in pmw capita 
income remaining after debt service, the same general 
conclusions can he reached. Although declines were ex-
perienced in 1956 and again in 1961, the same phenomena 
were experienced in the case of per capita income before 
debt service. From 19lj.9 to 1952 the rate of increase of 
the former (11 per oent) outstripped that of the latter 
(9 par cent), and the opposite waa again true in reference 
to the period from 1952 to 1960 (21 per oent and 2% 
per oent respectively). As in the case of the previous 
analysis, the former (k ?*? *•**) exceeded the latter 
(3 par oent) from i960 to 1963. 
On the basis of the relative growth rates of the 
aforementioned variables there is no reason to conclude 
that growth in per capita income during the sixteen-year 
time span waa seriously retarded by increased external 
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 rigidity ID the form of debt service. It is apparent ~i 
that because of the adequacy of income growth during this 
period the chronic external imbalance produced, in part, 
by increased rigidity of this typo was not disturbing to 
the extent that outbacks in the Brazilian standard of 
consumption wore necessary. Since the incidence of ex-
ternal debt service did fall on a part of the increments 
in per capita income, it was not apparently necessary 
to ohooso between the competing claims of external debt 
serrioe on one hand and higher consumption standards and 
Investment needs on the other. Income growth was 
apparently sufficient to satisfy both* 
External debt service in relation 
to domestic savings 
fo oonfirm the validity of those above conclusions, 
it is necessary to look beyond the Brazilian income growth 
performance. The successful servicing of external debt 
over the long run depends not only on an adequate growth 
rate of per capita income but also on a correspondingly 
healthy rate of growth in domestic savings• Unless the 
rate of now external borrowing can bo oxpoeted to exoeod 
the rate of debt repayment indefinitely, domestic savings 
must grow to assume a progressively larger role in 
2^5 
reconciling the competing claims of debt service and 
domestic capital formation.1 the ratio of dabt service 
to domastio savings la, of course, a useful tool is 
measuring changes in tha claim of tha former on the latter. 
An increaaing claim of this type over time would imply, 
of course* a reduction in the share of savings available 
for domestic investment; it would not, however* imply a 
reduction in the absolute value of inveatible funds from 
domestic sources. 
During the period from 1952 to 1958, the claim of 
external debt service on Brazilian gross national savings 
did increase steadily and rather substantially. The ratio 
of the former to the latter also increased significantly 
from 6*7 par cent in 1952 to 18.6 pmT cent in 1958. 
After this 1958 postwar peak, however* the ratio declined 
to a 1963 level of 10.7 pax* cant which was below the 
levels reached in 19^8 and 1914-9 (12.9 p^v cent and 15.5 
per cent respectively), the only exception to this 
general decline was the Isolated increaae from 15.1| 
per cent in 1959 to 17.7 P^T cent in I960 (fable i|.0). 
An alternate method of weighing changes in the 
claim of debt service on domestically generated 
-^See Chapter I, pages £4-65. 
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investible funds involves the measurement of gross 
domestic, rather than groaa national, saTinga in the 
denominator of the aforementioned ratio* The former is 
a more accurate variable in thie regard, aince the latter 
excludes the proportion of annual domeatioally generated 
earing* that i« used for payment of investment income. 
For thie reason the ratio of debt service to the latter 
is overstated, while the ratio of debt service to the 
former more accurately measures the proportion of total 
savings that is annually committed to providing a return 
to foreign capital. 
In comparing the two during the postwar period the 
patterns of fluctuations are similar, but the ratio in-
volving gross domestic savings is smaller for each year 
measured (Table ij.0). The only modifications of previous 
conclusions are as followss first, the claim of external 
debt service on potentially investible funds throughout 
the entire time period was somewhat less burdensome than 
was originally asserted} secondly, the increase in debt 
service payments in relation to domestically generated 
savings was somewhat less rapid than was illustrated by 
the previous analysis. 
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Fluctuations In the patio of debt service to n 
gross domestic savings closely paralleled those of debt 
service to national income, although the rate of increase 
of the latter from 1952 to 1953 was not as rapid as in the 
case of the former* The marginal propensity to save did 
generally decline during the sixteen-year time period 
(Tables 38 and 39). From a period average of 18.3 per cent 
experienced during the earlier period (1948*1953)* the MPS 
fell to an average of 17*2 per cent during the later 
period (1955-1963). Although this decline was not steady 
and although the rate of general decline was slight* it 
does explain, in part, the sharper rise in the ratio of 
debt service to domestically generated savings than in 
the case of the ratio measuring changes in debt service 
in relation to national income. In part, the increased 
burden of debt service claims on domestically generated 
savings during this later time period was attributable to 
the fact that consumption generally increased in relation 
to national income. 
In measuring the Impact of external debt service 
from this long-run point of view, it is also meaningful to 
account for changes In gross savings remaining after debt 
service. Changes In the absolute level of remaining 
L savings can then be compared to changes In gross national 
21$ 
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product Ixi order to ascertain whether Brazil• s capacity 
to finance investment needs from domestic resources was 
significantly altered daring the time period in question. 
From 19W* to 1952 remaining savings increased by 
2k per cent compared to a rate of increase of 16 per cent 
with respect to gross domestic savings before debt service 
(tables 39 *nd i»£>). During the subsequent period (1952-
I960) the former inoreased by 53 P*t* cent and the latter 
by 72 per cent, and during the final period of Interest 
(1960*1963) the rates of Increase were 21 per oent and 
12 per oent respectively* these differences reflect, of 
course* the easing of the debt service burden during the 
first and third periods and the prolonged Intensification 
during the second period* Although annual declines in 
gross savings remaining after debt service were recorded 
In 191*9* 1952, 195W 1956, and In I960, the rates of 
decline were small and were more than offset by sharp 
spurts during Intermediate periods, notably from !9ij.9 to 
1950, from 1952 to 1953» from 195**. to 1955 • from 1957 to 
1959# «nd from 1962 t© 1963. Considering the period as 
a whole, remaining savings Increased by 128 per cent 
(from 19i|$ to 1963). Snis statistic by Itself would, of 
course, support the contention that the pressure exerted 
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 on domestically generated savings by external debt servieon 
rigidity was not generally severe even though previous 
•tatietioa did show an Increased burden from 1952 to I960* 
In the Braiilian postwar experience fluctuations 
in the ratio of remaining domestic savings to gross national 
product moved within narrow limits (Table 1*0). From a 
secular standpoint changes in the ratio do not reveal any 
discernible trend pointing to either an increased or a 
decreased dependency by Braxil on foreign borrowing for 
the purpose of financing domestic investment n**&B» From 
a short-run point of view, however, some significant 
shifts in this ratio were evidenced• After a general but 
sporadic increase from 19^9 (10.7 per cent) to 1956 
(15*1 per cent) reflecting, of course, an increased 
capacity to finance investment needs domestically, or to 
express it differently, a decreased dependency on foreign 
assistance in this regard, the ratio fell sharply to 
10*1 per cent In 1957 reflecting, of course, the opposite* 
Despite the slow Irregular rise from that year to 1963 
(12.lv P^w cent), the postwar peak reached in 1956 was 
neither reached nor closely approached* In fact* the 
1963 figure was only slightly above the early level 
reached in 19U8 (12*2 per cent). Considering the second 
2?0 
part of the tin* period In question as a whole (1955- i 
1963), the Brasilia* capacity to finance Investment needs 
domestically did deteriorate relatively but not at a 
significant nor consistent rate, 
External debt service in relation 
to public revenues 
As was explained in Chapter X, public debt service 
Is a direct claim on the revenue receipts of the debtor 
country*s central government. Domestic resources must be 
tapped to provide funds to honor external commitments of 
this type. Since Brasil enjoyed healthy rates of growth 
in both national income and In domestic savings a reason* 
able a priori Judgment might be that the Brazilian govern* 
ment experienced no difficulty In this regard. Such a 
Judgment, however, must be assessed in light of statistical 
evidence. 
In measuring changes in the burden of public debt 
service on public receipts the ratio of the former to the 
latter is analytically useful, Although Table Ip. does 
reveal an Increased burden from the early postwar period 
(19li8-195ti) to 195Bt *» easing of this burden is revealed 
in the subsequent time span (1959-1963)• F*e» a 19l|£~ 
195i^  average of 5.0 pwr cent the ratio rose to 17*2 
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r psr oent by 1958 but declined sharply to 11*1 per cent n 
ID 1959* Shs moderate rite from 10.4 P«* oent In 1961 
to 11•3 per oent in 1963 foil far short of this earlier 
peak level. this extended decline from the 1953 poak was 
experienced despite the faot that both public and publicly 
guaranteed private debt1 generally lnoreased during this 
time span* 
Although the rise in the ratio from 1910*1954 to 
1958 did rofleot an lnoreased debt service burden con-
sidering the period as a whole, there is no evidence to 
support the contention that a serious savings problem 
was generated. Early increases in the ratio vers not 
sustained during this latter part of the time period* 
Furthermore, increased external rigidity throughout the 
period did not prevent a healthy rate of growth of public 
revenue remaining after debt service* The adequacy of 
this growth is indicated by the faot that the ratio of 
remaining public revenue to gross national product 
generally increased during this time period of interest. 
Despite tho faot that the ratio did decline from the 
^&e Justification for including publicly 
guaranteed private debt in the numerator of this ratio 
is that the public responsibility for its repayment is 
as great as that of public debt. 
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19I4.8-195I4. average laval of 8.3 per oast to 6*1 par cent 
is 1957 # the subsequent general rise throughout the 
remaining part of tha period pushed tha ratio above this 
19^8-19514. average, Although increased debt service did 
not prevent general increases in remaining public revenue 
in relation to OHJP, this is not to say that tha residuals 
were sufficient to oovar all other governmental expenditures. 
It Is true, of course, that Brasil suffered large 
inflationary budget deficits during tha time period in 
question* These resulted from conscious public efforts 
to spur development by deficit spending* Had tha burden 
of debt service in relation to public revenue been sig-
nificantly greater, Brazilian policymakers would have been 
faced with a dilemma* To maintain the same planned annual 
deficit levels would have necessitated a reduction in 
growth-Inducing public expenditures, and to increase 
planned deficit levels In the face of the increased 
external debt burden would have intensified the already 
severe Inflation pressures* During the time period of 
interest it is clear that the observed deficits were not 
externally forced* The contributions of the external 
sector to the deficits did not significantly increase* 
Although external debt grew rapidly throughout the 
L latter part of the time period of this study, the ratio , 
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of external debt outstanding to internal debt outstanding 
generally deolined. The former* measured in cruzeiros, 
actually exceeded the latter in 1955 hut by 1962 had fallen 
to 55 pa? **&t of the same (fable 1*2). This relative in* 
oreaee in internal debt, combined with the growth of public 
revenue remaining after debt service in relation to ONP, 
reflects not only the significance of postwar deficits but 
also the minor contribution of the external sector in this 
regard* 
Returns on loan and equity oapital in relation 
to Braillts national accounts 
The validity of including amortisation in the numer-
ator of ratios measuring changes in debt service in relation 
to national income savings or public revenue la indeed 
questionable. It is not illogical to assume that external 
debt will be turned over in the long run nor to assume for 
this reason that amortisation will not compete against 
domestic consumption and investment for domestically gen* 
erated income and savings* Under these assumptions 
domestic savings would have grown sufficiently fast to 
reconcile only the competing claims of foreign investment 
income payments and domes tie oapital formation. Amorti-
zation would not be signifioant in this regard. 
If amortisation is excluded from tha numerator of n 
tba aforementioned ratios, rasuiting fluctuationa over tha 
sixteen-year pariod (Tabla I4.3) ravaal a smaller savings 
problem than was previously observed. Thia is true not 
90X7 baoauaa tha ratioa of investment income paymentc to 
national income and to gross domestic savings vera eon* 
sistently small throughout the sixteen-year time spas but 
also because In both oases general declines vers exper-
ienoed throughout tha period as a whole* 
With respect to the former, no sharp increases 
vers evidenced at all* After a dee line from 1*2 per sent 
(I9J4JS) to 0.8 par cent (1952), a moderate jump to 1*3 
per cent (1953) followed, but from that postwar peak 
level the ratio unevenly declined to the postwar trough 
of 0*3 par cent in 19&3« Apart from this low 1963 level, 
fluctuations in tha ratio moved within extremely narrow 
limits during the critical second part of the sixteen-year 
time span* 
The same basic pattern of fluctuation was ob-
servable with respect to the ratio of investment income 
payments to gross domestic savings* After a general 
decline from 1*0 per ©ant (19i$B) to 5.0 per cent (1952}# 
tha ratio rose moderately to tha postwar peak leval of 
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r7#2 per cent (1953) then generally but unevenly fell to n 
the trough level of 2.0 per cent (1963)* ** In the 
previous ease, fluctuations in the ratio from 1955 to 1963 
were mild, apart from the late 1963 decline. This 
apparent exception to the relative constancy of both 
ratios during this period could be attributable, of course, 
to the aforementioned unreliability of 1963 debt service 
statistics. The inclusion of both interest on loan capital 
and transferred earnings on equity capital in the numerators 
of these ratios was mutually offsetting insofar as the 
former generally increased during the second part of the 
sixteen-year time span, and the latter generally declined. 
Since the rigidity of the latter in relation to the appro-
priate variables measured in the denominator was questioned 
earlier,1 there is reason to doubt the validity of the 
aforementioned conclusions. Even though the ratio of in-
terest payments alone did increase in relation to national 
Income and gross savings, the rate of increase was not 
sufficient to indicate a serious savings problem* 
Conclusions 
One principal conclusion that can be derived from 
this preceding analysis is that the savings problem in the 
L 3-See Chapter I, pages I4.O-I4.I. 
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Brazilian postwar experience van much less significant 
than the aforementioned transfer problem* Impressive 
income and savings growth rates were sustained despite 
chronic internal instability and external imbalance, 
This should not be surprising, however, sines it is cus-
tomary for developing countries to adopt fiscal and 
monetary measures for the purpose of stimulating domestic 
growth even at the expense of producing short-term external 
and internal problems as by-products. It is clear that 
external debt service rigidity did not retard economic 
growth in Brasil throughout most of the time period in 
question; however, the growth rate did slow down consid-
erably in 1962 (5.2 per eent) and 1963 (2#1 per cent) 
following a seven-year period of chronic external im-
balance produced, in part, by increased outflows of debt 
service in relation to export stagnation and terms-of-trade 
deterioration. 
Although a two-year period is too short to establish 
a trend, it can be surmised that the domestic growth process 
in Brazil was not immune from the effects of the chronically 
imbalanced external sector despite the fact that the con-
tribution of the latter to the former was small through 
the entire time period of interest* 
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 Rigidity In the Bragjllan n 
Import Struoturc 
ummmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm 
In assessing the impact of rigidity in Brazil's 
debt 0truetare on external balance during the postwar 
period the degree of rigidity In the country* s import 
structure oannot be ignored• Despite the pressure applied 
during periods of export stagnation and/or terms-of-trade 
deterioration by contractually fixed external debt service 
commitments, liquidity crises can be avoided If there is 
sufficient flexibility in the import structure. Over the 
long run, of course, even a high degree of import flex* 
iblllty can be overcome by the growth and development of 
import-substitute industries, but in order for the debtor 
country to overcome periodic "cash squeeze* problems 
emanating from sudden unexpected external disturbances, 
inherent Import flexibility is indeed essential. 
fhe previous analysis of Brazil's external debt 
structure in this chapter has revealed that the external 
imbalance suffered during the latter part of the time 
period was compounded by increased rigidity in this regard. 
The subsequent analysis attempts to further examine the 
impact of external debt rigidity—this time in relation to 
the degree of rigidity in the import structure. 
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 An automatic reduction Is the level of irapor- ' 
tation can be ejected in the oaae of a country Buffering 
deelines in national inoome. The reduction in the former 
will he particularly pronounced if the contribution of the 
external teeter to the level of national inoome i« large* 
Although external receipts did stagnate in the Brazilian 
postwar experience, no automatic reduction in importation 
was forthcoming. Since the ratio of exports to national 
inoome was small throughout the period (less than 5 
per cent), the effect of stagnation in the former on the 
growth of the latter was minimal. Despite isolated periods 
of slow inoome growth (fable 38), the over-all growth 
performance was impressive. Had the Brazilian government 
not imposed stringent trade and payments barriers, it is 
safe to assume that the response of import demand to import 
growth would have exerted intolerable and indeed unsup-
portable pressure on external balance. 
It is not the purpose of this chapter to evaluate 
the policy decisions'1 of the Brazilian government in 00m* 
pressing imports during this time span; rather, it is to 
assess the degree of import inflexibility which aoted as a 
limiting factor in the implementation of the same* 
^This will be accomplished in Chapter V* 
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 the dissection of the Brazilian import structure, n 
undertaken in Chapter IIIt revealed unsurprisingly that 
the import levels of those items required for basic sub-
sistence and for the support of current levels of pro-
duction were maintained at the expense of consumer durables 
and capital goods required to support longer-term develop-
mental aspirations. These empirical findings lend support 
to the Avramovic thesis that the main brunt of import 
curtailment Is likely to be concentrated in the field of 
capital goods and consumer manufactures* Although, as 
Avramovic points out, employment opportunities are likely 
to be adversely affected by reductions in the former and 
the country9 s standard of living similarly affected by 
reductions In the latter, such sacrifices arc preferable 
to the denial of essential subsistence Items or the denial 
of basic raw materials and intermediate products needed to 
keep the wheels of production turning* With respect to 
the latter, it Is logical to assume that the debtor country 
will adopt this shorter-run viewpoint inasmuch as import 
compression, as distinguished from Import substitution, is 
a policy designed to solve a short^run external liquidity 
problem. 
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In Table kk inflexible Import8 art isolated in 
three categories and changes in the chare of each in total 
import quantum are measured. Using the broad type of 
categorisation1 employed in Chapter III, only the cate-
gories including consumer durables and oapital goods are 
excluded. All consumer non-durables, all intermediate 
products, and all raw materials, including fuels and 
lubrioants, are classified as inflexible items. 
It is obvious that the share of total inflexible 
import items in total imports generally but not steadily 
increased throughout the time period of interest, The 
sharp decline in this share from 191^8-19^0 (61.5 par cent 
average) to 1952 (*JJ|>»5 pe* eent)# reflecting relative 
increases in the importation of non-cubsistance and longer-
run developmental items, was consistent with the brightening 
of Brasilia external trade and payments posture during this 
period. Hot only did external receipts increase signifi-
cantly, primarily as a result of improvements in the terms 
of trade, but also reduced rigidity in the external debt 
structure was experienced, primarily as a result of re* 
auctions in the outflow of amortisation on public debt. 
*See fables 2k and Z$m 
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She most prolonged rise In the share of total 
inflexible Import Items in total imports occurred from 
1952 (5i*..5 p»r sent) through 1956 (76.9 per cent), this 
period wae alao characterised by sharp increasea in debt 
service outflows and an unfavorable shift in the terms of 
trade which persisted throughout tho remaining part of the 
time period in question. 
After a moderate decline to 69 per cent in 1957 # 
the share of inflexible imports remained relatively eon* 
stent at approximately 70 pn cent until a sharp rise to 
77*9 per cent was again experienced in 1963, Despite this 
period of relative constancy, it may validly be concluded 
that the flexibility in &raxil*s import structure was 
signifioantly reduced during the postwar period considered 
as a whole. 
It is also clear that the large share of inflexible 
items in total Imports during the earlier part of the 
period <62*2 p^r cent average for 19M* through 195^) limited 
the degree of import compression during the latter part of 
the period (1955*1963). As is evident from the balaaes-of-
payments statistics presented in Chapter II, import com-
pression did reduce the pressure applied on external balance 
by export stagnation and terms*of-trade deterioration but 
i~ j 
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was cot of sufficient magnitude to offset them; chronic 
external imbalance persisted throughout this later time 
period. Inflexibility in the Brazilian import structure, 
which increased from an already high level during the 
sixteen-year time span, contributed to this external im-
balance by restricting Brazil's capacity to withstand the 
impact of the observed short-term external disturbances. 
Expanded importation of fuels and lubricants made 
the greatest contribution to increased import inflexibility 
during the time period in question (fable kk)» Despite 
isolated relative declines In 195*4-> 19?7, and 1959, the 
share of these import items in total import quantum rose 
from 13.1 per cent in 1952 to 28,8 pw cent in 1963* $ks 
share of raw materials (except fuels) and intermediate 
products in total import quantum remained extremely high 
throughout the time period, but rates of increase were 
less sharp than in the case of the fuels. Consumer non-
durables made the smallest contribution in this regard, 
both absolutely and relatively. In fact, the periodic 
relative declines during the critical time span between 
1954 *nd I960 cast a shadow of doubt over the degree of 
inflexibility of items within this category. Although 
these items were less Inflexible than fuels, lubricants, 
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other raw materials, and intermediate products* they were 
clearly more inflexible than oonaumer durables and capital 
goods. As m a illustrated in Chapter III (Table 2$) f the 
share of the former in total import quantum declined 
sharply from 9*2 per east in 19ij.B to 0,5 pw cent is 1963, 
and the share of the latter declined somewhat less sharply 
but, nevertheless» significantly from 1^ 0,3 pw cent in 
1952 to 21.6 pw cant in 1963* 
A certain amount of bias is unavoidable in an 
analysis based on broad categorization• Obviously, not 
all consumer non-durables, raw materials, and inter* 
mediate products ware rigidly imported during the time 
period of interest nor were all consumer durables and 
capital goods flexible to the extent that Immediate 
balance-of-payments adjustment was possible through 
import compression• Although broad categorisation is 
Justifiable in the case of Braail because of the clearly 
discernible pattern of fluctuation within moat of the 
categories outlined above, there Is ample reason to be 
more specific* 
In the United nations study quoted in Chapter III,1 
two import items and one import category (i. e»f wheat, 
% e e pages 153*169* 
261* 
newsprint* and fuels) were defined at absolutely essential 
in reference to the postwar period. Although other import 
expenditure! could perhapa qualify as fixed claims against 
BrasH's scarce foreign exchange receipts during this 
period, wheat, newsprint, and fuels vers undoubtedly the 
most rigid items In the Import structure. 
In assessing the degree of rigidity in Brazil's 
balance of payment % one meaningful approach is to measure 
changes In external receipts remaining after fixed claims 
hare been satisfied* By adopting the United Nations 
approach, fixed claims can be defInsd as the sum of 
absolutely essential import values plus contractually 
fixed external debt service. In fable \\$ these fixed 
claims are summed and then subtracted from annual external 
receipts (19^8-1^63)• 
From such a measurement It is obvious that Increased 
rigidity In both the Import and the debt structure, com-
bined with stagnation In external earnings$ had a devas-
tating impact on Brazil's external balance during the 
time period In question. Balances available for the 
purchase of imports other than those defined as absolutely 
essential and for the repayment of external debts other 
than those contractually fixed did generally Increase from 
L _1 
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1948 ($947 million) to 1951 ($1*388 million)? however, 
available balances in both years amounted to approxi-
mately 76 per oent of total external earnings* despite 
the faet that those in the latter year were considerably 
larger in absolute terms. From the postwar peak level of 
$1,388 million in 1951 available balances declined sharplyf 
although not uninterruptedly, to $j.09 million in 1962 (the 
postwar trough)* The most disturbing aspect of this 
decline was the fact that by 1962 available balances 
amounted to less than 32 per cent of total external 
earnings. Although available balances did Increase to 
$601*. million in 1963, the relative increase was only to 
kO pw cent of external earnings • 
From this empirical analysis it is clear that 
Brazilian import levels were maintained during the latter 
part of the time period in question at the expense of 
Increasing inflows of capital—one effect of which was 
Increased balance-of-payments rigidity in the form of debt 
service obligations* It has been shown that imports were 
compressed during this critical period (1955-1963)$ but 
the high degree of inflexibility In the Import structure 
severely limited the extent of this compression* Balances 
available after fixed imports and debt service declined at 
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 a much faster and steadier rate* It may be concluded ~i 
that external imbalance during this period was, In part, 
the product of lnoreaeed balance-of-paymenta rigidity; 
ironically, the latter was, in part, the product of the 
adjustment prooess designed to alleviate the former* 
Conclusions 
In summary of this chapter it is elearly evident 
that increased rigidity in both the Brazilian external debt 
and import structures served to compound the chronic ex* 
temal imbalances suffered during the postwar period, 
particularly from the mid 1950fs to I960* Prior to 1952 
the opposite was true* Despite the easing of external 
rigidity resulting from declines in the share of in-
flexible items in total imports as well as from reduced 
outflows of debt service, and despite favorable shifts in 
the terms of trade, large deficits on current account were 
nevertheless incurred (fable 1); the Imbalances observed 
during this period resulted primarily from sharp Increases 
in Import quantum which outstripped improvements in import 
capacity* 
The examination of the Brazilian external debt and 
import structures in this chapter reveals that 1952 was a 
pivotal year with respect to external rigidity* From this 
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year to I960 not only did debt service increase sharply, ~i 
but alto the relative share of flexible items in total 
imports significantly declined, the latter, of course, was 
a product of import compression as well as of import sub-
stitution* Since external receipts stagnated during this 
period primarily as a result of terms-of-trade deterioration, 
such external adjustment was indeed necessary* However, 
the degree of adjustment through import compression was 
severely limited by the high degree of import inflexibility 
at the beginning of the period (fable ipl). thus, even 
though import values declined significantly from 1952-1953 
peak levels (Table 6), the compression plus substitution 
were not sufficient to avoid the large current account 
deficits which persisted throughout the remaining part of 
the period; the combined effect of continued stagnation 
in external earnings and increased balance-of-payments 
rigidity was too severe. 
Although statistics reveal that rigidity in the 
Brazilian debt structure did generally ease from I960 to 
1963, the same was not true of the import structure* The 
easing of the former combined with moderate increases in 
external earnings was not sufficient to adequately reduce 
these deficits from the average of the earlier period 
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(Table 1). Import compression continued with the result n 
that the share of flexible Items ID total imports declined 
to the lowest postwar level In 1963 (Table kk). 
By measuring fluctuations In appropriate elements 
of balance-of-payments disturbance In relation to appro* 
priate elements of rigidity, severe liquidity crises were 
indicated during the latter part of the sixteen-year time 
span, although again a moderate easing of the pressure was 
indloated from I960 to 1963• Prior to this brief period, 
the ratios of total debt service, public debt service, 
interest payments alone, and amortisation repayments 
alone to external receipts all increased sharply (1953-
1960). Furthermore, both the eurrent and the real values 
of external earnings remaining after debt service generally 
declined during the period, although the latter was 
buffered by moderate declines in import prices. 
Of all the liquidity crisis indicators measured, 
only one (1. e., the ratio of transferred earnings from 
equity capital to external receipts) depleted an easing 
of external debt rigidity from the mid 1950*8 to I960. 
The general rate of decline of transferred earnings was 
greater than that of external receipts. 
Since Brasll was not forced to default on its 
L external debt servioe commitments during the time period j 
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 lis question, It might be concluded that its debt service n 
capacity was adequate. However, this concept of "ability" 
or "capacity* should be 
interpreted in a broader context than the mechanical 
provision of the foreign exchange needed to transfer 
contractually fixed debt payments* In order for the 
concept to become meaningful it is necessary that the 
servicing of the obligations be carried out without 
eliminating remittances of private earnings (for this 
could be at best a temporary expedient and would tend 
to discourage further investment), creating intolerable 
social pressures through Import restrictions con-
ducive to unemployment or leading to the creation of 
new payment arrears.1 
The statistical evidence presented In this chapter 
lends support to the contention that such a temporary ex-
pedient was indeed necessary in the Brazilian postwar 
experience, particularly from the mid 1950fs to I960. 
Since the nature of direct investments in Brazil was In* 
consistent with the observed declines In transferred 
earnings on equity capital during this critical period of 
export stagnation, the role played by Brazilian policy* 
- « 1« 4 K M A . * SiBO. o«,t*aetu«ny fi«d W w r t H 
institute of Inter-American Affairs, Foreign 
Operations Administration, The Economic Development of Brasil, 
A Report fvmp*,m& by the Joint Braeil-U. S. Economic Develop* 
ment Commission (Washington, D. C : Institute of Inter* 
American Affairs, 1955)t p . 23*i-
2The mechanics and implications of this role are 
assessed In Chapter V. 
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robligation* In the form of interest and amortisation is n 
not as readily postponable as the above, it is not il-
logical to expect an artificial foreign exchange priority 
system in favor of the former and at the expense of the 
latter. 
It is true that the ratios of debt service to 
national income and to gross savings did increase daring 
the postwar period (Sable kO), but the rates of increase 
were small certainly in comparison to the ratio of debt 
service to external receipts. Furthermore, the real rates 
of growth of national income, per capita income, and gross 
savings remaining after debt service were sufficiently 
healthy to conclude that the negative impact of Increased 
external rigidity on each was of minor consequence, Thus, 
although the examination of the Brazilian debt structure 
does reveal increased external rigidity, particularly 
during the latter part of the sixteen-year time span, and 
although the measurement of appropriate liquidity crisis 
indicators does point to severe foreign exchange shortages, 
these external difficulties did not appear to significantly 
retard the Brazilian domestic growth process. The increased 
debt service burden during this later period ^id produce a 
serious transfer problem but not a corresponding savings 
Lproblem* J 
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 CHarSKR V n 
BALAICB-OP-PAYMENTS ADJUSTMENT 19 
THE BRAZILIAN SXPERIEHCS 
fhe previous analysis of pertinent elements of 
balanee~of«paymente disturbance (Chapter III) and rigidity 
(Chaiptar IV) demonstrated a deepening external imbalance 
in the Brasilia* postwar experience. Imbalance, of 
course, necessitates adjustment; it remaina, therefore, 
for this chapter to diacuaa thoae elemanta of external 
adjuataient which made significant contributiona 1B thia 
regard. Furthermore, ainoe the principal fooal point of 
thia diaaertation ia axtarnal rigidity In tha form of 
external debt service obligationa, the attempt will bo 
made to aaaeas tha Impact of thia obaerred rigidity on 
tha adjuatmant proceaa itself. 
It la true that tha diaturbing influencea of 
export stagnation and terms-of-trade deterioration, 
depleted In Chapter III, were alone sufficient to 
necessitate policy-induced adjustment. Of primary 
Importance in this paper, however, is the extent to 
which external Imbalance was compounded by inherent 
balanee-of-paymenta rigidity, thereby requiring a more 
L J 
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concerted adjustment effort* The liquidity crisis n 
indicators, constructed 1B Chapter III, measured the 
impact of external disturbance In relation to external 
rigidity during the sixteen-year time spam the final 
assessment of the algnlfloanee of such indicators ahould 
take into account the obaerved reaction of policymakers. 
A oloae oorrelatlon between fluctuations in elementa of 
disturbance en one hand and in elements of adjustment on 
the other, apart from the que at! on of rigidity» would 
east s shadow of doubt on the use of these indicators. 
In other words, if inherent rigidity is of little or no 
consequence, fluctuations In the elements of disturbance 
alone would serve as short-run Indicators of liquidity 
problems* If, however, balanoe-of-payments rigidity Is 
of significance—and this would seem to be the ease In 
the postwar Brazilian experience,—a fooue on disturbance 
factors alone would be misleading* Mild external dis-
turbances could, in fact, necessitate drastlo measures 
of adjustment when combined with a high degree of balance-
of-payment s Inflexibility* Consequently, a true Indi-
cator of the total pressure applied must include both. 
In this chapter, therefore, the efficacy of 
Brazilian adjustment policies in correcting external 
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Imbalance is evaluated In light of the Initiating dls-
turbanee factors and the Inherent rigidity faetors 
discussed in earlier chapters. It la recognized that 
the successful application of balance~of-payments adjust-
ment policies depends on the strength of inherent 
external rigidities In relation to the countervailing 
policies so applied and also on the intensity of the 
disturbance which necessitated the action in the first 
place. Thus, external adjustment arising from r***rv* 
depletion, compensatory financing, import compression, 
import substitution, export stimulation, export price 
control, and artificial payments restrictions are 
analysed not in Isolation but rather in relation to the 
fluctuations of the aforementioned liquidity erlsls 
indicators. Only by this approach can the full impact 
of balanee-of-payments rigidity be assessed. 
Adjustment Through Reserve Depletion 
The first line of defense during periods of 
external liquidity shortage Is undeniably a country* s 
level of monetary reserves In the form of gross official 
gold holdings, convertible foreign exchange, and the 
country's gold tranche position at the IMP. The 
importance of these sources of unconditional liquidity 
L _J 
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should net bo overstated, hovevor* especially Is the 
oase of a debtor country it) the process of development. 
As was mentioned Is Chapter I, the opportunity ooet of 
maintaining largo reservea grows with the pace of 
economic dovelopmsnt. It ia not illogical to assume that 
a debtor country will lack the foresight to aat aside 
adequata funds as a buffor against future unforosoon 
oontingenoiaa if immediate developmental needs for 
liquidity are pressing. Furthermore, it is unlikely that 
a debtor country will tolerate substantial depletion of 
reserves during liquidity crises if other less harsh 
processes of adjustment are feasible. Access to com-
pensatory capital from public lending institutions* 
particularly the International Monetary Fund, has 
reduced the urgency of maintaining substantial monetary 
reserves. Finally* if liquidity arises are ehronioally 
incurred, as in the postwar Brazilian experience, it is 
reasonable to expost a more permanent adjustment policy 
suoh as the imposition of artificial trade or payments 
barriers• 
For these reasons the measurement of changes in 
the reserve position of a debtor country can be misleading 
if considered in isolation* Declining reserves do not 
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neeeeaarily Indicate that a country 1» adjusting to n 
external liquidity problems nor does a constant reserve 
level indicate that liquidity pre a sure s ara not being 
experienced. However, if changaa 1B reserves ara maaaurad 
in relation to obeerved liquidity pressures* and if the 
implication* of such changaa are aaaeaaed In light of the 
over-all adjustment pollciea of the country in question, 
the analytical findinga of aueh a procedure are Indeed 
meaningful* 
Changes in Brasll'a r***?** position 
In the Brasilia© experience statistical evidence 
(Table k&) does indicate that v**9rv* depletion was a 
product of the **wv* liquidity shortages gattmvm^, during 
the latter part of the time period of this study* total 
reserves declined from an average annual level of $451 
million (l9kB-l95k) to a trough of $3^5 million in I960, 
After a recovery to $k$& million in I960, a sharp decline 
to $316 million was again experienced by the end of the 
period, the general decline through i960 unquestionably 
reflected the atrain of external imbalance which grew in 
severity through the mid and late 1950's. It la 
pertinent to recall that all but one of the liquidity 
oriels indicators, measured in Chapter IV, did point to 
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an increasingly severe external liquidity problem which 
did not reach a climax until I960* It is statistically 
apparent, therefore, that the combination of export 
stagnation, terme-of-trade deterioration, and the rising 
debt service burden, all of which were incorporated into 
the aforementioned liquidity oriaia indicators, did lead 
to reeerre depletion. It la also true, however, that 
Halted use va* made of this adjustment measure. Had no 
other meana of adjustment boom employed, clearly, the 
prolonged imbalance would have necessitated complete 
reserve depletion by I960. 
So* reluctance on the part of authorities to draw 
down reserves is illustrated by the faot that a constant 
level of monetary gold wao maintained through 1959* Only 
from I960 to 1963 did significant reductions in the gold 
stock occur. It lo true, on the other hand, that no such 
reluotanee wao observed in the case of convertible foreign 
exchange* Frost an average annual level of $132 million 
(19M*~1951*)» foreign exchange reserves declined sharply 
to a postwar trough of $37 million in 1958 and remained 
at a relatively low level through i960* This decline 
wao interrupted only by an isolated recovery In 1956 
(Table 1*.6). Reserve adjustment during this critical 
L J 
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period of ehronie liquidity shortage almost exclusively 
involved the dinning dona of foreign exchange nitHtii 
the subsequent recovery of tha latter to a level 
of $173 million in 1961 and the maintenance of thle 
relatively high level through 1963 la consistent with the 
eaalng of the debt service burden which began to dooline 
in relation to external receipts after I960* However, 
only in 1961 was a significant increase in total reserves 
observed, the sharp declines in monetary gold reserves 
from $235 million (1961) to $225 million (1962) and again 
to $lf>0 million (1963) »ore than offset the aforementioned 
advances in convertible foreign exohange holdings. 
Ihe resorve buildup in 1961 and the subsequent 
depletion through 1%3 are readily explainable. Export 
values rose sharply in 1961 from the stagnated level of 
the late 19501*, but this reoovery waa not sustained. 
In 1962 export values foil to their lowest postwar level 
since 19M> (fftblo 6). The passage of a stringent bill in 
1962* restricting the repatriation of foreign capital 
and the remittance of earnings did serve the purpose of 
xFor a ocanplete analysis of this enactment, see 
pages 333-335. Although the attempt is made in this 
chapter to treat Brazilian adjustment policies in topical 
sequence, it is not possible to completely isolate simul-
taneously applied policy measures by topic. The inter-
L relationships of policies must also be treated. J 
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reducing the outflow of debt service from the extra* 
ordinary high level of the late 1950*8* but tills was not 
accomplished without cost* lev foreign Investments were 
discouraged by this enactment to such an extant that by 
1963 s. not annual outflow of non-compensatory oapital was 
actually recorded. She resulting pressure on external 
balance was such that reserve depletion was indeed 
necessary. 
The observed reserve depletion during the mid and 
late 19$0f s was undeniably rendered necessary by the 
increasingly heavy debt service commitment, which, combined 
with export stagnation, served to produce the observed 
chronic external imbalance• However, in creating con* 
ditions necessitating reserve depletion in the period 
subsequent to 1961, the role of the debt service burden 
Is less clear. Hie aforementioned liquidity crisis 
indicators, measured in Chapter IV, prove to bo inadequate 
in accounting for the extent of the reserve depletion. 
Indeed, they indicate a general easing of the burden in 
relation to the earlier period rather than the opposite* 
Despite this inadequacy, however, the indirect role of 
the debt service burden is evident In this regard* 4s a 
result of the attempt to rmfa** the burden artificially 
L J 
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through public enactment, a more serious problem developed 
within the capital aooount. Diollsss in the gross Inflow 
of foreign capital outetripped the desired declines in tha 
outflow of debt service* She and result, of course* was 
tha expanded utilisation of tha adjustment policy of 
rosonro depletion* 
Tha ratio of reserves to import values 
In assessing tha adequacy of reserves over time, 
it is useful to consider changes in r^mmrvm in relation 
to changes in import values. If increases in import 
purchases outstrip corresponding increases in a country*s 
capacity to finance these expenditures, as was evident in 
the Brasilian experience particularly during the latter 
part of the postwar period (1955-1963), fluctuations in 
ths ratio of reserves to imports become analytically 
significant* A decline in this ratio reflects reduced 
reserve adequacy to oops with further liquidity pressures 
produced by continued external imbalance. However, 
fluctuations in tea ratio become loss critical if 
external receipts grow at an annual rats that is adequate 
to finance expanded import requirements j in such a case, 
relative declines in reserves may simply reflect an 
.lloo.tiot, of row**, tart, to M l a p m t a l chapels,
 j 
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arising from a sense of reduced urgency with respect to n 
external liquidity. 
In reference to the Brazilian postwar experience, 
It ess bo safoly asserted that this reduced urgency did 
not materialise. Chronically deficient extamal receipts* 
particularly during the latter part of tho period (1955* 
1963), produood Increased anxiety Ins toad. Tho extent 
of this anxiety waa reflected In governmental efforts to 
achieve balance through artificial measures* which 
appeared at times to bo almost frantically applied. 
In assessing tho adequacy of Brazilian reserves 
over time by uaa of tho ratio of reserves to Import 
values* a gradual roduetloa in rocorvo adequacy becomes 
statistically apparent during tho later tlao period (195?-
1963). From an annual average of 31 por cent for tho 
period 19M*-19$k» the ratio declined generally but 
unevenly to 21 por cent by 1963* fhe principal ox* 
ceptlona to thio general decline wore the Isolated 
sharp rlaee from 29 por cent In 1955 to 3? per cent In 
1956 and from 2tg> por cent in I960 to 31 3*r cent In 
1961 (Table 1+6). 
Considering tho extent and tho prolonged nature 
of tho liquidity shortage* experienced during this 
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period, sharper and mere consistent declines In this 
ratio might in<U«d have been expected. Had Brazilian 
authorities depended on reserve depletion exclusively 
for purposes of adjustment, this moat assuredly would 
hare materialised* However, as will be brought to ligjit 
latsr in this chapter, othar adjustment measures including 
import compression wore extensively utilised* Ehe 
artifieial roduotion of imports through the imposition 
of trade barriers and exchange oontrola clearly was 
instrumental in producing this gradual and uneven decline. 
Had it been possible to compress imports to a far greater 
extent through the more rapid growth of import sub-
stitute industries, this ratio could have risen even in 
the faee of extensive reserve depletion. 
The ratio of reserves to external debt service 
the met of this aforementioned ratio as an in-
dicator of rosorve adequacy can alio be misleading if 
the source of a country's external imbalance extends 
beyond the question of excessive demand for imports* 
the Brazilian postwar experience is a case in point, 
inasmuch as the rising debt service burden exerted 
additional pmttmm on scarce foreign exchange reserves 
and compounded the problem of deficient import capacity. 
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 In assessing the significance of changes in Brae 11»9 n 
reserve position during the postwar period, It is 
appropriate therefore, to consider the ratio of reserves 
to external debt service. 
In contrast to the slow irregular downward move* 
ment of the ratio of reserves to import values, this 
ratio declined sharply and steadily during the severe 
liquidity crises of the mid and late 19$0»e# Average 
animal reserva holdings during the earlier period 
(19^ 8-195^ 1-) amounted to more than 220 per oent of 
average annual debt service* By I960 this ratio had 
fallen to 57 per cent. Although a moderate rise to 
89 per oent did occur In 1961, this improvement was 
certainly of minor quantitative significance compared 
to the substantial deoline experienced earlier, 
The analytical Importance of such a deoline 
should not be overstated. Brasil was not forced to 
support the debt service outflow in excess of the 
capacity to service such debts by reserve depletion 
alone* As was explained before in the ease of the 
observed excessive demand for imports, alternative 
adjustment polloles were available and were extensively 
utilized. However* since the analysis of the total 
L Brazilian balance-of-payments position for the time ^ 
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period of thi* study did reveal that external receipts 
were generally insufficient to cover Import demand alone 
despite considerable Import compression and apart from 
the question of the heavy debt service burden, the sharp 
deeline In this ratio becomes much more meaningful from 
the standpoint of ******* adequacy. It indeed reflects 
the substantial reduction in reserve adequacy with respect 
to this moat critical source of liquidity shortage* Had 
Brasil been forced to rely to a greater extent on reserve 
depletion, as indeed might have boon the ease considering 
the difficulties encountered in the administration of the 
complex systems of exchange and trade controls as wall as 
the difficulties encountered in the attraction of in-
creasing amounts of compensatory capital, clearly, this 
growing inadequacy would have proven to be a much greater 
source of public concern. If the export and import 
trends observed during the latter part of the sixteen** 
year time span continue through the 196o»s, and if 
greater inducements are not forthcoming for the purpose 
of attracting more non-compensatory capital, it might 
indeed become unreasonable to expect that increasing 
inflows of compensatory capital will he sufficient to 
fill tfea external gap, 
L J 
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Xf Brasilia* authorities are forced to look 
beyoad oempenaatery finaoeing, either aore atringeot 
lnpoaed with the inevitable undeairable aid* effeot of 
fu2"ther dla^oujNMrliui foreign lnfveatiaaiit or* alternately* 
reaervoe will have to bo depleted to a far greater extent 
than waa evident through tha mid and lata 19£0fa and tha 
aarly I960*** However, if the depletion oontinuea at 
tha rata obaerved during thia period, thla indeed may 
beeome unfavorable even aa a atopgap meaeure. la effect* 
^aV^r ^ee^ae ' " P T P T jeY*a*e*f^e* PjMWaaa* eja ^yat'"^i^^^w*e«Pfl» ev^ffaJP^a^erv^e/- ew»«^Pwiej^p^jjPjeje^^e/.;p •wWP*Jf 
indeed render Brasilia external latbalanee that aaioh mora 
unmapportable through the elimination *f raaarva depletion 
at a policy maaaura of ad juetaaent. 
The ae«ond line of &*ten** during liquidity eriaee 
li tha availability and aocaaaibllity of compensatory 
fioaooiog. Thara la undeniable evidence is tha Brazilian 
experience of increased dependence on compenaatory 
financing, j>artioularly during tha lattar part of the 
time period of interest when external imbalance and 
liquidity orlaaa became chronic. Table 29 reveale 
extensive tapping of extemftl funde, not only from tha 
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International Monetary Fund but alae from the Kxport-
Xaport Bank of tha tTnittd Statea, the Federal Reaerve 
Syateoi of the United Statea, the United Statea Agenoy 
fop Zntemavtlenal Developsaent, tJuitod Statea private 
banka, and other Korth Aaerlean and Buropoan aourcea 
of ore4it» Monetary movement* between prtv**# Brazilian 
financial inatlttetiona and ferolgn i.n#tl.1^ ittJlone also 
reflect exteneive reoourae to eompeneatory finanoing# 
During tlit early part of the poatwar era 
(19^3-1950), a period characterised by a relatively light 
debt eorvioa burden* the ree^iirenent to attraot oca* 
penaatory funda na# oorroapondingly email* disable 
balanee-of*trade eurpluaee whioh aubetantially offaet 
the Urge defioita on aervloe itema and the net outflowa 
of non-ooBKpenaatory oapital were the principal contributing 
factora in this regard (Table 1). 
Although the debt aervloe burden in relation to 
export recelpta continued to eaae through 1952, the 
sharp riae in intporte in 1951*1952 (Table 6) required 
expanded conqpenaatory meaaurea. Proa a 1914-3-1950 
average of $$6 million, the inflow of cctapenaatory 
capital roae sharply to |£65 million in 1951 (Table 29)* 
Although the requirement dropped to $7*i million in 1952, 
L tbts did not reflect an easing of the external imbalance, j 
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As a result of the largest bala»oo-of-trade deficit in 
the postwar period, deferred imports payments root to en 
unprecedented level of $5I|1 mi 111 on in 1952, 
Despite Idie faot that the imposition of harsher 
import controls in 1953 produced a substantial balance-
of-trade surplus, the requirement to pay the deferred 
import debt necessitated heavy compensatory financing. 
In 1953 a»d Again in 1954 the combination of matured 
debts arising from previously deferred imports payments, 
continued large deficits on service account including 
rising interest and dividend payments on foreign capital, 
and expanded amortisation commitments on capital account 
more than offset the artificially attained surpluses in 
the merchandise trade balance. 
Despite deterioration is the terms of trade and 
increases in the debt service burden in 1955 and 1956, 
import ecmpreeeion was successful to the extent that net 
outflows of compensatory capital were experienced, this 
was a short-lived phenomenon, however. From 1957 to I960 
export stagnation, produced for the moat part by continued 
deterioration in export prices, had a telling effect on 
Brasilia trade balance. Trade surpluses which were 
needed to offset the unavoidably large deficits on 
L J 
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§cwv&eo ooooont atoartlly dJjalnlshed despite the retention 
Of Stringent import Control measure** Sew&ofc defleltS 
g*ow primarily as a result of increased outflows or 
interest and dividend payment*, and the net annual It)* 
flov of non*oompensatory capital actually declined as a 
raault of aharp increases in amortisation repayments. 
The net effeot of tbeae oonbined developmente la reflected 
in the faot that Brazil urns required to attract a not 
inflow of compensatory capital amounting to $1,016 
million for this four-year period~-an average of $25U 
million pop year (S*able 29). The role of the excessive 
debt service burden in producing this imbalance was 
obvioue. The failure to reduce deficit* on eerrioe items 
"^eitSBr ^^* ^ a ^PSp •S*OP ais> ^ pesssjp ^ sj^jp j a S^J* ^STB>- ^fwev^p asswur^ Sf ^p s # ^ ^ a * ep jp- ^p^e* vfs*o^s/ pwwi w ^PSJP ej^s^^esfiS' es 
accounts notable Is the transportation account were not 
sufficient to offset increases in the former. FHirtherraore, 
because of the increased amortisation burden the sub-
stantial gross inflow of non-compensatory capital was 
simply insufficient to effect external balance. 
The legislative introduction of the aforementioned 
profits remittance b i l l in 1961 and i ts subsequent passage 
in 1962 did serve to artificially reduce the debt service 
L J 
283 
r n 
outflow *hieh hud reached excessive levels In 1958*1960. 
However
 # it alto had a second undesirable effect; namely, 
the dlsoouregemerit of non^oosxpettsatory financing 
particularly from private sources. $h# gross inflow of 
this type of capital declined sharply in 1961! and again 
la 1963 (fafe&ft 28)« Improvements in the country* e 
export posture and declines in deficits on service 
account during this three-year time span were offset by 
the inability to attract sufficient non~coB3pensatory 
capital to avoid continued external imbalance* Since the 
full aft*** <*f t&* pm#ti% mmmmm MU **§ M * **U? 
* & TP' ;W'^ ^P ^ P N P W ^F<p#f^S* W w^^^^^^m ^WP*a^F eJfiS-^Br^p (SlHp^Wejt sPl*^^"W '^P^^i ^Sf^ipSwaSlr^p^pS^P'^W'^ff^SWpl M ^w^^MSwe-^^^WhSlh 
amounted to only $3 million in 1961• However, subsequent 
«Uli«« a ^ $36$ »m£att wHq^itttMly« 
determine the) limits of a debtor country's ability to 
tne actrae$ion ox ccotpenea'cory capital* uerxam 
questions are unanswerable. To what percentage of the 
total supply of compensatory capital did Brasil avail 
itself during the liquidity crises of the postwar era? 
low close did Brasil approach to the maximum available 
28? 
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levels? The difficulty in answering these questions 
private* 
Changes *" ^f***1'***2^1* t r a n o h e 
I t i t poaalble, however, to supply partial 
answers to the above by focusing cat the principal source 
of eonqpeneatory O)podit*-43tt3at0iyf the International Monetary 
<Sr SjejeWPSeiSB ajMasPSF sBWPa^P^PMpe'VP ^ ^ ^ F P*HPe*elPTP'a*** #BF4jp ^WSS*seyip» '^^jwJMP^S* ^p^^P^pFaflS^p^ei ^ F I P W W F ^wjpje'WPwPfc ^ P ^IP«P£ 
HOP conditional credit can fee ascertained by measuring 
changes i s i t s oredit tranche position. Sfcia milwU, 
l^essi ^G^tF^&m'^wvf mt ^SSPSWS*^F*Bw-^p*i(s>^p^p^!a ejws*sjar ^p*ie* ^sF t^iesst sp? ^^ p^ pnwp 4fihIB*^p^p^ *^mr s^^aps' ^P^P^^^^BF ^P'WWPWJPJ* 
^P^<Bfr^W?eW^IPepMPi^OV SawT|P*eW^ejrfBMPPSSJmPS7 ip^S** P^PMPJflr" lafiepeSF ^ P ^ p S ^ W ^PSpPeSF ^p1 ^MrVPMPS) ^P/WS | a " WP' •Hfc'PJP4Pfc"PJ 
sjrsinssipip^ppNlsjp • F ^ F H W B P ajppp-ejppisi 'P* air^pawt IWPMP^P efe^Vflps^appt ^MHpheaeeV w ^gpej mmfli0'%0 jss^piflp. ^pr^pst* W %*7i** 
Use) cruaeiro quota. To determine the adequacy of thiu 
source of liquidity over time, It ia then appropriate 
to measure change* in. unutilised credit in relation to 
change in impart values and in debt awf'toe*^ 
^International Bank for Reconatruction and 
a y '^ ff' ^ p-^y efcsjpatpsassspspp ap ja MM A a WP^MPPWPWP* iP.e^^8PSW^*Me* ev^^ers" vp^im^p^apHec^ppe ea ^ * * ejpsa? i^PipFisar^p* ^PISP/TPS** • 
Bconcmic growth and External Debt i An Analytical rraaac* 
1 y^^ K^ i Xp «vt 
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It i s elear from Table 47 that the ohronio 
ttn# period of interest (1955*1963) did result in Increased 
Breailian rellanee on IMF credit. IMP drawings generally 
lnoreased, and the country's credit trenohe position 
generally declined as the external situation worsened. 
With r*speot to this latter point, statistics are super-
fioially deoeiTlng* Although Brasilts credit position 
deolined to a postwar lest of $75 million in 1958 and 
remained below $m wllllm mmt& i f St * * Mm Pm 
to $210 million mis experienced Is I960. This was 
attributable not to decreased borrowing—drawings, in 
fast, inereased from $9£ million in 1959 to $11^ 0 lis 
I960—but, rather, to an inorease In Brazil's IMP quota 
from $150 million to $280 million. "This, of course, 
substantially expanded credit availability at a time 
when tto need for oredit was most pressing. Subsequent 
deolines from Hits postwar peak oredit tranche position 
i f $iX§ million la 1961 through 1%$ reflected the 
increased utilisation of credit la relation to the 
earlier period. Had the quota not been raised and had 
BtMil •mldbftstd to SMvtMt its) drsMngs at t&« observed 
rate (Table kl), the legal limit of 200 per cent of 
L - J 
$150 million would elearly have been closely approached. 
The effect of the chronic external Imbalance in 
radioing tho adequacy of this eouroe of compensatory 
ft»*ii#iag t§ mtlm%*& in ttoo d#«liai3ig ratio* of 
ooodltlonal liquidity to Import values and of conditional 
liquidity to debt service prior to I960 (Tabla ltf)» tn 
the fewer **§•# tho rata of deoline wag loss for tho 
mm M u n i stated in tho oase of tho ratio of raaarvoa 
to Impart values. 
Aftor tho trough levels of 6 pair oont and 7 par cant 
were reached in 1956-1959* tfaa ratio inereeeed sharply to 
Ik ?** *•»* In I960, Clearly, thia rise waef for the 
in Braailt* O f quota* It ta af pertinence to note that 
deepite the subsequent decline to 12 par tout by 1963, 
thaaa 195&-1959 trough lavala ware not olosely approached, 
•Rio quantitative significance of the I960 increase in 
quota ia illustrated by the faot that in no year prior 
to I960 waa thia 12 par east level exceeded. Aa a 
Conditional liquidity it flynonomous with un-
utiliEed IMF orodit. 
L _J 
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 result «f ttoe l u m i l In credit availability, Hi* •harp 
rednotiooa la **»a*?ai which oeeurred Ut« i s the period 
appeared less ominous, in effeet, mm reduced adequaoy 
of unconditional liquidity! vat partially offset by the 
increaaed adequacy of conditional liquidity. 
extern*! debt aervioe 
Daelinea In the ratio of conditional liquidity to 
dabt aervioe from 1155 (%f par cant) to 19$&»19$9 (1? 
par aant * 18 par aant) vara considerably iiharpar than In 
tha above ***** 9a* riaa in I960 (to $$ par cent) waa 
oeapajrable, but unlike tha former ***** tela improvement 
vaa sustained through 1963* Conditional liquidity 
•mounted to U2 par oant of debt serviee in 1963, ant 
although this fa l l short of tha 1955-1956 peak levels of 
kl per aant and 1*6 par cent respectively, i t was indeed 
a substantial improvement over the 1958-1959 trough 
levels. 
Bit I960 increase in quota wa* not the only 
contributing factor with respect to the latter. I t should 
alia he remembered that this period wa* characterised by 
mmmtmmmmmmmmmmmmMmmmmmtmmmmmmmmmmmm > ' 
^Unconditional liquidity equals a country*s geld 
and foreign exchange holdings plus It* IMP gold tranche 
position. 
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ft alight casing of thft debt service burden (Table 3 D . 
there 1ft some consolation In the fact that 1 B 
the face of continued external imbalance, available IMF 
credit Increased towards the wad of the time period In 
question. The outlook In 1958-1959 wftft clearly not as 
bright from this point of view, 
the IMP m m only one source of credit for Brazil 
during the postwar period. Beoauae of the prolonged 
nature of the external imbalance, Brazil was farced to 
borrow heavily from priTate aa well aa from public 
sources other than the IMF* Aa the Brasllian demand for 
credit expanded, the price charged by foreign lenders, 
particularly private lenders, also increased, the 
observed Increases In the effective rate of interest 
paid on foreign loans (fable 32) reflected, of course, 
this development. Furthermore, slime the net Inflow of 
longer-term non-eompenaatory capital became increasingly 
inadequate to offset the trade deficit, the requirement 
to attract increasingly larger amountB of shorter-term 
compensatory capital led to a severe shortening of the 
debt structure, particularly In the late 1950* a• Thia 
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development vae reflated by the obeerved deolinea in 
the effective rate of amortisation (Table 32) and alee by 
the faet that amortiaation payment* incre&eed eignifieantly 
1B relation to Intereat paymenta* 
In the Brazilian peetvar experlenoe, the in-
ereaeingly hamvy debt eerviee burden wae alaa^ly the prle* 
paid t** tha extenelve utiliaetion of ©ompeneatory 
f laaiiel&g aa ft mammy* of external adjuetaaent. Credit 
nay indeed remain euffioiently available throughout tha 
I960** to ettnport tha eontinued uaa of this adjuatment 
meaaure, aut 1% may beeome available only at a pro-
greealvely higher ***** perhape eventually at a 
The wiadom involved in thia trend towarde greater 
dependence on oompenaatory financing oannot ba aaaaaaad 
emit t*m tha atandpoint of oradit availability* its* 
heavy ooat involved inuat alio ba coneidored. 
It »i#it ba auparfioially argued that the period 
from fcffeo to 1963 M i oharaoteriaed by both a alight 
waning of tha dabt eervioe burden (Table 31) and a 
•light lengthening of tha debt atructure and that, 
therefore, the earlier trend tovarda inereaeed dependenoa 
on eeoapenaatory finanoing vae* in faett broken, A 
oloeer examination of the underlying raaaona for thla j 
29S 
apparent rerereal of tread* km***** reveala tha 1 B -
Yalldlty off snob a 1 1 M of argumentation* leither of the 
aforaaentlopod daTelopoente v m tha produete of structural 
ljaprovoMntei rather, they vere artificially induced by 
Brasilia© polioyaakara—tha produotc of atopgap Measures 
of adjuet»e»t» The eating of tha dabt aarriea burden was 
mora apparent than real, inaamoh as tha outflow of dabt 
aarriaa vae reatrlotcd by tha paaeaga of tha stringent 
profita ranittaaaa bill 1* 1962* Sins* lb It highly 
doubtful whether thaaa restrictions will reasin m the 
books booauaa of tha undesirable payohologioal effect on 
foreign investors* there ia rosso* to believe that tha 
trend towarda inaraaaad dabt eervloe rigidity obearred In 
tha aid and lata 19$$*s %dll return im the aid and late 
1969*s* This, of eourea, assunes that tha liberal debt 
sarviee poliay of tha earlier period returns and that tha 
chronic external lahalanoe persists. 
Tha slight lengthening of too debt etruatura was, 
for tha moat part* tha product of renegotiated dabt 
ments In tha face of the prolonged labaZanoe, extended 
grace parloda nsra granted primarily to Braall on 
previoualy contracted or edit a by auoh public landing 
i- j 
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inatltutlaaa MI tlit Expo7t«X»port Bank of tha TTnltad States 
and tha XMP« Oloarly, sueh ranagotiatioeo its** atopgaps 
In natwa and should not bo mlaoooatroad as atruetoral 
oorrootlOBs* 
Xndaod* If tha projaotad axtarnal lmbalanoa doas 
paralat ttooagh tli* 1960«§# an Ineraaaingly hoary inflow 
of aoopansatory eapltal will ho inert tabla. Iron i f this 
external finenoing eegtiimes to fee readily available* a 
mora fundamental problem nil! arise. Will tha resulting 
inoreesed debt eerriee burden and tha shortened dabt 
strueture be supportable? 
•Poa> d£^ m<da Vft^otftdiHK • si salami ttajhdBMSf^^NSfcttm jstfSsmauSMSSjsj ^yaMy^^L jsitaam^sMSav dm ^^^^ 
teroal imsalenee aallad for tha stringent applieation of 
artifioiel trade and payments barriers, as noil M for 
exohange rate manipulation* These measures were need* 
hoverer, not only fop purposes of external adjustment tot 
alao for purposes of doYalopmantal etlmulaties* Import 
ooapression was a naaaaaary atop to aehiere tha former, 
but tha problem was to minimise tha adTerse affaat of 
rowor imports on aomesvio grswro* Axpoxr; strimuxaision 
vaa a seoond desirable maani of external adjustment, out 
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hero the preelooi was to support to* expert eeoter without 
militating agalnat the Interest of ether M l m which 
were M * e direetly Involved in tlm developmental effort* 
In the faee of lofty doTOlopoOTt aspirations, 
ainee extensive extern*! funding was neeeseery to support 
sush efforts* dobt servloe beoaae a burden* the failure 
of artifioial adjuetjeent meaeuree to correct too chronic 
imbalance, particularly during tte latter part of the 
postwar ere, necessitated compensatory finessing which 
compounded tho dobt servtee problem through the Shortening 
of tho debt structure. The u»o of reserveo aa a temporary 
stopgap agalnat liquidity shortage was alio haispored by 
development prioritioa* Aa wee mentioned earlier, tho 
opportunity ooata of maintaining largo reserves aololy 
for tho purpoee of external adjustment art aonaidarod 
too hlgih for post developing countries! Braail proved to 
Tho faet that chronic extern*! imbalance persisted 
through tho timo poriod of this study daspita tho ox* 
tensive utilisation of exchange and trade controls, 
Illustrates not only the severity of tho problam hut also 
tho fundamental conflict mentioned above* The purpoao of 
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tho tttbsoqMBt aaalysis ©f tho dosoriptioti and u t i l i -
oxporloaoo ! • cot to asaoao thoir offoot OR domostio 
ffronrth and dovolovMBt nor Is It to aooortain tho doaroo 
of oonfliot botwooo tho aforomontionod goala* Rathor, i t 
lo to dotomioo to vhat oxtont thoflo adjuatwnt polioioa 
wtM ooooooofal 1B ooaproaalsg inports and to attwolatlug 
oxporto and to noaauro tho iarpaot on dobt aorvioo 
eapaolty* Tho fooua to m tho oxtoraal ooctor a»d so 
oaoht oonstatit rofWBW# irt.ll bo nado to tho oxtonsal 
problau iodioatod in proooding ohaptora# 
$h§ oa&loraoi}t of trado and m b i i i i polio? 
ill u l BMutiLlios oootvo* aacooFloiaoo 
Booaaso of too promitjonoo of oof f 00 in BroBil«f 
oxport atraoturo, oxohango policy during tho poatwor 
porlod won ©loaoly linkod to tho fortunos of ooffoo solas. 
TinH'inrowoiiln in tho not bortor tor»s of trado dorlBg tho 
oarlior part of tho poriod, produood priaarily by twroooas 
in ooffoo priooa, nor* of auff iciotst wagoitudo to ©amou-
flaao a groaa ovortalttotion of tho orusoiro* Doooito tho 
foot that dcraoatic pricaa iooraaaod sharply botwoon 191*8 
»nd 1952, a fixod purchaao rato of 18*38 cruaoiros por 
dollar and 0 fixod soiling rate of 18.72 oruzolroa por 
L -J 
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dollar were maintained. This was supportable only 
because IstvMlM in coffee prloes outstripped the 
aforementioned rises lis domestic prices* Despite over-
valuation, coffee production and exportation remained 
profitable throughout this time span, the greatest 
sacrifice was felt by the exporters of secondary products 
whoae prices did not rise at a comparable rate with 
those of coffee. In the case of the latter, price 
rises &i& generally outstrip Increases in production 
costs? this mat not true of many secondary export 
products• 
Although Imports in general vere encouraged by 
the overvaluation, discriminatory controls in the form 
of import licenses were established during thli period* 
le import item* were absolutely disallowed, but the 
importation of non-essentials was restricted by the 
establishment of a system of priorities which f&m0& 
Importers to Join long waiting lists for the necessary 
licenses*1 Rate discrimination was also in effect• 
For some non*eseential imports, certain invisible 
Items end some remittances, a rate of J pear cent 
hkm» Baer, ^ " ^ ^ ^ 1 1 5 a ^ ^ ^ < s gf 0" 0^ 0^ 
ItWs^xM»» X w l e fP« %9*$0* 
L J 
300 
above the basic sailing rate waft applied} thla roe* 
to 8 p*r cent In January, 1952,* 
Although never legally decreed, Brasilia* ex-
porter* and importers both benefited during this period 
fro* a liberal government attitude toward* compensatory 
deals* Exporters of product* which were difficult to 
•ell vera allowed to sell* at a premium, foreign exchange 
rooeipt* to importer* unable to obtain the **m* through 
official licensing. Such *ale* were condoned by 
official* under two condition*! (1) that the export 
product* involved vera worth promoting and (St) that the 
import product* involved were not low priority non-
essential*.2 It i* clear that to a degree thl* practice 
reduced the Inflexibility of the fixed exchange *y*tem 
oruft«iro**3 
Apart from the latter concession, the exchange 
rata system remained highly inflexible through 1952, 
United Katlons, Economic Commission for Latin 
America, Economic Survey of Latin Amcricai 1955 {Hew York* 
tJteited latlens* 19$S)$ P* 17%. 
^Lincoln Gordon and Engelbert L, Orommer*. 
Administration, Harvard University, 1962), p. 16. 
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 deapite the foot that eerioue problema of external la- n 
balaaoe wore experienced 1B 1951 *&* In 1952* fheeo 
problana, however* wore not primarily the product 0 of the 
eyatem iteelf* Aa waa Motioned before* largo inoreaeea 
in tho importation of raw materiala and capital goode 
woro permitted in anticipation of a poaeible trade die* 
ruption reaultlng from tho Korean War* Prior to this 
two-year period* improvemente In tho Braailian terae of 
trado woro euffioient to produoo largo aerohandlee trado 
eurpluaea doaplto tho inflexibilities of tho exchange 
rata ayetesi whleh* In part, served to militate again at 
tho intoroata of tho export sector. In 1951 and 
partioularly la 1952* continued terme-of-trade improvement 
waa not auffleiont to off aot tho combined off act of tho 
groatly lnereaaed import demand and tho of oromontlo»od 
undealrable offoot of exchange rato overvaluation. 
It la of intaroat to nota that tho external dobt 
service burdon of this porlod contributed vary elightly 
to tho obeerved external imbalance. It ahould bo 
remembered that the burden of debt aerviee in relation 
to external rooolpta actually declined frost 1914-8 to 
1952. Of course* auch a statistical obaervation la 
deceiving inasmuch aa tho outflow of dobt service waa 
L J 
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rrestricted throughout this period by artificial payments n 
barriara.1 In a sense, the exchange rata System neces-
sitated thaaa restrictions; overvaluation served to 
stimulate tha outflow of dabt service while at tha same 
time diacouraglng naif eapltal inflows, 
Tha f ixad exchange ayatam baoama completely un-
eupportable 1B 1952 aa tha result of tha combination of 
faotora diaauaaad above. In 1953 two important policy 
Innovations wore made* In January a limit ad fraa axohanga 
markat vat created, mostly for tha purpose of stimulating 
experts* Importers oontinuad to daal la tha official 
market, but exporters of cartain produata vara allowed 
to taka advantage of tha fraa markat whisk* of courae, 
mora accurstaly raflactad tea trua relative value of tha 
eruselre* Dapanding on tha dagraa to which officials 
fait that axport products naadad stimulation, throe 
export eatagorias were aatabliahcd In February of 1953 
by STJMOC, tea 
first whara 15 pwr cant of tha axohanga receipts 
could be sold on tha fraa axohanga market; a second, 
whara 30 pmw cent could bo sold there; and a third 
V o r a complete assessment of these artificial 
paymenta barriers, see pages 327-329* 
%*er t on* olt*, p. 52* 
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category where 50 per eotit could b# eold In that 
market. M*»7 instructions followed vhloh lBHHfld 
the list of essential export produote, audi after a 
while all of theee produota vera put it* the third 
category.1 
the progreeeive llboralitation of tha policy reflected, 
of course, tha continued intcreet of tha Brazilian govern* 
rnant in export eti*ulationj however* the efficacy of the 
polloy wae reduced by eubeequcnt atepa taken to control 
tha free rate by eelllng exchange received in the official 
market.2 
The second major and by far tha more significant 
reform introduced in 1953 involved tha creation of a 
Multiple exchange rata system which replaoed direct 
Quantitative eontrole with an auction system. Five 
import categories were established with essentiality 
being the basic criterion. In each amotion available 
exohange was rationed through tha establishment of 
exchange quotae and a basic rate of bids. Certificatee 
wave sold which entitled the importer to purchase ex-
change at the official rate. The pricea of these 
certificates ware determined by demand/supply consid-
eratlona. Of course# governmental control of tha latter 
%bt*» 
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waa reflected is the dlaoriiilnatory allocations made to 
each Import category. Tho importer waa la tho final 
analytic faced with throe prloea—the official rate of 
exchange, tho purchase of tho certificate. And a transfer 
tax which eerved aa am additional meehanlam of control*1 
tho purchase of a certificate did not aeeure tho 
importer immediate aoooao to foreign exchange i a waiting 
period vac deeignated by central authorities, again aa 
a control measure. At too external poature of Braail 
eteadily deteriorated throughout the middle and late 
1950*e, tho waiting period wo* lengthened, reaching an 
arerago of five montha in 195^-1960, This, of course, 
•erred aa a psychological aa noil aa a financial souroe 
of import deterrent.2 
Two featuroe of thia policy Innovation were of 
particular importance from the atandpoint of external 
adjustment* Firatf 
foreign currency wee offered to importers in 
accordance with the real availabilities and after 
preferential payments had been effectuated. Hence 
no new ownmcrolal arroara could arise. The 
exieting arroara which hod inereaaed during 1952# 
in partioulart were redeemed during the following 
years. Secondly, aa the total amount of Import 
Gordon and aroramere, op. eit»» pp* 17-16• 
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agloa was eonslderably higher than that of export 
premiums, the monetary authorities acquired vast 
soma whieh vara partly used Tor export stimulation 
but mostly want to the Treasury.1 
With respect to tha former point, the policy 
revisions of 1953 ***• *» utKjuallfiad suooess. Unlike 
tha earlier system, import compression waa accomplished 
without tha burdening of subsequent periods with unpaid 
import debts. By failing to cheek tha accumulation of 
eonaerelal arrearst the earlier system had, in fact, 
served to alleviate current problems but only *t the 
expense of tha immediate future* Since external im-
balanae did become chronic during the mid and late 
1950* e> the elimination of this typo of debt aocumu-
lation was unquestionably timely and well advised. 
With respect to the second feature enumerated! 
above, the efficacy of the 1953 policy revisions waa 
clearly reduced by bureaucratic short-sightedness. 
Although of questionable wisdom from the standpoint of 
external balance, the system waa established so that 
tha amount of import agios5 would exceed that of export 
%»*•*• ffa,tf»e» P* «** 
2priaes tali by import era for exchange certificates. 
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premium*.1 Had a substantial paroantaga of tha raaidual 
boon usod for purposas of ganaral axport stimulation, 
suoh a faatura would hava boon jus tlf labia* Howarar, 
daaplta tha obvloua naad for tha rapid axpanaion of 
axportation daring tho Bid 1950'** *o*t of tha funds so 
aaauaulatad vara siphonad off to tha froaaury for anti-
inflationary purposas. ffnfortunataly, tha growing 
inflationary proaauraa wars nolthar ehaokad nor lndaad 
oran impadad by auoh alloeationa* Xn sffsat* thasa funds 
sarrad nolthar to dlrsotly adjust axtamal lmbalasas 
through additional axport stimulation nor to indlraatly 
aohiovs tha sama through a raduetlon in inflationary 
proasurss* 
tha waaknaaass of tha 1953 raf orm raaasuraa 
avantually lad to ravislon and furthar rafora In 195? • 
Tha maaauraa introdussd during this lattar yaar actually 
had two main faaturaa. fha first, by raduaing tha 
aforaaantlonad flva import oatagorlaa to two, was 
diraotad towards tha simplifiaatlon of tha axohange 
systam and tha aliaination of soma of tha administratis 
ooaplaxitias, A H goods daasiad as "assontial* wars 
lneludad in a ganaral oatagory, md all othars wars 
^Loab, loa» olt» 
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plaeed in a special category. Importere of high priority 
goode eueh ai wheat, fuela, newsprint* etc, vara permitted 
to taka advantage of an artificially maintained Ion ax* 
change rata which waa in tha form of a subsidy. Further* 
more, with tha intention of etlmulating tha inflow of 
loan aapital for high priority development needs, thia 
low exchange rata waa alao author! sad for tha payment of 
lntereat and amortisation.1 
Tha second faatura of thia reform meaeure waa 
alaarly supplementary• Tha stimulation of essential 
import a, aa outlined above, would have been unsupportable 
during thia period of liquidity ahortaga had not mora 
atringant maaauraa boon taken to reduce import demand 
elaevhere. By replacing tha traditional apaoiflo duties 
applied to nen«eeeemtlal imports by a aohedule of 
ad valorem duties baaed not only on the essentiality of 
import itema but alao on the availability of domestically 
produced substitutes, thia waa accomplished.2 Aa a 
result of the eevere inflationary preaeurea which 
poralated throughout tha earlier part of tha postwar 
periodf the tariff system based on apaoiflo duties had 
%aer # OP, elt«» $• 55* 
%©rdon and Qroramers, op. c l t . # p, 21, 
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loot its effectiveness. In affect, daty ratea bad n 
declined unrealietioally In relation to ourrtnt ratea.1 
Slnoe there wero no proepeote In tee aid 1950fa f©* *» 
aaalog of theaa Inflationary praaauraa, reform wae In* 
evitable. 
Although tho measurea introduced in 1957 produced 
eignifieant changes in the relative exchange coata of 
Importa, exchange ratea for exporta wero not affected. 
The old ayetcm woo maintained deapite the fact that tee 
pronounced rata rigidity In the face of continued in-
flationary preeeure served to diacourage export growth* 
Steps wore taken In 1959, however, to alleviate tela 
eituatiorw Under SUKOC Inatructlon 167, exportera of 
manufactured products wero allowed to take advantage of 
the mora rcalietio free market ratea. Later In tha same 
year all other exporta, with the exception of coffee, 
cocoa, crude mineral oil, and mamona wore admitted to tea 
free market, clearly, with the intention of stimulating 
aeeondary export growth* Deapite theae liberalising 
atepa, continued liquidity problcme in 1940 and 1961 
William B. Dale, Brasil/iPaotore Affecting Foreign 
Investment (Menlo Park, California! Intomational 
Induatrial Development Center, Stanford Research Institute, 
1959)* »• 50. 
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forced tee government to eetablieh * eyetom of forced 
loans* af footing both Importer a m& exporters. To acquire 
foreign exchange, importers wore required to wait a 
period of eix Mentha after the agio was paid la tee 
auction market a* Reporter a, on the other hand* were 
required to aocept partial payment of foreign exchange 
eaminga in Banco do Braail securities.1 
fce adjustment policies established from 1957 to 
1961 are intereating from many standpoints. Previous 
ohaptora hare revealed teat thia period van characterised 
by the moat intenae liquidity pressure of tee postwar era. 
Continued external Imbalance supported by increased in* 
flows of compenaatory capital and compounded by excessive 
rigidity in bote the external dobt and the import 
structures led, by necessity, to the expansion and 
solidification of artificial measures of adjustment. 
Defensive economic warfare was waged on many fronts, 
teo effort was made to stimulate export a
 # but at tee same 
time exporters were deprived of a portion of the immediate 
fruits of their endeavors through tee forced loan program* 
the compression of non-essential imports was intensified 
by the tariff reform and the exchange rate reform measures 
%aer f op. elt.« p. 58. 
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which, la many instances, resulted in the complete 
exclusion of lowest priority items. 3ne price effect 
of higher tariff• and a mora expensive aiahaiiga rata was 
supplemented towards the end of the period by a more 
subtle deterrent la the form of the waiting list, ffnlike 
earlier systems, Importers were required to pay in full 
at the beginning of the period and, as such, were fereed 
to grant loans to the dispensers of foreign exchange*-* 
the Brasilia© government. 
Although it is true that importers of essential 
items (general category) enjoyed an exchange rate 
advantage over importers of nonessentials during this 
period, they suffered a rate disadvantage with respect 
to those who were allowed to participate in the free 
market (i» e.t exporters, enterprises engaged in tourism, 
and enterprises that remitted profits)• 
feliey developments in 1961 attempted to bring 
greater unity to the exchange rate system. tinder STJMOC 
Instruction 20I4,, imports in the general category and all 
exports except coffee were placed on the free market* 
Subsequent measures continued this unifying process. 
L J 
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Instruction 205 
transferred exchange earned frost coffee exporters to 
the free market, requiring exporters to deliver $22 
per nag so as to enable the governmentf with the 
equivalent in oruseiros, to finance the support of 
exoess production^ 
Under Instruotion 208 the oembio do ousto system was dis-
eontlnucd, and all imports wore transferred to the free 
market* Deep!to this latter move, other import re* 
strietioBs remained intaot with one exception, She 
f oroed loan program Imposed on importers vas replaced by 
a system of Letres do Importaoao which was equally as 
restrictive. Importers under this new system wore forced 
to place on deposit for a period of 1$0 days the equiv-
alent la oruseiros of the value of foreign exchange 
bought) in exchange the importers received Banco do Brasil 
securities»2 
It is significant to note the Braxlllan policy-
makers failed to properly implement the exohange reforms 
of If61. The unified free exchange market became free in 
name only* tightly controlled by the Banco do Brasil, the 
overvalued rate served as a deterrent to the needed ex-
pansion and diversification of exports* Exporters, 
TESSA** P* 5^* 
%oi<t. 
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expecting devaluation, actually compounded the problem 
by withdrawing from tha market In order to take advantage 
of more favorable future rates, Export gain* experienced 
early in 1961, a* a result of the pollelce of unification, 
were wiped out by a combination of real wm& peychologlcal 
feetore* 
Frustrations arising from the unrealistic over-
valuation of the exchange rate finally led to a devalu-
ation in May, 1962. However, this action a till left the 
exchange rate grossly overvalued, as reflected in a down-
ward drift of the blaok market rate, and as a result, 
export* failed to respond. Foreign exchange shortages 
became more acute, necessitating a more drastic measure 
by as early *• July. TJnder STJMOC Xnetruotion 228, a 
vertical exchange monopoly wae granted to the Banco do 
Braail. Thia measure, however, also failed* 
Instead of saving foreign exchange for essential 
imports and debt transfers, as wae the intention, 
there was a sharp rise in clandestine deals which 
deprived the country of such dollar earnings as 
became avallable.l 
Hie system became so unworkable that by July 
practically no import exchange was made available by the 
^Economist Intelligence Unit. Quarterly Economic 
Review; Brasil, Ho. 1*3 (S«ptember# 19621f p, 5. 
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Banco do BMill* STOOO Instruction 229 (Auguat) n 
aboliehad the Monopoly allowing banks again to eetablieh 
their own exchange rata but only under tha watchful #79 
of the Superintendeney itoalf. Aft in the past, tha 
exchange rata devaluation which accompanied thia Mature 
foiled to eorrcot tha chronic overvaluation.1 
Overvaluation paraiatad throughout 1963 daapita 
continued efforts to correct the same through policy 
revisions. At before, thia failure was ooapounded by tha 
foot that the frequent reoouree to revision created ait 
atmosphere of uncertainty and uneasiness which resulted 
not only la frustration and eaharrassment for official 
policymakers tat alao In confusion among thoaa to t&e 
private scoter who engaged in foreign trada and finance. 
m Br*iil»f extern*! fetlonlc 
In retrospect, it ia olaar that tha reforms of 
1953 war* tha major policy daralojaaants of tha postwar 
periods. Subsequent changes through 1963# although many 
its number, were evolutionary rather than roTolutionary in 
nature. Only the tariff reform of 1957 oould be considered 
a significant exception in this regard, it is interesting 
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 to note that 1953 aleo signaled the beginning of the n 
malignant debt aervioe problem which grow in Intenaity 
through i960 and which remained heavy through 1963* 
Although it cannot bo aaid that this debt aervioe 
problem waa created by inefficaeioue trade and exchange 
rata policies* it oan indeed bo aaid that the latter 
generally tailed to alleviate the pressurea exerted by 
the foneer during the time period of tAda study. 
With reapeot to policy offorta directed at export 
stimulation, thia failure was unquestionable. Prior to 
1953 the groaaly overvalued foreign exchange rate had 
become unsustainable deapite improvement in the terms of 
trade. From 19P to 19S2 export volume had declined by 
a substantial 31 per cent (fable 6)—a development which 
waa in B O little way attributable to overvaluation. By 
1953 export atiwulation waa critically needed, but de-
valuation waa not forthcoming, lather* a limited froo 
exchange market waa created which afforded exportera the 
opportunity to take advantage of more realiatic rate*. 
However, aa waa provioualy mentioned, this market gradually 
became free in name only aa a result of public tampering. 
Export premiuae wore paid by the Braailian government 
subsequent to the policy reforma of 19531 hut the amounts 
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wore eonsiderably loss than those of iaport *g&£S. * • 
difference eould haire been used for further expert stim-
ulation, but this was not dene* Policy modifications 
through tha mid and late 1950*41 did open the fifoo market 
to wore expert produete, but public tampering with the 
fraa rata continued. A forced leas policy in tha early 
I960* sf vhioh affaetad exporters as wall aa importers, 
served to offset expert stinaxlation elsewhere by de-
priving exporters of tha imcdiate use of foreign ax-
ohange earnings* Bventual devaluations In 1962 and 1963 
were too littla and too lata. 
Baa f ailure of axport atimulatien measures ia 
clearly illustrated by statistical evidence. Apart from 
aa iaolatad spurt 1 B 1955-1956, axport fuantnm actually 
declined from 1953 to 1958 (table 6). Although the rata 
of decline was slight* this fact itcelf is amasing in 
tha face of tha eonaerted stimulation afforte, Moderate 
spurts were experienced in 1959, 1961* and in 1963* but 
only during this last year was the early 19M> level ex* 
aeaded and even than only by approximately 1 ^mr cent* 
. Tha fact that the aforementioned trade end ex-
change rata policies were mora- successful in compressing 
imports than $m etteulatlng exports should not bo 
L surprising, the former is obviously the easier to J 
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aeeomplieh. Of course, It would h a w been easier itlll 
had developmental aspirations been las* ambitious and 
bad the requirement to increase the importation of raw 
aaterialaf intermediate goods, and capital goods been 
correspondingly smeller* 
She replacement of direct quantitative import 
controls 1*> 1953 wttk tha multiple exchange rata and 
auction system did successfully serve to oompraaa 
import* of a non-eaaential nature is subsequent year a, 
particularly in tha aaaa of consumer durable5, Further* 
mora, aa was explained before, this policy reform alee 
eliminated one of the meat undesirable by-product a of 
the earlier system (i# e.t the accumulation of commercial 
arrears). 
Statistics atteet to the degree of success of 
thia reform, Wmm 1952 to 1956 the import volume of 
consumer durablea declined by a substantial 92 pw cent 
(Table 2k). Despite the feet that fuels and lubricants 
and certain critically needed raw materials and inter-
mediate products actually increased during thia period, 
total Import quantum actually declined by 36 per cent. 
Deferred import payments, which in 1952 alone had 
amounted to $5!A million, were paid off completely by 
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r1956, and no new debts of this typ« wore inourred after ~i 
1952* 
In 1957 policy revisions wore undertaken with the 
intention of ImproYing the good features of the 1953 
reform and of eliminating aome of the inherent complexities* 
Despite the faot that external imbalance did peraiat 
throughout the add and late 1950^af more concerted efforte 
wore made to stimulate the importation of itema needed 
for development. The aimplifioation of the exchange 
system in 1957 in reducing the previously established 
fire import categories to two did serve Hits purpose. 
The fartfee* etimalatieii of Impesrta f w develepstcat, 
of cewse, resulted t&e farther eem^reeelem of iaesceittiai 
imports, Shis was attempted through the tariff reform of 
traditional system of specific duties by a system baaed 
^MJHSI sa^sr ^MUfc « j ^ « ^ ^ ^ _ ^ ^ jMe^k.4ft4l[ ^ a e e 
Unfortunately, the increased importation of 
essentials outstripped the reduced importation of in-
quantum increased by 8 por cant from 1957 to I960. Thin 
rate of increase, although quantitatively small, was 
disturbing im the face of the widening external balance 
Lpredueod by export stagnation and the growing debt _j 
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eervlee burden* Import oompreeelon was fay from 
aufflelent during this period of gov*** liquidity 
ahortagee. 
In the early i960** mora aevere import re* 
etrlotlene wort lmpoeed out of neeeaeity. fhe afore-
mentioned forced loan program, the eyatem of Letraa do 
Importaeae, and tho monopoly grantod to tho Banco do 
Braail were three easea In point, tho payohologieal 
offoot of tlio many policy revisiona and reversals vhioh 
characterised thia poriod did aot to confuse and dia-
oourago importera, but tho dubioua advantage a gained 
hero in import roduotlona wore more than offoot by the 
aeme offoot on exportera. 
From a atatietical point of view total import 
quantum did deoline by approximately 9 par eent between 
i960 and 1962 aa a result of tho combination of tho above 
f aot ore
 9 but again thia waa far from auf ficlent to 
produce external balance. Furthermore# dlffioultiea at 
tho and of the time poriod im question were compounded 
by the foot that import quantum increased aharply In 
1963 to a level exceeded previously only by those reached 
in 1951 and 1952 during tho Korean War* 
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Considering the tin* period as a whole, It my ~ 
safely be concluded that the policy measures Introduced 
by Brasllien authorities did fail to compress imports and 
stimulate export* sufficiently to close the widening gap 
of external imbalance* She frequent recourse to policy 
reform end revision* particularly during the latter part 
of the period, refloated, of course, the extent of the 
external problem indicated by the ratio analysis of the 
preceding chapter, 
**ttt ***** 1frw# awrft .ft*»tt+mff 
In Chapter III* the measurement of fluctuations 
is Brasilia imports revealed pronounced import compression 
during those periods characterised by shortages in ex-
ternal liquidity* the previous analysis of exchange rate 
and tariff poliey during these same periods revealed 
that to a considerable extent import demand was 
frustrated by artificial restraints. It is of further 
relevance to note that import restrictive measures 
aimed at the reduction of external imbalance were 
supported by the public sponsorship of import substi-
tution, fbe continued growth of import substitute 
industries was induced with the obvious intention of 
minimizing internal disturbances arising from w&m*& 
L J 
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Importation. The supporting role of such a program was, 
of eoux»sof limited. Import substitution requires long* 
term planning as well a* the long-term implementation of 
plana onee made. By itaalff It cannot be utilised as a 
short-term policy measure aimed at correcting recurring 
external liquidity crises produced by short-term 
fluctuations in export•, imports, and capital flews* 
Ragardlaaa of a developing country* s balanee~of-paymenta 
posture, Import substitution in usually an integral part 
of developmental planning} It is. In fact, usually an 
essential by-product of development. 
Beeause of the prolonged external imbalance in 
the Brasilia* postwar experience, the publicly sponsored 
growth of import substitute industries did play a dual 
role, however* First, the replacement of compressed 
import items rendered the increasingly stringent adjust-
ment measures of the Brazilian government more palatable 
to domestic consumers. Secondly, the replacement of 
previously imported consumer supplies served to temper 
inflationary pressures which, otherwise, might have 
produced a more severe debt service problem through 
adverse effects on the country's trade balance as well 
as on the flow of short-term speculative capital. 
L J 
321 
r i 
Import substitution in the Brasilia^ pottwar 
experletiee was elearly epurred by tha Imposition of 
artificial restraints on the external seetor, Tha 
struetural ahanges required by tha Import substitution 
prooaaa %r*m$ in fast, indueed by those aforementioned 
measures of restraint. Again, tha Intention was to 
aehieve external balanoa with minimal interference with 
tha domeatie growth proeeas. 
During the early postwar pariod (19J4B-1952), tha 
imposition of aalactiTa import controls of a Quantitative 
mature In tha faoa of a fixed overvalued exchange rata 
iem» alaarly discriminatory. As was mentioned before, 
»e»~eeaantial consumer goods fait tha main brunt of 
these restrictions. 
tha natural rasult was a oonsldarabla impatus to tha 
astablishmant of domestic Import substitution in« 
dustrias for the manufacture of thasa consumar goods* 
especially durabla goods, whloh up to than had not 
boon produced In Bra»il# and vhloh osma to an Joy a 
twofold exchange protection. In terms both, of * 
reserve market and of operating costs, this was 
essentially the stage when the industries producing 
electrieal household applianeos and other durable 
consumer goods wars established.! 
^ l t e d Nations, Soonomlo Commission for Latin 
America* "The arowth and Peoline of Import Substitution in 
Brasll,* Economic B u l l e t i n ^ frat^ America, IX, 1?. 
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She aystem of exchange auctioning established in n 
1953# *hieh replaced tho direct import control* also 
served to stimulate the substitution proo««« tat through 
different m m i i Since this system produeod * do facto 
domestic production relatively moro attractive with 
respect to a rango of baaio industrial products and raw 
matoriala ntese import priooa in local currency roao 
considerably beoauae they became subject to payment of 
inereaslngly largo exchange agios^ As a roault of thia 
complex system* 00% only wore imports compressed by the 
Increased coat and inconvenience of foreign exchange 
purchases* but also the replacement prooaaa through 
domestlo means was strongly stimulated* 
Governmental offorta to atop tip tho paoo of 
import substitution became moro active during tha lattor 
pert of tho postwar period, 1955-1963. Tho rapidly 
deteriorating external posture of tho country vat 
cloarly en important contributing factor in thia regard# 
Although external imbalances wore suffered daring the 
earlier period (19ij.8-1951f)# they wore not chronic by 
mature* A superficial glance at Brazil's balance of 
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payments for fchla period is deceiving In the sense that n 
large current aeoount defioits war* incurred, parfcieMlarly 
in 1951*1952. However, it flhould bo recalled that unlike 
the situation during tht subaexjuent period, these lm-
balanoes were largely due to circumstantial factors such 
at the precautionary largo increases in capital goods 
imports during the Korean War* Also, in oontraat to the 
later period, the healthy growth of the export market 
from 19I4& to 195k contributed significantly to foreign 
exohange needs. The requirement to attraet foreign capital 
to support import demand and debt service oossmitasents was 
relatirely light•1 
Because of the chronic nature of external im-
balanoe from 1955 to 1963 neoassitatlng incroasingly 
largo inflows of eowpeneatory financing and booause there 
were no proepoets for immediate correction, the intensi-
fied use of svteh a long-term adjustment measure as 
import substitution beoame appropriate. 
She implementation of the Brasilian government's 
decision to support the development of import substitute 
industries extended in many directions. Exchange rate 
and tariff policies continued to subsidize the 
%fel4» 
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substitution process. Through governmental participation 
in domeetlo investment, increasing amount! of domestically 
generated investible funds were earmarked for Import 
substitute Industrie*• Also, inaraaaing amounts of not*-
compensatory foreign oapltaX were guided tovarda thoaa 
special projects which would support amah efforts. An 
example of tha lattar was tha preferential treatment 
extended to diraot faraign investments in tha metal 
tresef onelng industry grantad undar SV&OQ Instruction 
Supported by both diraot and indirect public 
subsidy, tha period from 1956 to 1961 
mm tha installation of come dynamic industries such 
as motor vehicle production, shipbuilding, tha manu-
facture of hoary electrical equipment and other 
machinery-producing induatries, and tha expansion of 
suah basic industries as tha steel, petroleum, 
metallurgical (ferrous metals), pulp and p*p*r$ and 
heavy chemical industries.2 
The implications of these developments are clear, the 
a&alysls of the Brazilian import structure in Chapter III 
revealed that the producta of these mm and expanded 
industries were historically of great quantitative sig-
nificance from tha standpoint of import rigidity. 
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Unmistakably, these are Import substitute industries. "* 
The replacement of previous imported items through 
the expansion of domestic productive facilities during 
this latter part of the postwar period was not sufficient, 
of course, to produce external balance, the destabilizing 
effects of export stagnation ana teras-of-trade deteri-
oration combined with the heavy debt service burden was 
simply too severe* However, the rapid rate of import 
growth experienced during the earlier period was signif-
icantly checked, thereby reducing the extent of the 
imbalance. 
The easing of external pressure threm#* the public 
sponsorship of import substitution was not without cost, 
however. Ifce concerted adjustment efforts of the 
Brazilian government, aimed at reducing external imbalance 
without at the same time retarding domestic development, 
required a constantly increasing share of the public 
sector in national expenditure. In the face of an un-
satisfactory system of public financing, inflationary 
pressures naturally resulted.1 
foe continued aggravation emanating from the 
external bottleneck both compounded the resulting 
[_ I Old. _j 
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inflationary spiral and was a product of it* A vicious 
circle vac, in fact, produced. The persistence of 
external imbalance in the face of largo budget deficits 
produced inflationary pressures which served to render 
the adjustment pvo**** that much more difficult, fhm 
rising level of import substitution which was induced by 
the aforementioned spending programs helped to partially 
alleviate the situation by increasing productive capacity, 
but the availability of goods, nevertheless, lagged 
behind total expenditure. Demand-pull inflation obviously 
resulted with the expected disruptive effect on external 
balance. 
Although the public sponsorship of import sub* 
stltution did lead to Inflation* the alternatives very 
likely could have been costlier, Without a ti$it rein 
on import demand, expanding developmental nm&B could 
have rendered the chronic external imbalance completely 
unsupportable. In the face of export stagnation, terms-
of-trade deterioration, and the heavy debt service burden, 
import compression was undeniably necessary. Had the 
Brazilian government not stimulated import substitution 
by public investment, exchange rate subsidies and other 
more subtle inducements, import compression might have 
L -J 
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produced more inflation through the creating of 
scarcities, particularly 1 B the field of consumer 
durables. External imbalance might indeed have widened. 
Adjustment ifbrwtjgh Artificial 
Paymenta Restrictions 
It la true that trade and exchange control 
measure* were employed extensively in the Brazilian post-
war experience for purposes of import compression and 
to a lesser extent for export stimulation. It is also 
true that artificial payments barriers were Imposed for 
the purpose of reducing the external liquidity pressures 
emanating from within the capital account and from within 
the investment income service account. 
In this section the focus is directed towards the 
relationship between the severe postwar debt service 
problems and the imposition of artificial payments 
barriers for purposes of adjustment. The effort is made 
to ascertain to what extent the heavy debt service burden 
foroed the application of such artificial measures and 
also to measure the effects of the resulting policy im-
plementation on the debt structure itself. 
During the early part of the postwar period, 
stringent measures of this type were indeed imposed. From 
L J 
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19W& to 19$2 a maximum of 20 per eent annual repatriation 
of foreign capital was allowed, and earnings remittances 
wore limited to 8 per cent of registered capital.* fhe 
fixed exchange system, however, served to stimulate the 
outflow of transferred earnings while at the same time to 
discourage new inflows of direct foreign investment* 
"Between 191*9 and 193>2# #1?3 million of profits were 
remitted abroad, while set direct investments from abroad 
amounted to only $13 million."2 the disruptive effect of 
the former on external balance was minimal, however; at 
least, this was true of its immediate Impact. Although 
transferred earnings from equity capital did generally 
increase in relation to export receipts, declines in the 
outflow of interest and amortisation on loan capital 
were sufficient to more than offset this potential source 
of liquidity pressure* As was seen in Chapter III, the 
ratio of total debt service, including these transferred 
earnings, steadily declined from 19M* to 1952. Brazil* s 
early reoovery from the disruptive offsets of World Mar 
II—a phenomenon which was unique in Latin America—did 
not require hoavy inflows of compensatory loan capital 
%aer f op, oit., p» *J0* 
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 to assure internal growth with & reasonable degree of 
external solvency. Of course, fete easing of the total 
debt service burden was also attributable to the afore-
moo tionad artificial payment* barriers which accompanied 
the inflexible exchange ayatem. 
A more liberal attitude was adopted towards 
eapital tranefera and profit remittances in 1953• 
Previous restrletlons wore lifted and transactors were 
allowed to participate in the froo exchange market. 
Prior to 1953* *&e rigid maintenance of an overvalued 
exchange rate had, in effect, acted as a subsidy to profit 
remittance and capital repatriation) thus, m o imposition 
of quantitative payments barriers was deemed necessary. 
fbm second effect of artificially expensive cruzeiros 
was, of course, the discouragement of now investments, 
the latter woo tolerable only because of the favorable 
shifts in the terms of trade which persisted throughout 
this earlier part of the postwar period*3' 
The policy decisions mode in 1953# ending the 
quantitative restrictions on capital outflows and service 
payments and providing a do facto devaluation of the 
cruzeiro for debt service, were ©f critical importance tm 
%tittttM£f* on* ait*, pp# 128-129• 
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light ef subsequent developments, the prolonged 
deterioration In the terms of trade following the end 
of the coffee boom In 1951* required substantial inflows 
of both loan end Tenture capital. These liberalised 
policies afforded the inducement for the attraction of 
capital and enabled Brasil to support it* chronically 
imbalanced external posture during the mid and late 
1950** and during the early I960*** 
the liberalisation policies of 1953 *l*e extended 
to the granting of preferential rates for financing of 
critically needed imports through external loans with 
the stipulation that the maturity period be at least 
five year*, fhe inflow of loan capital was stimulated 
not only a* a result of this effort by Brazilian policy* 
makers to support the importation of critically needed1 
items but alto as * result of further inducements to 
attract venture capital. Until 1955 those preferential 
rates were also available for the financing through 
external loans of transferred earnings on equity capital. 
Increases in lean capital were induced indirectly 
because restrictions against venture capital were reduced* 
the new foreign investors who came to Brazil brought 
their own capital and alee their connection* with 
international financial institutions. In this way, 
the modification of the legal treatment of foreign 
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 capital stimulated and increased its inflow* directly/ 
la the area of venture capitalf Indirectly, in loan 
capital.1 
The attraction of loan capital in increasing 
amount0 throughout the mid and lata 195®fe lad inevitably 
to aa increasingly heavy burden of debt service commit-
ment* Is the form of interact and amortisation. Increased 
rigidity in the debt structure vaa a product not only of 
the increased inflow of compensatory loan capital 
necessitated by external imbalance tot also of the 
liberalised foreign exchange policy which induced an 
increased inflow of non-compensatory lean capital* The 
improved Investment climate for vmlm** capital following 
the 1953 reforms did meet beneficially induce foreign 
investors to reinvest their profits. 
In the seven years between 19^7 and if53 the inflow 
of venture capital averaged only 15 million dollars 
per year, while prof it remittances averaged kl 
million dollars; in the following eight years, 195k 
to 1961, when no restrictions on profit remittances 
were in effect new venture capital averaged 91 
fell te an average ef IS milllen dollars!* 
Reduced profit remittances during this latter 
period clearly $*m*& to relieve some of the pv^&mup9 
%bid»# p. lit* fhia is pert of a statement made 
in 1962 by Humberto Bastos, the President of Brasilia 
Hatlonal Economic Counoll. 
L I^bj»d» j 
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applied to Bra*ll« $ scarce foreign exchange resources 
by the increased burden of debt aerrlee paymenta en loan 
capital. It is of pertinence her* to repeat two previous 
findings relating to tbia question* VMle the ratio of 
total debt aerrice excluding tranaferred earning* on 
equity eapltal to external reeeipta increased sharply 
during this latter period, the ratio of transferred 
earninge to external reeeipta actually declined despite 
the export stagnation and terms-of-trade difficulties 
that persisted throughout the period. 
In support of the contention that the sweeping 
reforms of 1953 vere important in the attraction of loan 
capital. It la alio pertinent to note the contrast 
between the negligible inflow between 19^8 and 1952 and 
the subsequent heary inflow following 1953 (fable 28)• 
Although new loans from public sources abroad did 
increase throughout the mid and late 1950* s, the rate of 
increase was clearly not sufficient of itself to offset 
the chronic imbalances emanating from current account 
difficulties! the attraction of private funds in 
increasing amounts was Indeed necessary. 
Had the payments barriers of the earlier period 
(19i|.8-1952) been retained throughout the mid and late 
L -J 
333 
r i 
1950l«f the attraction of increasing amounts of compans* 
atory **pifcal would have been considerably mora difficult 
aa a result of the inevitable psychological effect* 
Private sources of compensatory capital would have been 
particularly affected by such restrictions, of course* 
From this point of view the lifting of the earlier 
restrictions in 1953 «»d the maintenances of a relatively 
free payments system through I960 vere well advised. 
In late 1961 a drastic measure wag taken to curb 
the outflow of debt service. Frier to the passing of 
this Profits Remittance Bill, the transfer of capital 
and earnings abroad dating back to 1953 vaa free of 
artificial restraints* As was explained before, the net 
effect was twofold—(1) rapid annual Increases in the 
inflow of foreign capital and (2) rapid annual increases 
in the burden of debt service. The difficulties arising 
from the latter prompted a bill submitted in August, 1961, 
which was designed to make reinvestments of earnings more 
attractive than their withdi*awal. the combination of 
the real economic difficulties and the ultra-nationalistic 
leanings of Chamber of Deputies resulted in a series of 
drastic amendments wrltttn into the original bill, under 
this enactment all foreign capital, all remittances 
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 abroad, and all reinvestment a of foreign companies bJid to n 
be registered with the Banco do Brasil. The registration 
had to bo made in oruseiroa at a conversion rate fixed by 
a newly established Foreign Investment Council* a 
ceiling of 10 pw cent per annum was established for the 
remittance of profits arising from the registered capital* 
Remittances in excess of this figure were to be regarded 
as capital repatriation and were, therefore, deductible 
from the value of the registered investment for the 
purpose of calculating future profit remittances. A 
ceiling of 20 per cent of the registered capital was 
established for annual capital repatriation, sad a 
ceiling of 6 per cent pw yea? was placed on the 
remittance abroad of Interest on foreign loanaj excessive 
remittances of this latter typo were to he considered as 
1 
Strong opposition from government and business 
circles did lead to a reconsideration of the bill in 1942} 
however, the Chamber of Deputies prevailed, and the 
objective clauses remained on the books under a new 
"heta* Soonomiat Intelligence tmit. Quarterly 
Sconomlc Revlewt Brazil> Ho* IpL (February, v$b J, p« 2. 
L J 
335 
r n 
Although the statistical analysis lis previous 
ohapters revealed an easing of the debt service burden 
subsequent to the passage of the Profits Remittance Bill, 
it la clear that this was not achieved without con-
siderable cost. Continued export difficulties necess-
itated the) continued attraction of increasing amounts 
of foreign capital, hut the restrictions imposed on 
remittances and repatriation only acted as a further 
deterrent to new investments* Already discouraged by 
the persistent inflation, the foreign investor reacted 
to the bill In ft predictable manner* 
the Profits Remittance Bill appeared to ease 
Brasilia debt service burden through artificially 
induced reductions in debt service outflows j however, 
it actually served only to compound the problem* As was 
observed before, declines in the inflow of non-
compensatory capital, notably venture capital, more than 
Off tot this superficial improvement* The burden of 
attracting compensatory capital with shorter maturities 
and at higher rates actually became heavier during the 
early 1960*s* As such, the external payments situation 
became progressively graver* 
Some relief was obtained in 1963 through the 
L
 postponement of matured debt* Specifically, the IMP J 
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agreed to defer payment em a $34*$ million debt which 
had matured in September of 1963 until May of 1965* 
Alee, the XT, S. Treasury deferred for six month* So 
per cent of a $25*5 million stabilization loan which 
fell due in October of 1963* finally, gold-backed debt 
coraaitaents of $28*5 million due to private Vf S* 
bankers were liquidated by means of * gold swap agree* 
ment with the TJ. 3. Treasury.1 Despite these arrangements, 
only the surface of the debt service problem was scratched. 
as of June 30, 1963, Brazil's total external debt amounted 
to the equivalent of $3*68? million—41,928 million of 
which was already overdue or falling due before the end 
Of 1965* 
Clearly, the external payments restrictions under 
the profit remittance legislation did not supply the 
answer to the debt service problem* the problem at the 
m^ of the time period of this study remained grave 
indeed) so grave, in fact* that rumors of an external debt 
moratorium pen&ited throughout 1963 *^ 
*The Economist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly 
Boonomic Review. Ho# %S f Scomber* 1963)* p* 3* w a 
breakdown or the composition of mis debt outstanding, 
see Table I4.8. 
%bld* 
33? 
r
 *W1frP»* - ^ ^ gyport frit* Petrel n 
She intensive Application of the adjustment measures 
discussed above resulted primarily from the inability of 
Brazilian policymakers to check export price erosion during 
the latter part of the postwar period. It was specifically 
noted in Chapter III that prolonged terms-of-trade deteri-
oration between 1955 *&d 1963 was the principal factor 
contributing to the chronic external imbalance. Also, In 
this regard It was noted that declines In export prices, 
particularly la the coffee sector, were relatively more 
significant than increases in Import prices. 
This situation developed despite ooncerted efforts 
by policymakers to stabilise export prices through domestic 
controls and through international agreements* Because of 
the predominance of oof fee in the export structure, it Is 
not surprising that the most concerted efforts3- were 
3-Prloe stabilisation measures were not applied to 
the ooffee sector alone, of course. Efforts were also made 
to control the prices of secondary export products* Signif-
icant examples of such efforts wer# the attempt to maintain 
a prloe floor on cocoa exports through supply s*eetrtetion 
and a similar attempt to stabilise the price of sugar exports, 
not only through domestic supply restriction but also through 
membership in the International Sugar Agreement. Since 
secondary export prloe fluctuations during the postwar period 
were unquestionably of mimx Quantitative signlfieanee in 
produoing the destabilising shifts in the Brazilian terms of 
trade noted above, the analysis of export prloe controls in 
this chapter focuses on the ©offee problem which was clearly 
Lef signal importance in this regard. j 
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directed towards the coffee sector. Although these 
attempts to stabilise coffee prices were certainly not 
without historical precedent, both the techniques 
employed and the degree of failure were, 
A full evaluation of postwar fluctuations in the 
Brazilian ooffee cycle, of the price controls employed, 
and of the reasons for failure necessitates the development 
of a historical perspective. 
From the turn of the century to 1937 the Brazilian 
government employed price stabilising policies of a 
defensive nature, the purpose of such policy measures 
was simply to reduce the pressure of supply changes on 
the export price level. Mechanically, this involved the 
stockpiling of coffee during periods of abundant harvest 
and the depletion of existing stocks during periods of 
poor harvests. 
One effect of govemment-supported price stability 
was the gradual loss of the country* s monopolistic grasp 
on the export market, necessitating the abandonment of 
the pries support program in 1937* 
f&m the moment the country ceased to compete and 
devoted itself to the defense of a relatively higto 
prioe level, favorable conditions were automatically 
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created for an expansion of coffee planting else-
where In the world.1 
Hot only did competitors such as Colombia strengthen 
their market position at the expense of Brazil, but they 
were also able to consolidate their newly acquired market 
positions by the production and exportation of different 
grades of coffee. Product differentiation eliminated the 
possibility of Brasil regaining its market position by 
simply reducing prices.2 
A second effect of this extended policy was the 
secular expansion of coffee production* Investments in 
the coffee industry became more attractive as price 
fluctuations became more remote. Since the risks of loss 
arising from market price declines were minimized, 
profits acoruing to coffee planters became* in effect, 
guaranteed income* Excess production became a chronic 
problem.3 
• With the abandonment of the price support program 
in 1937 # howeYerf prices did decline and losses were 
*TJnited nations, Analysis md Projections of 
Soonomlo Development; the Economic Development of Brasil* 
p. 95# 
%bid« 
%bid* 
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incurred, nevertheless, excess supply persisted through-
out the early end mid 19Jj.0»s as a result of the war* a 
disruptive effects on world demand. 
Aa was mentioned earlier, the gradual depletion 
of accumulated stocks after the war delayed the recovery 
of coffee prices when normal peacetime demand was finally 
restored* Subsequent to the sale of all remaining stocks 
in 19i|.9# however, prices rose sharply through 195k# 
primarily aa a result of the unresponsiveness of new 
production*1 
The prolonged rise in prices eventually led to a 
delayed rise in new production, and by 195? world supply 
again exceeded world demand, Prices fell sharply (fable 
9), and Brazilian policymakers realised that independent 
price control measures would not suffice to prevent 
severe price erosion, fhus, an agreement among the major 
coffee producers in the Western Hemisphere was reached in 
October, 195? # in Mexico Oity,2 
fhe plan was based on ejtporte reetrietione, the 
terms of which were dependent upon past export levels* 
3-For a complete assessment of these developments 
see Chapter III, pages 
% h e Sconomist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic 
Review: Brazil> Ho. 2k (February, 1957)f p« 2. 
3J*1 
Since Brasil was the largest coffee exporter. it vat 
required to withhold the largest absolute amount from 
the export market. Prices strengthened slightly as a 
result of this agreement (fable 9), but the effect was 
only temporary. The more significant effect was the 
Increasing relume of governmental stockpiling 1B Braall— 
a phenomenon which persisted through 1963* The ln« 
creased governmental stockpiling coupled with increased 
world production of coffee led to a general breakdown 
in confidence in the market structure. Furthermore, 
the Inflationary practices undertaken by the Brazilian 
government in order to finance this rising level of 
•took simply served to compound the problem* 
The failure of this retention scheme to check 
the price deoline was attributable, in part, to the 
exclusion of non-katin coffee exporters from the agreement. 
This freedom from restriction for those exporters out-
side the Hemisphere afforded them the opportunity to 
Increase their share of the world market and at the same 
time enabled them to frustrate the attempts to stabilise 
prices. 
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In recognition of these deficiencies, new 
International Coffee Agreements were signed in September 
of 1958 and in September, 1959• She former increased 
retention quotas,1 and the latter for the first time 
inoluded non*Latln American coffee.2 Price stability 
vat achieved from 1959 to 1961 (Table 9) but at a high 
cost* Brasil, in particular, suffered because of the 
aeousulatlon of exportable coffee surpluses* fhe Infla-
tionary pressure emanating from the financing of govern-
ment stockpiling persisted throughout this period. 
In August of 1962 an international coffee 
conference was hold in How fork m&*# the auspices of 
the United Rations, and ft five-year agreement was 
signed which, for the first time, included consumer as 
well as producer eountries. Major coffee importing 
countries bound themselves to control the established 
export quotas by the required usage of certificates of 
origin for all their coffee imports.-^ 
W . 1 1 ««• «qulr.d to retain kO p.r o.nt of It. 
exportable coffee surplus. 
2Pranee and Portugal signed the paot on behalf of 
their African dependencies. 
3Economist lntelllg**a«« Unit* Qaartorly Economic 
Reviewt Bra all. Io# 43 (September, 19*zj't p* ?• 
L -J 
3k3 
r n 
Before 1962 price stabilizing agreements were 
based on export controls} the problem wee attacked only 
from the supply aide of the market. With the inclusion of 
importing countries in the coffee agreement, the 
meohaniam for a more effective check on price erosion 
was established* Although the price of Brazilian coffee 
did fall from 1962 to 1963 (fable 9), the rate of decline 
was small compared to the average annual rate of decline 
between 1951* and 1963* 
Considering this latter part of the postwar 
period as a whole, it may be concluded that the coffee 
price erosion was substantial despite the relative d0gr^^ 
of price stability achieved from 1959 to 1963 • that is 
to eayf despite the price strengthening effects of the 
international eoffee agreements* the oof fee price level 
in 1963 remained well below the average annual level 
reached between 19l|8 and 1954 . 
The impact of this deterioration on external 
balance during this period is evident. Coffee price 
erosion was the principal factor contributing to the 
net barter tews»ef-trade deterioration which* in turn* 
was the principal element of balanee~of-payments 
disturbance contributing to the chronic liquidity 
L -J 
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problems of the add and lata 1950*s and the early I9609 a« 
Conclusions 
the combination of external disturbances discussed 
In Ohaptar XXX and the external rigidities discussed In 
Chapter IY produoad tha liquidity problems which 
naoaaaitatad tha adjustment measures discus sad in this 
chapter* Tha application and implementation of thesa 
measures raflactad tha intensification of liquidity 
pressures during tha mid and late 1950's and tha early 
1960»st aa previously indicated by the fluctuations of 
key ratios measured in Chapter IV. Xt should he recalled, 
of course, that the purpose of these liquidity crisis 
indicators was to measure fluctuations in pertinent 
elements of balanae-of-payments disturbance in relation 
to those In pertinent elements of balanoe~of-payments 
rigidity* 
Since these indicators did reveal a malignant 
liquidity problem between 1955 *»d 1963f it was expected 
that this chapter would reveal a more intensive 
utilization of available tools during this later period 
than was observed during the earlier period (19M&*195&)» 
Such expectations were confirmed In the ease of reserve 
Ldepletion* Respite the official reluctance to draw down j 
gdld reserves until very late in the period, the sub* 
stantial depletion of foreign exchange reserves during 
the mid and late 1950»B was consistent with the severe 
and prolonged liquidity shortages indicated earlier In 
the study. 
Although foreign exchange reserves did rise In 
1961 end remain at a relatively constant level through 
1963$ total reserves declined as a result of sharp off* 
setting declines In official gold holdings* This again 
nas consistent with earlier findings. 
Reserves Here not completely depleted from 1955 
to 19631 although this certainly mould have happened had 
Brasil net applied alternative adjustment measures more 
vigorously* The attraction of increasing amounts of 
compensatory foreign capital served as en alternative in 
tills regard* As Brasil* s external posture deteriorated 
daring tfelt later period* the f^mBWuxm on scarce monetary 
reserves was eased by increased inflows of this type of 
capital* Unfortunately, the widening external imbalance 
necessitated the tapping of private as well as public funds* 
Aa a result of the growing demand for the former* 
interest rates rose with the obvious effect of producing 
a heavier debt service burden 1 rapidly expanding debt 
L _j 
strvloe obligations, in turn, necessitated progressively n 
larger inflows of compensatory financing in subsequent 
years, thereby completing the cycle. Furthermore, since 
the inflows of shorter-term compensatory capital out-
stripped those of longer-term non-compensatory capital, 
the average effective time period of repayment declined 
annually reflecting, of course, a shortening of the debt 
structure* Amortization payments increased in relation 
to interest payments despite the higher interest rates, 
and the set result was the steady worsening of the 
general debt service problem* 
This observed overdependence on compensatory 
financing for purposes of external adjustment was, in 
part| the product of policy failures elsewhere. The 
failure of trade and exchange rate policies to adequately 
stimulate export* and compress imports was moat note-
worthy in this regard* It cannot be said, however, that 
such failures resulted only from human error or from 
official bungling. Unlike the previously mentioned 
adjustment measures, trade and exchange rate policies 
wore not established for purposes of external adjustment 
alone* lot only were these policies designed to support 
domestic growth requirements as well, but the latter 
L
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actually received priority whan oonfllot* arose. Imports 
woro compressed but not to the point of interfering vith 
rising domestie production levels• Increases in the 
Importation of production-supporting inputs during periods 
of liquidity shortage off sot much of the advantage 
gained frost the drastic reductions in the importation of 
Inessentials. Total imports could have boon compressed 
to a far greater extent had the direct and indirect 
restrictions imposed against inessential imports boon 
applied, even in part, to the so-called essentials. It 
was simply a question of a higher priority granted to 
internal needs rather than to external adjustment. 
Governmental policies in support of the growth 
and development of import substitute industries 
supplemented the restrictive policy efforts aimed at 
Import compression. Without the former, the drastic 
curtailment in the Importation of consumer durables 
would not have boon possible. Had the latter part of 
the time period studied not boon characterized by the 
rapid domestic growth of these industries, the stringent 
measures of import control could not have boon imposed to 
the extent observed. 
L J 
3k& 
Export stimulation through the use of trad© and 
exchange rat* controls was considerably less successful 
than import compression* There was general reluctance on 
the part of Brazilian policymakers to effect income 
transfers in favor of the export sector. Historically, 
the prevailing philosophy was that the latter should 
support the other sectors in this regard. Such income 
transfers were, in fact, evident during the early post-
war period. However, since this philosophy did carry 
ever te the latter part of the period despite export 
stagnation, policies designed to stimulate exports ware 
never properly implemented. Developmental needs in 
other seetors were considered too groat to transfer 
income for the) purpose of supporting export growth. 
Again, developmental priority travailed. Continued 
external imbalance was the price paid* 
During the earlier part of the postwar period, 
artificial payments barriers accompanied the maintenance 
of a grossly overvalued exchange rate} however, with the 
trade and exchange rate policy reforms of 1953 these 
barriers were removed. Clearly, the intention of the 
latter was to areata conditions conducive to the 
expansion of foreign investments| unquestionably, this 
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wis successfully accomplished. Although the increasingly 
large capital inflows during the mid and late 1950'a ware 
sufficient to support the chronic external imbalance, a 
heavy and growing debt service burden naturally was 
treated, 
The chronic imbalance compounded by this growing 
delit service burden eventually led to the reintroduotion 
of stringent payments barriers in 1961-1962 • Although 
debt serviee outflows were artificially reduced, net 
foreign investments were discouraged to the extent that 
a net outflow of non~oompensatory capital wan recorded 
in 1963* The requirement to attract compensatory capital 
grew correspondingly greater* 
In 1963 it became necessary for Brazil to postpone 
t&e repayment of large matured debts. It it clear that as 
a result of the prolonged external imbalance, the external 
debt structure had indeed become unsupportable by 1963. 
The artificial payments barriers imposed earlier 6M not 
serve to alleviate these problems} rather, such problems 
were compounded. The continued depletion of reserves and 
the attraction of increasing amounts of compensatory 
capital reflected that fact. 
L -J 
CHAPTER VI 
DISSERTATIOK CONCLUSIONS 
It la not the intention of this concluding 
ehapter to summarise the major findings of the disser-
tation, Stnoe a building-block approach was uaed in the 
investigation of the central dissertation problem, this 
would amount to needless repetition. The key questions 
posed in titie Introduction are answered in the summaries 
of the prlnelpal chapters, and the major findings of the 
dissertation as a whole are presented in the concluding 
remarks of Chapter V* 
On* purpose of this chapter is to briefly reflect 
on tho value of the dissertation approach and on Its 
applieabillty in the examination of debt service 
problems in other debtor countries. Realizing the 
limitations of the dissertation, a second purpose is to 
make recommendations concerning the need for farther 
study of related topics. 
It is the author's opinion that the analytical 
framework constructed in Chapter I is sufficiently broad 
to be used in the empirical investigation of any debtor 
country experiencing debt servicing difficulties. The 
L -1 
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framework was not constructed with Bresil in mindj there-
fore, substantial changes need not be made in the study 
of other debtor countries even though the repayment 
problem* encountered may differ in kind or in degree 
from those suffered by Brazil dumping the post-Votfld War II 
period.1 
On the basis of the Brazilian experience, it is 
alio the author's opinion that no one simple tool of 
analysis or rule~of-thumb cam be validly employed in 
assessing the vulnerability of debtor countries to 
periodic liquidity crises. Although the ratio of 
contractually fixed external debt service to external 
receipts is perhaps the best single tool in this regard, 
the fact remains that elements of balanee-of-payments 
rigidity, other this debt servicing obligations and 
elements of bala»ee-of-payments disturbance, other than 
fluctuations in external receipts must be considered. 
It is true that this dissertation does focus on 
Brasilia debt serrleing burden in relation to foreign 
exchange availability; however, all pertinent elements 
of disturbance and of rigidity are duly considered 
^Exceptions to this general assertion are 
explained on subsequent pages. 
_ i 
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(Chapters XXI and XV respeetlvoly) * The ratio of 
contractually fixed debt service to external reoelpts Is 
only one of the combination of liquidity oris!a Indicators 
used In the analysis of the Brazilian experience. 
k combination of indicatora should bo employed in 
any study of this type, although not necessarily the 
same ooaibination. Some modifications within the frame-
work mentioned above may bo necessary* depending on the 
typo of problem faolng the debtor country under study. 
An example of this would be the treatment of transferred 
earnings from equity investments. Since equity invest* 
moots in Brasll are not concentrated in export industries, 
transferred earnings do not tend to vary directly with 
fluctuations In export earnings. In this dissertation, 
therefore, transferred earnings are included in liquidity 
crisis indicators as elements of balance-of-payments 
rigidity. If enclave investments are prevalent in other 
countries under study, however, this inclusion may not bo 
appropriate, 
Furthermore, the sources of balance-of-payments 
disturbance may differ In debtor countries other than 
Brmsil, this* of course, would influence the adoption 
and degree of utilisation of appropriate indicators. 
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In the Brasilian post-World War XI experience declines in 
export earning* were particularly disturbing in the face 
of a heavy debt service burden. On the other hand, 
disturbance* arising from import expansion were of 
relatively minor significance in this regard. The 
reverse could be true of other countries under study, 
thereby justifying the adoption of different tools of 
analysis. 
Although the empirical study of Brazil ean serve 
as a useful guide for further studies of this type, the 
point should bo mode that the approach adopted 1 B this 
diossrtatlon is relevant only for countries suffering 
external debt servicing problems. As HAS stated in the 
Xntroduetion, this dissertation focuses on balanee-of-
payments rigidities in the form of contractually fixed 
external debt service. However, balanee~of-payments 
problems io not necessarily result from increased 
external rigidities. Elements of disturbance may alone 
produce external imbalance, apart from the question of 
balanee-of-payments inflexibility. The empirical in* 
vestigation of such a country should focus on the 
fluctuations in elements of disturbance in relation to 
thote of sJ|u*t*otit. Blements of rigidity may bo of 
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little or no Importance, 
In adopting the approach of this dissertation* 
the researcher should alao be aware that Brasil»s 
external debt servicing problems war* extremely ****** 
during the postwar period* All indicators employed 
revealed this severity* The significant role of 
external indebtedneaa in producing external imbalance 
was n»deiilable| the findings of the empirical investi-
gation were conclusive. However, for othar debtor 
countries with leas severe problems of this type, the 
measurement of liquidity crisis indicators may prove 
to be inconclusive. It is conceivable that more 
sophisticated statistical techniques may be needed to 
link debt servicing problems with external imbalance. 
Of course, if a debtor counties problems of 
repayment are not severe* the use of liquidity oriels 
indicators may be conclusive in revealing no link at all 
between external indebtedness and external imbalance. 
Again, in such a ease external imbalance may be shown to 
be the product of balanoe-of-payments disturbance alone* 
Although the adoption of the analytical frame-
work developed in Chapter I was appropriate for the 
t Brazilian study, other studies are needed to further test 
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its relevance and applicability. Also, since thin 
dissertation does focus on the shorter-term aspects of 
Brasilia debt servicing problems, further studies are 
needed with longer-term focuses. Admittedly, a debtor 
country may experience periodic liquidity crises ae a 
result of a heavy debt servicing burden, but over the 
long run the benefits of external borrowing may exceed 
the costs of the repayment burden. Despite the adverse 
effect of the repayment burden on external balance over 
the short run, the accumulation of external debt over 
the long run nay not be ill-advised, 
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 STATISTICAL APPEHDIX n 
TABLE 1 
mumm or ?&nmms, 191*8-1963* 
Balance 
on Ion-Co«- Brrora 
Goods and Services Currant penaatory and 
Mdae. Services Total Donations Account Capital Omissions 
Year Millions of 1T« S« Dollars 
l^B 2?8 -315 -37 -7 -M* -9 29 
191*9 153 -271 -IIS -3 -121 -35 Q2 
1950 k%$ -319 106 -2 1 * -29 -23 
w 1951 67 -535 -^68 -2 -1*70 56 123 
vn 1952 -286 -i*21 -707 -2 -709 120 -26 
°* 1953 UaS -392 31 ~lk 17 97 -96 
1955 150 -3&0 -230 -5 -235 22 10 
1955 320 -3hk -% -10 -3*1 39 12 
1956 %36 -I|18 18 -11 7 201 -li* 
1957 107 -393 -286 -13 -299 290 -171 
1956 6I4 -326 -262 -% -266 202 -189 
1959 72 -$07 -335 -10 -31*5 216 -25 
i960 -21* -509 -533 -15 -5P 92 26 
1961 111 -!*il* -303 +15 -2S8 30fc i|9 
1962 -90 ~%10 -500 4-38 -i*62 259 -li*0 
1963 112 -268 -156 +21* -132 -25 -11(3 
Calculated from* United Hat Ions, Economic Commission for Latin 
America, *$tia Growth and Decline of Import Substitution in Bras11,* Economic 
Bulletin for Latin America. IX (March, 1961*)» 91* *B<3 Brasil, Superintendence 
Da Moeda Do Credito, Bolatia, Rlo de Janeiro, January* I960 - December, 1%3« 
r < n 
TABLE 1 (Continued) 
Compensatory Financing  
BaU of Official 
Payments Deferred Bal« of Monetary 
Before Import Payments Assets Lia- Gold 
Camp, Payments Loans tinc«r) bill ties (lncr) Various Total 
Year Milliona of PV S, Dollars 
1948 -2k 34 - 30 -21 37 -56 2k 
1949 -74 2a 38 -32 1*1 -1 - Ik 
1950 52 -103 31 2k -1 -3 -52 
1951 -291 30 26 82 156 -1 -4 291 
1952 -615 SLX -28 28 ?5 -1 - 615 
1953 16 -563 4@6 kl 21 -1 - -16 
1954 -203 -46 200 -10 60 -1 - 203 
1955 1? -8 61 -11 -5S -1 - -1? w 
1956 194 - -28 -182 1? -1 -19k -3 
195? -X80 - 3? 161 -18 - - 180 
1958 -253 - 195 31 28 -l - 253 
1959 - 1A - -21 26 150 -1 - 154 
1960 -^30 - 58 -26 358 I|0 - 430 
1961 65 -68 310 -180 -129 2 - -65 
1962 -343 163 120 36 -36 60 - 343 
1963 -300 -68 188 19 76 76 - 300 
r "i 
TABLE 2 
C0RRETT ACCO01TT SERVICE TRAHSACTIOHS, 191*8-1963* 
Mil l ions of ff» 3« Dollars  
Uf lU
 t •• • . - . . , • • . 1^6 l?l|9 l?gO l ?g l l?ga 19g3 19ft l?gg 
Bon-Monetary Gold M o v e i s e n t - - - 1 - I = 2 -
fravel Expenditures (Cr.) 6 6 5 1* 5 7 
Travel Expenditures (Dr.) -11 -8 -8 -16 -i* -30 -19 -19 
Transportat ion (Or.) & 33 16 19 35 2? 30 36 
h e i g h t - 5 3 h 7 8 1* 10 
Other 31* 28 13 15 28 19 26 26 
Transportat ion {Dr.) -190 -136 -13? -261* -255 -15? -179 -169 
f * ? 1 ^ -182 -12S -126 -230 ~22& -135 -156 -lif8 
Other -8 -6 -11 -3li -2? -22 -23 -21 w 
Insurance Services (Or.) 2 3 1 2 6 3 2 3 <S 
Insurance Services (fir.) „ 1 2 .10 -10 -1? -18 -11 -12 -12 
.investment Incoaae (Cr.) 3 3 2 2 li 2 7 5 
Direct Investments . • '« 
Por t fo l io .Investments _ « « . _ x i i l 
Other 3 3 2 2 1 * 1 3 1 4 
Investment Income (Dr.) «10g _1Q^ „ l l 2 . l S 9 -125-167 -li& -119 
Direct Investments _ 3 0 -80 -83 -137 -99 -120 -79 -72 
Por t fo l io Investments ^ *. i2 _JJ, _Q 
n ^ t h # « ** « . -a**- t« s ~28 ~ ^ -29 -22 -25 -35 -51 -39 
Other GovH* Expenditures (Cr.) 0 £ 9 22 3 Ik 16 15 
Other Gov*t. Expenditures (Dr.) _ l 6 ^ _^? ^ _ 2 9 -39 -32 -27 
Miscellaneous Services (Or.)
 lh 1 6 1 0 l ? 2X ^ ^ 5 ? 
Miscellaneous Services (Dr.) .^5 _^2 ^ 3 .51 .59 ^ 0 3 ,.97 . ^ 2 1 
TOTAL BALMCB -315 -271 -319 -535 -ii2I -392 -380 -3kk 
C a l c u l a t e d from: Supe r in t enden t s Da Moeda Do Credit©, Bolet 1M, 
Rio de J ane i ro , September, 1955-December, 1963. 
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TABLE 2 (Continued) 
Items i?g6 l?g7 lygg I??? I960 1961 l?62 1?6? 
Hon-Jfonetary Sold M o v e m e n t 1 - I - 1 2 1 
travel Expenditures (Or.) 9 12 16 ' 15 4 23 5 9 
£ravel Expenditures ($**•) -1*3 -52 -1*1 -1*6 -72 -1*2 -30 -23 
Transportation (Cr,) 1*0 $2 3k UO 46 ^8 1*2 52 
freight 10 10 6 8 13 Ik 12 15 
Other 30 k% 28 32 33 3k 30 37 
Transportation (Dr.) -159 -167 -136 -127 -12!* -125 -121 -138 
Freight -132 -11*2 -118 -107 -103 -102 -102 -115 
Other -27 -25 -18 -20 -21 -23 -19 -23 
Insurance Services (Or.) 3 6 k 2 k 5 7 2 
Insurance Services (Dr.) -11 -13 -10 -11 -11 -11 -12 -15 
Investment'Income (Cr.) 2 6 3 2 k 3 3 3 w 
Direct Investments - - » . - - - - - g^ 
Portfolio Investments • - - - - « • -
Other 2 6 3 2 3 3 3 3 
Investment Income (Dr.) -11*3 -IS*. -HO -152 -188 -18? -206 -83 
Direct Investments -70 -52 -4*2 -51 r61 -61 -83 
Portfolio Investments -1* -9 -7 -8 -18 -9 -2 
Other -69 -73 -61 -93 -109 -117 -121 -83 
Other Gov't, Expenditures (Or.) 18 1$ 8 10 13 5 8 10 
Other Gov*t. Expenditures (Or*) -k'9 -50 -35 -33 -U7 4*9 -4f6 -1*8 
Miscellaneous Services (Or.) 81 109 101 90 m 2k 13 12 
Miscellaneous Services (m>.) -I67 -177 -161 -197 -21*3 -110 -71 -fc9 
TOTAL B4IHCE -1*16 -393 -326 -1*0? -509 -UlU - U P -266 
r ~« 
TABLE 3 
DEFICIT BALANCES OP CATKGORIZiSI) SERVICE ITEMS* 
Millions of U. 3» Dollars  
Transpor- Invest- Other Klscel- Total 
Travel tatiori Insurance ment Govft laneous Service 
Expend!- Bxpeadl- Expeodl- Expend!- Expendl- Service Expend!-
Year tures tores tures turea tures I teas tures*3 
1%B - 5 -156 -10 -105 - 8 -31 -315 
19£*9 - 2 -103 - 7 -101 -22 -36 -271 
1950 - 3 -121 - 9 -110 -38 -38 -319 
1951 -16 -21*5 -15 -157 -39 -61* -536 
1952 - )4 -220 -12 -121 -26 -38 -1*21 
1953 -26 -130 - 8 -165 -25 -39 -393 
X9$k -11* -1^9 -10 -137 -16 -52 -378 & 
1955 -12 -133 - 9 -111* -12 -61* -3M* ° 
1956 -% -119 - 8 -l!U -31 -86 -^ 18 
1957 -k0 -115 - 7 -128 -35 -68 -393 
1958 -25 -102 - 6 -107 -27 -60 -327 
1959 -31 -87 - 9 -150 -23 -107 -4*07 
1960 -I48 - 7S - 7 -iSli -3ii -159 -510 
1961 -19 - 77 - 6 -I6I1 «kk -86 -1*16 
1962 -25 - 79 - 5 -203 -38 -61 -fcll 
1963 -Hi -'86 -13 - 80 -38 -37 -268 
Calculated froa Table 2. 
^Excludes non-monetary gold movements. 
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TABLE k 
DEFICIT mUMOm OF CATS30RIZED SERVICE ITEMS A3 PERCB1TAGES OF TOTAL DEFICIT® 
Transpor- Other Klscel-
Travel tatIon Insurance Invest- &ovft. laneous 
Ixoendf- Batpendl- Bxpandl- ment Sxpendl- Service 
tttres tures turea Income tures Items 
Year As Percentages of Total Annual Service Deficits  
194© 1.6 49.5 3*2 33.3 2.5 9.9 
1949 0.7' 38.0 2.6 37.3 8.1 13.3 
1950 1.0 37.9 2.8 31|.5 11.9 11.9
 %-
1951 3*0 1*5.7 2.8 29.3 7.3 11.9 &> 
1952 1.0 52.3 2*6 28.? 6.2 9.0 ** 
1953 6.6 33*1 2.0 1*2.0 6.4 9.9 
1954 3.7 39.4 2.7 36.2 4.2 13.8 
1955 3.5 56.7 2.6 33.1 3.5 18.6 
1956 8a 28.4 1*9 33.? 7.4 20.5 
1957 10.2 29.3 1.8 32.5 8.9 17.3 
1958 7.7 31.2 1.8 32.7 8.3 18.3 
1959 7.6 21.4 ^ 36.9 5.6 26.3 
1960 9.4 15.3 1.4 36.1 6.7 31.1 
1961 4*& 18*5 1.4 44.2 10.6 20.7 
1962 6.1 19.2 1.2 49.4 9.3 14*8 
1963 5*2 32.1 4*8 30.0 14.1 13.8 
a 
Calculated from Tables 2 and 3* 
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TABLS 5 
BALAECB OF PAYMMTS HICIIFfS & IDJMT&mRES 
191*8-52 1956-60 
(average) (average) 
Type of Millions Millions 
Receipts or of tl. 3. F«re*nt- of U. S. Percent-
Expenditures Dollars a^ee Dollars a&eg 
Total Receipts 1,1*77 100.0 2,001 100.0 
Exports 1,366 92.5 1,336 66.7 
Services 61 I*.l 170 0.5 
Donations 3 0.2 XI* 0.7 
CapitaX I4.7 3*2 1*63 21*. 1 
Total Expenditures 1,701* 100.0 2,091 100.0 
Imports (F.Q,B.) 1,23S 72.7 1,203 57.5 
Services 3^0 22*3 51*6 26.1 
Donations 6 0.3 21* 1.2 
Capital 80 i*.7 318 15.2 
Calculated from* United nations, Bconomle Com-
mission for Latin America, *$he Growth and Decline of Import 
Substitution in Brazil,* Economic Bulletin for Latin America. 
II (March, 1961* }* 15. 
m 
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TABLE 6 
NATIONAL MPORfS/MPOHTS* 
Value Quantum Index #nit Value Index 
Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports 
Million of ' ' 
I*S* tT, 3t Dollars I9g0 * 100 m 
194$ 1180 1121 136 43 20 189 
19U9 10% 1103 122 50 73 162 
1950 1355 1085 106 61 104 131 
1951 1769 19^7 114 93 125 158 
1952 1418 1986 94 90 123 162 
1953 1539 1316 104 69 119 141 
1954 1562 1629 90 98 139 123 
1955 1423 1306 104 87 111 111 
1956 14S2 1234 113 82 106 111 
1957 1392 1468 104 loo 108 110 
1953 1242 1352 100 100 100 100 
1959 1282 1374 ~L2Z 110 85 92 
1960 1269 1462 123 HI 63 97 
1961 1403 1460 133 104 S5 103 
1962 1214 1475 123 97 80 113 
1963 1406 14^7 136 97 81 113 
ftCalaulat@d from* United nations, Yearbook of Inter* 
national Trad© Statisticsf, 1963, Hew York, 1965, p. bg. 
r- = J 
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TABLE 7 
SHARE OF THIS THREE PRINCIPAL PRODUCTS XH TOTAL EXPORT VALUE* 
Percentages 
Share of 'the 
Raw Coeoa All Principal Products 
Year Coffee Ootton Beans Others In Total Exports 
191^ 8 1*1.6 15*6 i>.9 38.9 61.1 
19U9 57.6 10.0 l*.8 27.6 724 
1950 63.S 7.8 5.6 22.6 774 
1951 59.8 11.8 3.9 ZkS 75*5 
1952 73.7 24 2.9 21.0 79.0 
1953 70.6 6.6 h.9 18.9 81.1 
195U 60.7 11|.3 8.7 16.3 83.7 
1955 59.3 9.2 7.2 21^ .3 75.7 
1956 69.5 5.7 5.3 19.5 80.5 
1957 60.8 34 6.5 29.3 70.7 
1956 55.3 2.1 9.3 33.3 66.7 
1959 60.3 2.9 6.6 30.2 69.8 
1960 56.2 3.8 74 32.6 674 
1961 50*6 8.1 .^3 37.0 63.0 
1962 53.0 9.5 34 3U.1 65.9 
1963 53.2 84 3.6 3k.$ 65.2 
Calculated from? United Nations, Analyses and 
Projections of Economic Developments .The^ ScbVbmlo'^ 1]Delvel.op'^ ^^ ' 
meat of Braall. A Be port 'Prepared by tbe Joln't Working Oroup 
of the Banoo do Deaenvol^lmeoto Economiea of Brazil and the 
Economic Commission for Latin America of the United Nation® 
(Haw Yorki United Nation®, 1956), p. 87 and United Nations, 
Yearbook of International Trad© Statistics, Mew Tork, 1955-
T 5 g 5 : . . ~ 
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TABU3 8 
WOHLD COFFEE PRODUCTION BY AB1A, ABOTAL AVERAGES® 
Latin America 
tMtin Beat of 
Period Brassll Colombia America, fotal World total 
' " " * ' —
f c
— * — — ^ —
w
— — W — w iwil l '» I < m M » y n ' I i » in. i i .in n«i <nmmin" mi I I H . » , ..in m m i l «m u m i MM IUHHII mmmmmm— mimmmi in »)» II mi mum m i l i 
thousand He t r j o fori a  
1921-25 BBt — m S * l'30t CRT S 3 T 
1926-30 1288 175 3 ^ 180? 188 1995 
1931-35 1366 223 35$ I9kk 23U 2178 
1936-39 1388 265 39? 2050 305 2355 
19^7-50 1031 339 1*05 1775 316 2091 
1951-53 1105 397 1*6? 1969 1*26 2395 
195lt~56 1129 359 536 2021* 5^3 2607 
1957-59 1917 5?0 617 3001^ 71*1 371*5 
1960-62 1666 I16Q 768 3116 9% lillO 
ml I I < « r — l » « » ^ — » — M I — « M « — , I | T » I I I »n» 1 ur 11 WI.II •», «. ..jK^iia.,,.!,—^n.,111 ,,n IWHHHJIUMHK ». ...iiin.,i,-»ii ,»«..ii, i<giw ,ng»im u 'iwnnii m » n in f m l i M i i .IIII»III«II in ajimi wmim . 
Changes 
?Vomi P©rc.0nt»ger8iix . x 
1921-25 to +1*5 +i|l 4-16 438 -H 5^ 4-39 
1926-30 
1926-30 t o • 8 452 4-15 4-13 462 +18 
1936-39 
1936-39 to -26 426 • 2 -13 *> 1* -11 
i9i*7-5o 
191*7-50 to 410 4 6 4^ 32 41^ 465 025 
1951* -56 
1951*-56 to 470 *3i 415 +1*8 4-27 *Mi 
1957-59 
1957-59 to - 2 - 2 425 4 l | ' 43I1 +10 
1960-62 
•'•»»!!*» • — m ~ m — M W W W I U K I H I I I iiiinmm 1 m in if m i l — « — H H M M H I H I I • ».' '"» iiiumn i — » — m n • —«—w«»in» minimi IIWWHI »——««»»• « » <• i m »•• i w I » J 
aCalet*lat©d front United Watlons, fhe World Coffee 
goonomy> A Export fruoared by tfc# Food aad Agricultural 
Organisation (Bourn! tFnited nations, 1961), p. 11 and 
United Nations, Food acd Agricultural Organisation, Pro-
duction Yearbook, Rom©» 1960-1962. 
L J 
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TABLE 9 
PRICES OF EXPORTS BY PRINCIFAIi PRODUCTS 
Coffee Cotton Coooa 
Year J958 • 155 
^»—^———*——•—••••• " • I I - ^ — * — — — — ~ " — • • •—J———**-**» . . .{**.,
 r — n l v l l j l . . f r v l i n i [ | L l i n . ^ — , - l l . i r — r - — n r r - — - — n r - . r . . — r ^ . . . 
19M3 53 1X5 % 
191*9 62 126 1^ 6 
1950 109 132 69 
1951 122 23k ^3 
1952 121* 200 82 
1953 132 116 80 
195U 163 11? 130 
1955 116 121 86 
1956 116 97 62 
1957 110 108 7k 
1958 100 100 100 
1959 79 7k 66 
1960 80 76 6i* 
1961 79 86 51 
1962 7k »t* 50 
1963 72 Bk 59 
4 W W W — i w w — « n wiirinniim iimuin ii'iiw>.» wnimm.; nniiin mnwnin»««» o m m immiiii mmm « I . I « ' I I H < I <« • nu m 
^Calculated fromi Oetallo Vargas Foundation, 
Brazilian Iostltut® of Baono®icsf Center for Economics and 
Business Heaearch* Conlsiatttra Soonosaioa Internat ional , Rio 
d® Janeiro (fehm*&y» 1965/> P« 161* 
r
 TkBhB 10 n 
VAX#S OF Exmwsa m pBUfcxp&x* vmwum* 
ColTe* Cotfeoa Cocoa Qoffffse CottOfi Coco* 
*
,M
''
,
'****
lllwl
'
l
'»»''W»«ww»»»'<»«»w«B«»»«t»»MiwwM««MMi»<id^ minimum 
Value In Millions of TT.S. 
1*M saiism ; ;9g6»igo 
194$ 490.7 184.2 S&.O 71*8 722.4 50*4 
1949 631.7 109.2 52.4 91.8 428.2 45.5 
1950 865.4 105*3 78.7 125.9 412.9 68.4 
1951 1058.1 208.0 69.4 153*9 815*7 60.3 
1952 101*5*3 34.3 l i l .5 152.0 134.5 36*1 
1953 1088.3 101.8 90.6 158.3 399.2 78.7 
1954 948.1 223*1 147*5 137*9 &lk*9 128.1 
1955 $43.9 131*4 102.9 122.7 515.3 69.5 
1956 1029.8 85*9 78.5 149.6 336*9 68.2 
1957 % 5 . 5 46.6 91.2 123.0 U 3 . 5 79.2 
1958 687.5 25.5 H5*l 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1959 733#0 36.6 84*9 106.6 143.5 73*8 
1960 712.7 47.6 93»6 103.7 187*5 81.5 
1961 710.4 112.6 60.9 103*3 441*6 52.9 
1962 642.7 115.1 kUl 93.5 451.4 35*7 
1963 74^*3 117*6 50.8 108.8 461»2 44*1 
•*mtMmmmmmmmmt0*mm**0m*mmm*m**m—*imim*'mm***+*n m in«Hiiii»««wii»wM»iiiiii«iiu'iiiiiiiii»imiiii^^ . n 
*S*l<«ilafe©<t fromt tJtilt©<t H**lo»». Yp,ftr,|>ft|, 9f 
latsegiiafcloafcl tt**« S t a t u t i s t . . H0W York. 1948-1963* 
L -" 
TABLE 11 n 
QPAHTtm OF EXP0HT3 M PKXVCXFAL fRODTTCTS* 
Coffee Cotton Coeoa Coffee Cotton Ooooa 
Weight In Thousand 
Year He t r i e Tone 1958 m 100 
1948 1050 259 ?1 135*8 588.7 60,2 
191*9 1162 11*0 132 150.3 318*2 111.9 
1950 890 129 132 115.1 293*2 1 U . 9 
1951 982 143 96 127.0 325*0 81.4 
1952 9b 9 28 5B 122.8 63*6 49*2 
1953 934 140 123 120.8 316.2 104.2 
1954 655 310 129 8I**7 704.5 109.3 
1955 622 176 131 106*3 400.0 111.0 
1956 1008 143 139 I3O.4 325.0 117.8 
1957 859 79 127 U l . l 179.5 107.6 
1958 773 44 US 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1959 1046 82 98 135.3 186.4 83.1 
1960 1009 113 146 130.5 256.8 125.4 
1961 1018 224 120 I 3 I . 7 509.1 101.7 
1962 983 236 73 127.2 536.4 61.9 
1963 1170 248 83 151.5 563.6 70.3 
immmtiiimmHmmmmmmmimimmmm H I HI U [iiniiinii.nniiiiMiimiiMiiiiijiiiiinn m m * n ' W ' i "' ' n mimnmiimi J'""" """I" '•"" ' i" "<• " ' • l l 1 — — — • nn in m urn 
*0alctilat©d from! Uaiteo* Katlon*, Tepbook of 
Xntegaatloaal Trade S t a t i s t i c s . Hew York, 1948-1963* 
L J 
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TABLB 12 
WORLD COFFEE EXPORTATION B3T ABBA, ANNTTAL AVKBAOES* 
Latin Amerlea 
Restor 
Latin Rest of 
Period Brag 11 Colombia America Total World Total 
« — W — — — < M — — — » ^ m m i nini»»—WWII m m mi*mam~mm»*mm±»*m»**»Mmm m i l n w — > m i inn n —mi—Imm***—* in linnn 
Thousand Metric Tons , 
1922-26 ~m rs5 wr—im—ns—zm 
1927-31 917 169 267 1353 l f t 1507 
1932-36 853 208 279 13^0 210 1550 
1937-1*0 866 250 277 1393 225 1618 
1958-51 1021 30k 288 1613 300 1913 
1952-5U Bkl 3ko 3k9 ISA 371 1915 
1955-57 896 315 5oo 1611 Skb 2157 
195o-60 91*3 356 1*66 1767 651 21*18 
19^-63 1057 3*7 ^73 , 1697 *ft 2763 
Chang oa 
Front Peroenta&ea , 
1922-26 to 412 435 + 9 +13 +38 +15 
1927-31 
1927-31 to - 6 4^8 • k + 3 4^6 • 7 
1937-U0 
1937-1*0 to 418 +22 + h +16 +33 +19 
19U8-51 
19W-51 to +12 + h +39 0 462 +13 
1955-57 
1955-57 to 4 5 413 +17 +10 419 412 
19!$-60 
1958-60 to 411 4 3 4 1 4 7 +25 412 
1961-63 
im)mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm)mmmmmmmmmwmmmmmmmm>mm\»ni Himininni Hi KM mil mimn iwii innnin mum » miiinnumiiirnniimi innnwium > i m i " " , " " "" '• " "" " • 
^Calculated fromJ United Nations, The World Coffee 
loop oily* A Beport Prepared b^ the Food and Agricultural 
Organization (Home% United Nations, 1961), p. 17 and United 
Nations, Food and Agricultural Organisation, Exportation 
LYearbook, Bom©, 1960-1962, j 
3?© 
TABLS 13 
PRorarcrioH, EXFOBSA? ion AW Afnmm 
eoHstmmoir OF RAW cotton* 
Thousands of He t r i o tons  
Apparent 
Period Production lytoortatlOB Consumption 
191*0-191*8 l*29b 2Zk.Qh 205. 0b 
191*9-1953 l*08b 116 *0b 292*0b 
195U 395 309*5 85.5 
1955 fc28 175.7 252.3 
1956 400 ll|2,9 257.1 
1957 397 66.2 330*8 
1958 381 1*0*2 3M>.8 
1959 M*9 77*6 371.1* 
1960 $% 95.li H0.6 
1961 609 205.7 1*03.3 
1962 61*0 215*9 1*21*. 1 
1963 652 221.8 1*30.2 
•calculated froist United Sfationa, Aoalyaca and 
Projectlona of MonmU Development* Jb* Economic Develop-
ment of Braail. A Report Prepared by the Joint Working; 
(iroup of the Banco do Deaetrfolvlaento Economic** of Brasil 
and the Economic Coa&atiaeion for katin America of the 
Salted Nations (Hew Tortu United nations, 1956), p. 88 
and Suited Setlona, Yearbook of International Trade 
Statistic*, few York, 19514-1963. 
bPerlod averages. 
L J 
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TABLE 11; 
a 
BXK>BT VALUES OF POOD AHD RAW MATERIAL PRODUCTS 
Animal & Crude Hat, Fuels 
Pood/Live Beverages Veg. Olla Except and 
Animal and Tobacco and Fata Fuels Lubricants Total 
»i m i n i »i II II Hi 1 linn < urn mi • 11 n I I I M I I u I II I mmmmmmmmmmmmmn mmmlmmm————— • I i I T — — — — — — • — — a m m m m m i mi imii ill • in n i 
Tear Millions of 0. S. Dollars  
b 
1948 ?07.25 1^.60 22.70 397.14 0.00. 1,11*1.69 
1949 745.44 15.20 13.90 291.72 0.00® 1.066.26 
1950 1*016.11 22.25 17.30 283.60 0.00° 1,339.46 
1951 1,225.67 18.51 34.45 473.49 0.00° 1,752.12 
1952 1,159.82 18.79 14.03 215.46 0.00D 1,411.10 
1953 1,243.28 16.52 29.3c 236.51 O.OU 1,525*70 w 
1954 1,160.61 18.48 23.02 343.^5 o.oo^ 1,545.56 ^ 
1955 1,064.33 IB.53 25.14 288.32 0.02 1,396.34 
1956 1,182.09 20.53 26.07 224.39 0.02 1,453.10 
1957 1,046.33 17.70 39.52 256.60 2.82 1,363.05 
1958 944.65 17.13 35.02 192.37 26.21 1,215.56 
1959 968.53 15.64 28.35 211.80 26.97 1,253.29 
1960 936.99 19.00 31.30 227.59 12.81 1,227.68 
1961 934.57 27.10 43.46 319.69 23.36 1,343.18 
1962 791.73 24.02 32.79 316.90 7.43 1,174.87 
1963 968.22 24.54 35.90 322.23 9.42 1,360.31 
C a l c u l a t e d fro®: United Nations, Yearbook of In t e rna t iona l Trade 
S t a t i s t i c s , New York, 1946 -1963 and Braz i l , I n s i i t t i t o B r a s l i e i r o d e Geografla 
e I s t a t i s t i c a , Conselho Haclonal de E s t a t i s t l c a , Anaarlo E s t a t l s t l e o do Brag l l , 
Rio de Jane i ro , 1948-1963. 
L ^ e s s than $100,000 
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TABLE \$ 
FOOD & RAW MATERIAL EXPORTS AS PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL EXPORT VAL0BS* 
Animal as Crude Mat, Fuels Total Agri-
Food/Llve Beverages Veg. Oils Except and cultural Raw 
Animal and Tobacco and Fats Fuels Lubricants Kat. Exports 
Year As Percentages of Total Export Values 
HI 'JWIIIIUI IMII«W»»«««I»««WI«II«M<«»MMWI<WMWIMIM»»^ I in 11 ammmmmmmm»mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmtmmtmmmiimammmim>mnmmmm wiimni in • » " ——mm~* , , urn 
1943 59.9 1.2 1.9 33.? 0.0^ 96.? 
1949 68.0 l.k 1.3 26.6 0.0® 97.3 
1950 75*0 1.6 1.3 20.9 0*0? 93.8 
1951 69.3 1.1 2.0 26.7 0.0° 99.1 
1952 81.6 1.3 1.0 15.4 0.0® 95.5 ^ 
1953 80.1 1.1 1.9 15.4 0.0® 98.5 Si 
1954 74.3 1.2 1.5 22.0 0.0? 99.0 ** 
1955 74.6 1.3 1.8 20.3 o.o;J 98.2 
1956 79.8 1.4 1.8 15.1 O.O0 98.1 
1957 75.2 1.3 2.3 18.4 0.2 97.9 
1953 76.1 1.4 2*& 15.5 2.1 97.9 
1959 75.5 1.2 Z.Z 16.5 2.3 97.7 
1960 73.8 1.5 2.5 17.9 1.0 96.7 
1961 66.6 1.9 3.1 22.8 1.? 96.I 
1962 65.2 2.0 2.? 26.3 0.6 96.8 
1963 68.9 1.8 2.6 22.9 0.7 96.9 
Calculated from Table 14 . 
DLess than $100,000. 
i _ - J 
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TABLE 16 
FBXICmXi CBTOE MATERIAL JSXFORfS OTHER THAN RAW COTTOH* 
Hldes/Sfelaa Pine lumber Sisal/Agave Fibres 
Value . Value Value (Millions Quantum (Millions Quantum (Millions Quantum 
of U.S. Index of 0 , 3 . Index of 0*8. Index 
Year Dollars) (1958«100) Dollars) {I958«I00) Dollars) (19g8»qQ0) 
191*8 35,7? 3&9.1 WM5 85.3 6.70 $9.8 
191*9 33*3*1 3|A«1 31.82 61.5 6.61 59.0 
1950 27.27 2 8 1 4 32.82 63.it 13.60 121.1* 
1951 3 5 4 3 365.6 50.50 97.5 23 .% 213.9 !3 
1952 9.73 IOO4 32.15 62.1 13.62 121.6 v*» 
1953 13.38 138.1 1|0.30 77.8 3.93 35.1 
195^ 10.55 108.9 39.31* 76.0 9.11 81.3 
1955 9.10 93.9 58.£2 112.8 11.29 100.8 
195^ 9 4 6 97.6 33.61* 65.0 U*.97 133.7 
1957 9.33 96.3 6 | . 1 5 123.9 11.13 9 9 4 
1958 9.69 100.0 51.77 100.0 11.20 100.0 
1959 15.66 161.6 38.16 73.7 17.63 1574 
1960 13,08 135.0 1*2.72 82.5 21.01 187.6 
1961 11. 01* 113.9 %7.65 92.0 23.22 207.3 
1962 8.57 8 8 4 38.6k 76.6 22.89 201*4 
1963 7.70 79.5 35.83 69.2 364** 325.5 
Calculated from: 0nited Nations, Yearbook of International Trade 
S t a t i s t i c s , Hew York, 1948-1963, and Brasl l , Ins t i iu lo ferasllelro de Seografla 
e ^s tat i s t i cs , Oonselho tfaclonal d© Bstat i s t lca , Anuarlo Estat i s t l eo do Braall, 
Rio de Janeiro, 19^8-1963. 
L J 
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*kEt& 16 (Continued) 
Hon-Ferrous Ore 
Iron Ore and Concentrates  
^alue • Value (Millions Quantum (Millions Quantum 
of U.S. Index of U.S. Index 
Tear Dollars) (1958*100) Dollars) (19$a«I00) 
194$ 3.32 8.1* 4.66 13.6 
1949 5.59 14.2 5.61 16. 4 
1950 6.63 16.8 5.41 15.S 
1951 12.6? 32.6 9.52 28.8
 t_ 
1952 23.61 59.9 13.72 40.2 *3 
1953 22.82 57.9 10.98 32.2 *** 
195^ 21.58 54.7 5.26 15.1| 
1955 29.97 76.0 9.09 26.6 
1956 35.1!* 89.1 13-37 39.2 
1957 U8.12 122.1 41.3$ 121.2 
1958 39.43 100.0 34.15 100. o 
1959 1*3.70 110.8 33«44 97.9 
1960 53.64 136.0 33.79 98.9 
1961 60.14 152.5 34.90 102.2 
1962 69.49 176.2 30.51 86.3 
1963 70.92 179.9 27.26 79.8 
L- - I 
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TABLE 1? 
EXPORT VALUES OF MATOWLCWRKD PRODUCTS* 
Machinery Textile 
and and other Total 
Transport Mfgfd Wfg*d 
Chemicals Goods goods import 
_ _ " *>>™ " » " ' tii my l w i i n i i n HI MI in i . tmimkimmm WIIIII .ii.ng,,.. ~ . ^n^ . . « i i mm i i .„ iinrmiM,, i I I I I I I K I H . I I . I I i III in. 
Year Millions of ff. S. Dollars 
1948 3.68 0.51 34.60 36*79 
1*9 3*5S 0.52 26.16 30.26 
1950 3.19 0.19 12.61 15.99 
1951 4.42 O.iOt 12.03 16.89 
1952 3.19 0.52 3.32 7.03 
1953 7.87 0.39 2.1*9 10.75 
1954 6.78 1.54 2.89 11.21 
1955 10.37 2.91 6.79 20.0? 
1956 7.92 2.10 11.21* 21.26 
1957 7*44 1.45 9.27 18.16 
1958 7.42 1.86 7.20 16.48 
1959 B.Gd 2.15 7.89 18.12 
1960 13.38 2.00 13.21 28.59 
1961 20.00 11.26 11.47 i|2«73 
1962 14.77 12.02 10.39 37.18 
1963 16.60 10.63 14.148 41.71 
*Caloul*t#d from l United Nations, Yearbook of 
In t e rna t iona l Trad© S t a t i s t i c s , Sew York, 194&-19&3 and 
Braz i l , I n s t i t u t e Bras l l e i ro de Oeografla e E s t a t l s t l o a , 
Consello Waeloaal d© Es ta t i s t l ca* Anuarlo K s t a t l s t l o o do 
,B*asi l , Hto d© Jane i ro , 1948-1963. , 
3?o 
r
 n 
TABLE 18 
MAHUFACTORtD SXPOHtS AS FlftCSffA$SS OF fOTAL IXFORf VAMIS* 
Machinery Textile 
and and Othar f otal 
franaoorfc Hfgfa Kfgfd 
Pftamioa^a Ooodf goo^a ?*|>3r*» 
l£I£ A» Faroantagea of total Export Valtaaa 
191*8 0.3 0«0b 3.0 3.3 
19t*9 0.3 0.0b 2.k 2.7 
1950 0.3 0.0b 0.9 1.2 
1951 0.2 0.0b 0.7 0.9 
1952 0.2 0.0b 0.2 O.U 
1953 0*5 O.Qfe 0.2 0.7 
195U 0*k 0.1 0.2 0.7 
1955 o*? 0*2 0.5 Uk 
1956 0.5 0.1 0.8 -.uk 
1957 0.5 o.l 0.7 U3 
1958 0.6 0.2 0.6 l*k 
1959 0.6 0.2 0.6 Uk 
1960 1.1 0.2 1.0 2.3 
1961 Uk °*8 °»8 3*0 
1962 UZ 1.0 0.9 3.1 
1963 UZ 0.8 1.0 3*0 
•Oaloulated from fabla 17* 
L
 bI*aaa fchaa 0.1$. _, 
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mBI*E X9 
GROWTH KXPOftf COMMODITIES AS PEao^TAOES OF TOZkL JUO0RTSa 
Orowth Exporta/ 
growth Sxporte Total Exports Total Exports 
Year Value (Kllllone of ff.S. Dollars) Fereeataaes 
1948 656,2 1160 55.6 
191*9 762.5 1096 69.6 
1950 1026 a 1355 75*7 
1951 125^.9 1769 70.9 
1952 l iei^.l 11*18 83*5 
1953 1298,9 1539 Bk.k 
X9$k 1213*7 1562 77.7 
1955 1098.1 2423 77.2 
1956 121*2.1 11*82 83.8 
1957 1135*5 1392 81*6 
1958 1001.1 121|2 80.6 
1959 1017.8 1282 79. k 
1960 998,2 1269 78.? 
1961 10Mi.9 11*03 7***5 
1962 910.1 121i* 7***9 
1963 1027.2 1406 73.1 
•calculated from; United nations, Yearbook of 
International Trade Statistics. Hew York, 191*3-1963* 
L _J 
TABLE 20 
IMPORT VAL0ES OP CATEGORIZED ITEHS* 
Food Rati Phels Chemicals Other 
Beverages Mat. and and Machinery/ Hanu-
& Ll?e Except Lubi»l~ £harn*a- Kcuip- factored Total 
Animals Fuels cants ceu t l ca l s ment floods Imports 
Tear _ Mil l ions of Vm S . Dollars _ _ 
1*8 210.2- 122.9 138.4 53.0 198.? 397.8 1121.0 
191*9 195.0 147.1 129.2 62.5 222.7 346.5 1103.0 
1950 194.6 153.5 156.1 69.1 205.5 364.3 1085.1 
1951 252.5 30S.3 238.2 137.9 515.0 535.2 1987.1 
1952 262.2 267.3 263.5 100.5 593.0 1*99*5 1986.0 
1953 288.4 1Q5.6 255.8 85.li 404.7 178.8 1316.7 iS 
1954 252.0 186.5 282.7 172.6 490.8 2lf6«U 1633.2 <» 
1955 250.8 1194 281.4 120.0 357.6 177.6 1306.8 
1956 194.3 120.0 302.6 144.6 306.6 165»8 1233.9 
1957 193.2 125.2 290.0 U1I4.O 522.0 213.6 1488.0 
1958 163.0 90.7 297.6 131.5 520.5 148.9 1352.7 
1959 179.6 101.1 272.4 117.0 501.1 203*2 1374.4 
1960 198.2 122.5 281.li 139.3 519.7 200.9 1462.0 
1961 198.9 131.9 261*.9 11|5.S 519.7 198*8 1460.0 
1962 2384* 64.0 262.6 163.0 503.4 243.6 1475.0 
X963 255.7 70.4 262.4 179.5 436.5 282.3 1486.8 
C a l c u l a t e d froias United Rations, Yearbook of In t e rna t iona l Trade 
S t a t i s t i c s , Hew York, 1948-1963* *n& B ra s l l , Super Iri t end ©tse la da Moeda <io 
Credl to, Boletlm, Rio d© Jane i ro , September, 1955 - December, 1963. 
L J 
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TABUS 21 
QAimQhlZED IMPORT ITSHS AS P*&CisSTA0iiS OF TOTAL IMFGHTS* 
^ood &aw ?uels OhMinals Other 
Beverages l*at. and and Machinery/ Marai-
& Live &xoept Inibrt- £harma~ £qtiip- factured Total 
Animals ffuela east* ceutlcals aent Goods Import a 
Tear As Percentages of Total Import Valued 
«<»«»»iw*w^'*'"MI»w»»»««»ii»»i»Wli ill! mi mmmmm*m*mmmmMm»mimmmimm*mmmmm~mmmmmm0mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmftltm i " ' i n u n i mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmimmmimmmmm HI mill — « « » » — iiiniw i » » « « — « — • • i in i i m nmnili » » — — » 
19fc8 I8*d 10.9 12.lt *4.7 17.7 35.5 100.0 
1SU9 17.7 13.3 11*7 5»7 20.2 31.l| 100.0 
1950 17.9 lfc.2 Vi.& 6 4 18.9 28.0 100.0 
1951 12.7 IS .? 12.0 7 .0 25.9 26.9 100.0 ^ 
1952 13.2 1 3 4 13.3 5.1 29.9 25.1 100.0 ^ 
1953 21.9 8.0 1 9 4 6.5 30.7 13.5 100.0 
199* 1 5 4 1 1 4 17.3 10.6 30.1 15.2 100.0 
1955 19*2 9.1 21.5 9.2 27.k 13.6 100.0 
1956 15.8 9.7 2k.5 11.7 21*.9 1 3 4 100.0 
1957 13-0 8 4 1 9 4 9.7 35*1 1 4 4 100.0 
1958 12.1 6.7 22.0 9.7 38.5 11.0 100.0 
1959 13.1 7 4 19.8 8.5 3 6 4 lfc.8 100.0 
1960 13.6 8 4 19.3 9.5 35.5 13.7 100.0 
1961 13.6 9.1 18.1 10.0 35.6 13.6 100.0 
1962 16.2 If.3 17.8 11.1 31*.1 16.5 100.0 
1963 17.2 k*7 17.6 12.1 2 9 4 19.0 100.0 
C a l c u l a t e d from Table 20 . 
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TABL£ ZZ 
GaTEQOBIZBD XMFOOT FHXOB IHDICBS* 
Raw Fuels Finished 
Food Mat* and Consumer 
Fro- Exoapfc I*abri- Bqtiip- Mami~ 
SaaAi—1NU« imSjpfoLu ^*Qt T^tatgf Total 
191*8 158»2 12t*,7 09.6 11*0.5 165.9 188,7 
1 * 9 U&.8 11*3.8 81,3 1^8.6 177.3 162.0 
1950 125.1* 123.3 80.2 121.6 190,9 131*0 
1951 13U*3 167.1 100.0 139.2 188,6 157.7 
1952 1U7.8 180.8 101,0 147*3 197.7 162.0 
1953 H.9.2 137 #0 10l*,2 135.1 227.2 11*0.8 
1951* 120.9 120.6 100,0 112,2 179.6 122.5 
1955 U U 9 1317.8 92,7 108.1 168,2 111*3 
1956 106.0 119.2 10l*.2 97.3 159.1 111.3 
1957 100,0 111.0 UG.J* 100.0 147.7 109.9 
1958 100»0 100,0 100.0 100.0 100.0 t$0.0 
1959 95.5 84,9 95.8 100.0 75.0 ,91.5 
1960 92.5 89.0 118.8 100.0 77.3 97.2 
1961 97.0 98.6 111.5 97.3 70,5 102.8 
1962 100,0 105.5 108.3 108.1 86.lt 112.7 
1963 106.0 95.9 80.2 102.7 79.5 108.5 
mC«lcul«ted froms Oatnlto Varga» Foundation, 
Braalllan Inatliufce of Economics, Center tor Boonomlos and 
to**m*m Reaearch, Ooii|iiatura BoogOBloa International. Rio 
Lda Janeiro iFaomarf, i9o>; • p. to>. _, 
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TABLE 23 
CATEGORIZED IMPORT Q0AKT0M ZHDICES* 
Raw Fuels Finished 
Food Hat. and Consumer 
Pro- Except I*ubrl~ £quio~ ffanu-
duots Fuels oanta meat faotures fotal 
_ _ « l — — — — i i * i I I i iiT i , , . „ in , , ! iiiiBiy.ni inn iimmwi ii mil .in in <i iiinn. i n , mi mui . n i i i i i . m i . i r . n minii K m 
Year 1958 * IQQ 
19U6 78.9 37.0 52.9 50.7 78.9 U3.5 
19U9 80.0 38,5 5 5 4 a - l 6i*.4 50.3 
1950 87.8 kl*0 66,9 63.5 54*1 614* 
1951 HO.O 73.0 80.2 106.8 I6I4.7 93.1 
1952 103.3 59.0 90.9 113.5 127.1 90.3 
1953 U l . l 50.0 82.6 67.6 33.0 70.0 
195fc 123.3 94.0 9k.2 103 .k 56 .k 97.9 
1955 135.6 72.5 103.3 7 8 4 29.7 86.9 
1956 108.9 72.5 99.2 77.0 31.0 82.1 
1957 117.8 102.0 m.k U l * 5 51.5 100.0 
1958 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1959 117.8 125.0 93.9 1 0 5 4 H 3 . 5 110.3 
1960 132.2 129.5 80.2 1U*.2 56.1 111.0 
1961 125.6 92.5 91.0 126.1* 58.7 101*.1 
1962 lkk*k 81.0 82.6 106.1 i.j.1.9 96.6 
1963 IkUl 105.5 H0.7 96.6 52.5 1 0 1 4 
« H — 1 1 M1IWXHM.I —11 • • nil 11 i n 1 mi 1 HW.HMI i i l i , » H l l i I ill 1 Hill . U l l l . l l I I . i n » W ' » H « • • • 1 1 — I H I I I M W I I ) I l u l l II I M H I I I H I 
•calculated from* Oetullo Vargas Foundation, 
Bras11Ian Inst i tute of Economics* Center for Eeonoralo and 
Sualn«ss Kesearen, Oonluntura Booncmloa International. Rio 
L de Janeiro (February 1965)» P. 161* • ^ 
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 TABLE 2k n 
QUANTUM OF IMPORTS BY MAJOB CATEGORIES* 
Final Consumer 0ood8 Fuels aod 
Parable Non-Parable Sab-Total Ltsbrlcanta 
Year Thouaanda of Dollars at 19$$ Prloea  
1948 91,522 74,589 166, 111 129,829 
1949 74,700 76,052 150,752 136,903 
1950 62,693 63,999 11*6,692 164,463 
1951 150,1476 122,874 273,350 212,299 
1952 92,415 120,943 213,359 234,738 
1953 19,813 84,504 104,317 231,335 
1954 21,785 97,975 119,760 278,408 
1955 7,078 90,131 97,209 271,107 
1956 7,105 90,231 97,336 281,633 
1957 11A69 814,964 96,433 234,433 
1958 12,873 61,248 74,121 284,573 
1959 23,063 61,236 84,299 279,089 
1960 15,029 80,028 95,081 319,590 
1961 8,388 87,944 96,332 322,834 
1962 5,981 101,136 107,117 329,291 
1963 7,491 98,849 106,340 441,314 
•calculated from: United Nations, Economic Com-
mlaalon for Latin America, "The Growth and Deeline of 
Import Substitution In Brazil* Economic Bulletin for Latin 
America. IX (March, 1964), 21 and United Nations, Yearbook 
of International Trade Stat i s t l ea . New York, 1%1-I9OT» 
L -J 
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TABLE 21* (Continued) 
Raw Materials/intermediate Products 
Hon- Spare Sub- Equ 1 p~ 
Hetal Metal Parts Total sent Total 
Year Thousands of Dollars at 1955 Prices  
191*8 68,716 23k,03b 93,1*55 396,207 305,098 997,21*5 
19U9 36,168 251* ,14.62 61,739 1*12,369 323 • 052 1,023,0?6 
1950 107,800 322,390 76,202 506,392 380,618 1,198,165 
1951 152,076 1*39,1*18 1147,929 739,1*23 631,633 1,856,705 
1952 129,696 371*, 330 118,972 617,998 721,113 1,787,207 
1953 112,268 328,170 16,510 1*56, 91*8 356,623 1,11*9,223 
195** 219,1*81 1*25,531 68,626 713,63? 1+10,920 l f522,726 
1955 111,2146 371,575 M**82? 527,61*3 292,006 1,187,970 
1956 99,236 31*9,251 58,175 506,662 256,969 1,11*2,601 
1957 121*,561 351,1*50 106,967 582,978 1*01,839 1,335,683 
1958 91*,372 31*0,365 161,692 596,1*29 3$kM3 1,309,566 
1959 98,361* 372,661* 193,1*16 661*,l*l*i* 1*12,1*82 1,1*1*0,311* 
1960 119,055 1*20,1*32 93,769 638,251* 388,832 1,1*1*1,759 
1961 13!*,65l 1*09,111* 27,1*01* 571,169 1*30,1*22 1,1*20,757 
1962 125,310 31*8,873 26,161 500,31*1 361,121* 1,297,876 
1963 159,1*85 1*73,287 18,932 651,701* 330,561* 1,529,922 
L J 
m 
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TABLE 25 
PERCENTAGE BREAKDOWN OF IMPORT BY MAJOR CATEGORIES* 
Final Consumer goods Fuels and 
Dupable Hon«-Pur able Stab-Tots! Lubricants 
~ " - * - ~ - ~ - ~ — ~ -
J
~ * ~ * * - ~ ~ - ^ — — * — — ~ ~ - ~ -
J
~ — — 1 ~ — m r i- r T,i—iir Tirrrn 11 -ruin ii" ••iiiirri BI mi inTr - inn urn 'm mi mum—mrmn'imii mri——rr-IT— 
Year Percentages „ 
1948 9.2 7»5 16.? 13.0 
1949 7.3 74 11*.? 134 
1950 5*2 7.0 12.2 13»7 
1951 8.1 6.6 24*7 114 
1952 5.2 6.8 12.0 13*1 
1953 1.7 74 9.1 20.1 
1954 14 64 7.8 18*3 
1955 0.6 7.6 6*2 22.8 
1956 0.6 7.9 8*5 24.6 
1957 0.9 64 7.3 19.0 
195B 1.0 4*7 5.7 21.7 
1959 1.6 4.3 5.9 19.3 
1960 1.0 5.6 6.6 22.2 
1961 0.6 6.8 6.8 22.7 
1962 0.5 7*8 8.3 254 
1963 0.5 *»»S 7.0 28.8 
*Caleulat©a fro® Table 24. 
L -I 
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TABLE 25 (Continued) 
Raw Materlala/latermedlate Products 
* * * * " — — • — — — ' ' 1JI 1 " Iimi i i . ' n i i I W I i m i i n n » g • .in i » i — m u M i •mmmiSmtmm-. i 
Hon - Spare Sub~ Equlp-
Metal Ketal Farta Total meat total 
Tear Feraenta&es 
1948 6,9 23.5 9.k 39*8 30.5 100.0 
194*9 9.U 21*.9 6,0 i*0.3 31.6 100,0 
1950 9.0 26.9 6.1*. i*2.3 33.3 100.0 
1951 8.2 23.7 8.0 39*9 3^.0 100.0 
1952 7*3 20.9 6 4 3^.6 1*0.3 100.0 
1953 9.8 28.6 Uk 39*8 31.0 100.0 
195k lk*k 27.9 U*6 1*6*9 27.0 100.0 
1955 9.U 31.3 3.7 kk*k 21**6 100.0 
1956 6.7 30.6 5.2 kh*k 22*5 100.0 
1957 9.3 26.3 8*0 1*3.6 30.1 100.0 
1958 7.2 26*0 12.3 kS*S 27*1 100.0 
1959 6.8 25.9 1 3 4 1.6.1 28.7 100.0 
1960 8*3 29*1 6.0 i&*2 27*0 100.0 
1961 9.5 28*8 1.9 M>*2 30.3 , 100.0 
1962 9.6 26.9 2.0 38*5 27.8 100.0 
1963 1 0 ^ 30.9 1.2 1*2.6 21.6 100.0 
.-1.111 . in . , • „ I I » . 1 1 11 , -1,1 j.irn j- 1 iln. mi • " » » » " " " " » " " ' * " - • • " " " ' «' " «"• •" "•• • • • w i n — I H « I . » I I 
1 
1 
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TABLE 26 
BREAKDOWH OP IMPORTS W ECONOMIC USE AND DSSTINAT IOH* 
gy Type of Use 
Intermediate Products "'fed frro&ie^a 
«e j -jy „, "*,ffi—J gj 
I«AE 22M1 an^ ntaffft Total Quantum Total 
1948 997,21*5 396,207 39.7 601,038 60,3 
1949 1,023,076 412,369 40.3 610,707 59.7 
1950 1,198,165 506,633 1*2.3 691,532 57.7 
1951 1,856,705 739,933 39.9 1,116,772 60.1 
1952 1,787,207 618,387 34.6 1,168,820 654 
1953 1,149,223 457,615 39.8 691,608 60.2 
1954 1,522,726 716,772 47.1 805,954 52.9 
1955 1,187,970 604,724 50.9 583,246 49.1 
1956 1,142,601 613,930 53.7 528,671 46.3 
1957 1,335,683 689,302 51*6 646,381 48.4 
1958 1,309,566 720,444 55.0 589,122 45.0 
1959 1,440,314 790,427 54.9 649,887 45.1 
1960 1,441,759 762,961 52.9 678,798 47.1 
1961 1,420,757 731,690 51.5 689,067 48.5 
1962 1,297,876 664,990 51.2 632,886 48.8 
1963 1,529,922 872,361 57.0 657,581 43.0 
^Calculated from* TTnited Hatlons, Economic Com-
mission for Latin America, *The Growth and Decline of 
Import Substitution i n Brazil* Economic milletln for Latin 
America. IX (March, 1964), 25 and United Katlona. Yearbook 
oj international Trade Statistics, Hew York, 1 9 6 1 - 1 9 6 3 . , 
387 
TABLE 26 (.Contltread) 
By Degtloatlon 
Por Coneumptloo For Invaataeni ' 
% of % of 
Year Quantum Total quantum Total 
191*8 520,623 52*2 1*76.1*82 1*7.8 
191*9 535,753 52.1* 1*87,323 1*7.6 
1950 631,21*6 52.7 566,919 1*7 #3 
1951 921*,218 1*9.8 932,1*87 50*2 
1952 806,103 1*5*1 961,1014. 5***9 
1953 637,809 55*5 $11,1**1* V**5 
1951* 827,8U* 9*.l* 69f*,912 1*5*6 
1955 71*3,307 62,6 1*2*1*, 663 37*1* 
1956 737,224 61*. $ i*0$,387 35*5 
1957 711,657 53.3 623,826 1*6.7 
1958 708,098 51**1 601,1*68 1*8.9 
1959 735,6A 51.1 70l*,680 1*8*9 
1960 835,129 57*9 606,630 1*7.1 
1961 828,301 58.3 592,1*56 1*1.7 
1962 785,281 60.5 512,595 39*5 
1963 920,91*1 60,2 608,981 39.8 
••• . i in. i HI. <••« H H . mm m m minwiw .mm-T '"" » • ' " — » • " ' • • » » » ' •"•'• "•<• •»» """•'• " • 
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TABLE 27 
TERKS OP TRADE* 
Set Barter Set Barter Grose Barter Income Terms Import 
Terms of Terms of Terms of of Trade/ Quantum 
Trade Trade Trade Capacity to Index (dollars) (cruseIroa) (dollars) Import (dollars) (dollars) 
Year 19ft3»10Q 
194|8 I&. 0 39.i* 207.9 57.5 62.1 
19^9 53*0 1*7.8 160.3 61.7 71.9 
1950 93.5 03.5 H*i.6 9iu6 87.7 
1951 93.8 85.3 80.7 *°2.7 l33*0 
1952 89.6 80.5 66.7 80.0 129.0 
1953 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 # 
195U 13^.5 98.1 60.6 116.1 HjO.O • 
1955 117.7 82.9 79.J* 116.5 12fc.l 
1956 112.7 71.6 90.8 121.5 117.3 
1957 116.7 81.0 69.0 l l5 . l l 11*2.9 
1956 U 9 . 3 72.1 66.2 1U*.1 11*2.9 
1959 109.2 7l|.7 73.1 127.7 157.6 
1960 101.U 89.9 73.3 116.8 156.6 
1961 97.3 82.7 8fc.8 1 ^ . 7 H|8.7 
1962 83.8 66.2 8^.3 98.8 136.0 
1963 90.9 75.6 88.1* 118.2 l iA.9 
Calculated from: Oetullo Vargas foundation, Braj&lliao Inst i tute of 
Economies, Center for Economic and Business Research, Oopjuntura Kconorolca 
International. Rio de Janeiro (February, 1965)» p. 160-165. 
L_ -1 
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TABLE 28 
CAPITAL ACCOtTCT BALANCES t HOH-COHPBMSATOKY CAPITAL FLOWS* 
„ _ Private , , 
Direct 
In* Bein~ Astorti-
vestment vestment Loans gatlon Other Total 
« • — ^ m m m — — • ! M i « n . i m i . mm mm ,- inimiIMn i n mi » i m i i n n mi ip . « . . . — i . » , m i pn i i IHIII»M—M—IHIIKII n i .mn i I.I i in 
Year Millions of ff, S, Dollars  
191*8 25 k% 13 60 
1949 5 39 - - -12 32 
1950 3 36 -11 20 
1951 «fc 6? - - 7 70 
1952 9 85 4 U8 
1953 22 33 21 -11 39 109 
1954 11 k0 32 ~h -4 IS 
1955 43 36 24 -9 15 109 
1956 69 50 131 -40 18 248 
1957 11*3 35 211 -69 36 356 
1958 H O 18 223 -3*6 25 230 
1959 124 34 291 -191 -10 248 
1960 99 39 217 -237 56 176 
1961 108 39 346 -210 -56 225 
1962 69 67 178 -188 65 191 
1963 30 - 93 -128 1 -4 
- . L | • • I •• -II I - - • • - """ " — ' i " — • • • • « I I I « I I I I I IIWH II I I III I II i i l i . M H • 
*Calcttiated from* Brazil. Superintendencia da 
MOeda do Crejito, Boletim, Kio de Janeiro, September, 1955-
LDeoemberf 19©3» J 
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TABLE 28 (Contlntfad) 
Public  
Capital 
Subscribed 
Amortl- IMF, IBD, 
Loana gat Ion IBRD Otfoera Total TOTAL 
Year Millions of g, g, Dollars  
— — — — ^ — • • » — — — — — w m - m t m m — — — • — — » i
 n , i . n IIIMITI i n n m n 11 n JII HI HI nn roiMimwuw mnnm •<» in n i • nin n urn 
191*8 9 -61 -37 - -89 -9 
19U9 kO -107 - - -67 -35 
1950 28 -85 - - -57 -29 
1951 38 -27 - -25 -111 56 
1952 35 -33 - - 2 120 
1953 23 -35 - - -12 97 
195** 77 -130 - - -53 2Z 
1955 60 -131 - 1 -70 39 
1956 100 -Utf - - ~k7 201 
1957 108 -173 - -1 -66 290 
1958 150 -178 - - -28 202 
1959 U|8 -186 - 6 -32 216 
1960 130 -173 -b l - ~8|4 92 
1961 183 -117 -26 39 79 30U 
1962 165 -122 -20 kS 68 259 
1963 169 -225 - 35 -21 -25 
mmmmmmmmm^mmmmmmmmmiimmmmtmm inn m u m mum iin mini mm n. nnnm iimi mm' i m ' "•' nin i n in in • 111 ' " " " " " "" """•' '" • " — • — i m m ^ t m m m « • — » 
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TABLE 29 
CAPITAL ACCOOTT BALASCBS: COHPERSATORy CAPITAL PLOWS* 
Balance of Payments Loans  
5 3 _ Burop- Agree* 
Export* Federal U«3« Horth ean aent 
Import IMF Reserve Private AID Aaer. Credit with 
Bank Banks Banks Credit Sngland 
Year "" Kill Ions of tf.S. Dollars 
1^.8 . . . - . . . . 
191*9 - 38 - - . . . . 
X950 . . . • . . . . 
1951 - 28 - - . . . . 
1952 - -28 - - . . . . 
1953 300 28 - 156 £ 
195fc 133 6? M 
1955 U5 * -133 133 - -
1956 - -28 - - . . . . 
1957 37 - . . . . 
1958 100 37 58 . . . 
1959 - ~21 - - . . . . 
1960 » l|8 - 10 
1961 101 kO - fc8 50 35 36 
1962 81 -18 - - 25 10 22 -
1963 80 5 - -. 25 30 31 
Calculated froms Brazil, Superlntendencla da Moeda do Credit©, 
Boletlm. Rio de Janeiro, September, 1955 - IteGmih&p, 1963* 
i_ j 
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TABLE 29 (Continued) 
Balance of Payments Loana 
Official 
Agree* Monetary 
sent Assets Gold 
with Increase Llab- increase 
Japan Other ?°**\ (») llltlea {zl Total 
Tear Mill tons of 0«S« Dollars 
19P 30 -21 3? 69 
1%9 * - 3& -32 ill -1 1*6 
1950 * 31 2k -1 5k 
1951 - - 28 82 156 -1 265 
1952 - - »2& 28 ?5 -1 Ik 
1953 - - U86 kl 21 -1 51*7 
1951* - - 200 -10 60 -1 21*9 ig 
1955 16 - 61 -11 -58 -1 -9 * 
1956 - - -20 -162 1? -1 -191* 
195? - - 3? 161 -18 -1 179 
1956 195 31 2B -1 253 
1959 - - -21 26 150 -1 ia 
1960 58 -26 353 £*0 430 
1961 - - 310 -180 -129 2 3 
1962 - - 120 36 -36 60 180 
1963 - 1? 188 -18 19 76 265 
mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmMmmmmmm0*mme***m~mmm*mmmimmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm~mmtmmmmmmmmmMm^ i in mmmmmmmmmimBiBmmmHllimmmlmmimlmmmmimmmmim aim—out——ill n in i — — — w i n i < I I H H I I — — — •'• • I I « — « — « M — • — — « — » 
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TABLE 30 
CAPITAL ACCOUNT BALANCESs CATEGORIZATION OF 
TOTAL CAPITAL FLOWS* 
Long-Term Private Capital  
Direct R e - L o a n s & 
Investment Investments Other Total 
Year Millions of 0, S, Dollars  
19U8 25 l|2 -7 60 
19U9 5 39 7 51 
1950 3 36 -9 30 
1951 -1* 67 -2 61 
1952 9 85 -3 91 
1953 22 36 36 96 
195U 11 k® 53 10k 
1955 1*3 36 70 1U9 
1956 89 50 92 231 
1957 11*3 35 U»l 319 
1958 110 18 137 265 
1959 121* 3U 153 311 
1960 99 39 -3 135 
1961 108 39 130 277 
1962 69 67 -10 126 
1963 30 - -53 -23 
^Calculated from? International Monetary 
Fund. Balance of Payments Yearbooks Washington, D.C.f 
L 19U8tl?oT 
m 
r n 
TABLE 30 (Continued) 
Official Monetary 
Short-Terra Private Deferred Long- Movements 
Capital Excluding Import Term Private & 
Monetary Movements Payments Capital Official 
Year Millions of 0*. S« Dollars  
191*8 21 $k -65 kk 
191*9 -12 28 -U* -1U 
1950 -2 -103 -60 57 
1951 21 30 -22 261 
1952 -31 Ski S 129 
1953 11* -563 -11 51*5 
195U -29 -1*8 35 161 
1955 -Si* -8 12 -1*? 
1956 1 1 - 7 -2U2 
1957 30 - -73 193 
1958 3.1 ~ -50 229 
1959 -5$ - -1*1 158 
i960 68 - -10 329 
1961 -53 -68 123 -1*0 
1962 65 -68 103 11*5 
1963 9 163 90 I6I4 
L J 
r
 TABLE 31 ^ 
DEBT SERVICE IS RELATION TO KXTERHAL EARNIKOS* 
External Debt Seryloe _ « _ _ 
Export Amortisation Invaataant Income (debltT 
Ba*»nlBga Loan Equity 
(Gooda and Private Public Capital Capital 
Servleea) Capital Capital Total (Intaraat) (Dividend a) 
Year HlXllona or 8»3« Dollara 
1%B I2k7 - 61 61 28 80 
191*9 1161 - 107 10? 2k 80 
1950 1398 - 85 35 29 83 
1951 1©31 - 21 21 22 137 
1952 II187 - 33 33 26 99 
1953 1653 11 35 %6 kl 120 w 
1951* 1667 k 130 13^  65 79 $ 
1955 1$|6 9 130 11*0 kl 72 
1956 1635 ^0 1IJ7 187 73 70 
1957 1592 69 173 2i*2 82 $2 
1956 1&08 11*6 178 32k 67 kZ 
1959 110*1 191 186 377 101 51 
1960 Ikkk 237 173 W O 127 66 
1961 1511 210 117 327 126 61 
1962 1292 188 122 310 123 83 
1963 lij92 128 225 353 83 
' • " • - • '" • • ' • i i i i • I ' ' H I 11 » mil 1 i m i i 1 11 11.1 ii ' 1 1 » I . 1 1111 • • , n . - i i — . i i , ii wmi .1 11 • 1. urn i i , i . 
Calculated from* Brazil, Superintendedia da Ho@da do Credtto, 
Solatia. Rio da Janeiro, September, 1955 * December, 1963. 
L -I .. 
r n 
TABLE 31 (Continued) 
External Debt Service 
Total Debt 
Total Debt Service 
Service Including Debt Debt 
Excluding Return* Returns on Service Service 
On Equity Capital Bgulty Capital Ratlob Ratio0 
Tear Millions of fl.S. Dollars Percentages 
19i*8 89 169 7.1 13.6 
191*9 131 211 11.3 IS.2 
1950 111* 197 B.2 lfc.l 
1951 U9 186 2.7 10.2 
1952 59 153 l*.0 10.6 
1953 93 213 5.6 12.9 
195*4 199 276 11.9 16.7 & 
1955 187 259 12.1 16.8 0* 
1956 260 330 15.9 20.2 
1957 321* 376 20.li 23.6 
1958 391 1*33 27.6 30.8 
1959 1*78 529 33*2 36.7 
1960 537 603 37*2 1*1.8 
1961 1*53 5H* 30*0 3*1*0 
1962 i*33 516 33.5 39.9 
1963 **36 ^36 29.2 29.2 
bRatio of total debt service (excluding returns on equity capital) 
to external earnings. 
cRatio o t total debt service (including returns on equity capital) 
to external earnings. 
i_ j 
P
 SABLJ8 32 
IJRPECTIYB BaTSS OF PUBLIC DEBT SERvTGB* 
Effective Effective 
Average Aaortl- Effective Amort1- Time Periods 
Debt
 0 Interest satIon Interest sation of Re-. 
Outstanding Payments Payments Rates Rates payment*3 
Tear Millions of U.S. Dollars Percentages Years 
19^8- h b b b b b 
193* 932.0D 19.6 60,9 2.1 6.5 15-3 
1955 1,297.9 29*9 111.6 2.3 8.6 11.6 
1956 1,1*61.1 37.1 H|3«5 2.5 9.8 10.2 
1957 1,506.9 39.6 158.8 2.6 12.5 8.0 
1956 l,62tt.8 I4O.7 210.3 2.5 12.9 7.7 
1959 1,667.3 §3»7 186.1 2.6 11.2 9.0 
1960 1,690.0 60.7 215.7 3.6 12.6 7.8 S 
1961 2,030.9 6^.9 181.5 3*2 8.9 11.2 ^ 
1962 2,293*1* 87 .S 205.8 3.9 9.0 11.1 
1963 2,1^.6 97.3 236.9 k*l 9^9 10.2 
Calculated from: International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, International Development Association, Economic Grovthand External 
Deb t; A S tat is tlcal Pr esentat Ion » A Report Prepared by the JSoonoaie' Staff 
(Vasblngtbn, b.C.s IBJRD, 196IU pp» 9, U|. 
Period averages. 
cAverage of debt outstanding at the beginning and at the end of 
the year. 
Average of debt outstanding at the beginning and at the end of the 
year divided by annual amortisation payments. 
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YiUBLB 33 
REFAYMEHT SCHSOTLi OF 
HBDI0K-T1RK AKD LOm-fmU EXfEBKAI* DEBT* 
— „ SgMl^ . Oomras^lble Cuyrepgle^ 
Fria* In- Sab* F r i t * * 1 5 - Sub-
—siBii—terjtjtt ?iw,,a,w gtagKt ., ,*•£•?!, fo*fl . 
xaar ffaouaandg of tf.S* Dollars 
• ' " ' • • ' ' • • ' " ' " ' ' ^ ' ' • • ' ' " ^ • ' " ' ' ' • ^ • • • ^ ^ ^ • • • • • • • ^ • ^ ' ' • • • • • • ^ • • • • • • w i ^ ^ IITTIHI imiSmimmmmmmmmmmiimmmim'in m itimimmmmmammmmumi i i 
1964 572,761 155,184 727,945 557,049 153,161* 710,213 
196| 252,839 91,677 344,516 244,032 89,511 333,543 
1966 222,081 77,763 299,844 215,532 76,937 292,469 
1967 192,460 64,266 256,726 188,638 63,821 252,459 
1968 16^,067 54,206 218,273 161,054 53,9% 215,048 
1969 137,045 45,371 182,416 136,375 45,320 181,695 
1970 117,504 37,457 154,961 117,167 37,439 154,606 
1971 99,065 31,302 130,367 98,888 31,298 130,186 
1972 83,028 26,278 109,306 83,028 26,278 109,306 
1973 76,822 22,168 98,990 76,822 22,168 98,990 
1974 68,883 18,312 87,195 68,883 18,312 87,195 
1975 59,592 14,934 74,526 59,592 14,934 74,526 
1976 51,058 12,073 63,131 51,058 12,073 63,131 
1977 46,829 9,620 56,449 46,829 9,620 56,449 
1978 45,234 7,3U 52,545 45,234 7,311 52,545 
1979 42,902 5,131 48,033 42,902 5,131 48,033 
1980 41,070 3,039 44,109 41,070 3,039 44,109 
1981 
t«f ~ 121.380 ?tg78 Ig8t9g8 121,380 7,576 1 2 8 ^ 
Tofe~ 
al« 2.394.620 681.670 1.078.290 2.355,533 677,928 3.033.461 
•Calculated tvmt Braiil, Superintendencia da Moeda 
do Credito, Bolotlm. Rio da Jaaa-iro (Haroh, 1964), p. 86. 
b4« of 0©cemb©r 31, 1963• 
L -J 
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TkBhM 33 (Oootlmied) 
lQooav®rtlble Cnrr#Qol®gb 
Sub-
Principal Interest Total 
Y**r Thousanda of g»S« Bollara 
196fc 15*712 2,020 17,732 
1965 8,807 2*166 10,973 
1966 6 f f t9 876 7,375 
1967 3.B22 kkS U*267 
1966 3,013 212 3,225 
1969 670 51 721 
1970 337 18 355 
1971 177 k 161 
1972 m m. m 
1973 
197U -
1975 • -
1976 ** *• ** 
1977 -
197w #» •» *• 
1979 **• * * 
i 9 6 0 ** - » • • 
19^1 & 
after ~ ** 
— M — W W — » i ^ » — W ^ 111 ! • H I n IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII 1 urn • 11111111 mi 1 MiiMWiiiiii ••Miiniii in' 11 1^  i n nun- • 1 11111 — « 
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TABLE 3b 
REPAYMENT SCHEOTLB OF MEDIUM-TERM AND LONG-TERM EXTERNAL DEBT* 
Amortisation & Interest Payments Amortisation Amortisation 
on Debts Incurred for the interest Pay* and Interest 
Purpose of Special Project merits on Debts Payments 
Total Financing** Incurred for on 
Amorti- the Purpose Previously 
satlon & Official Private of External Consolidated 
Interest** Financing Financing total Adjustment1* Debts0  
Year WOWAroS W tt.S. mtwd 
1964 727,945 75,189 328*451 403,640 319,598 4,707 
1965 344,516 59,014 171,4U 230,425 109,384 4,707 *-
1966 299,844 54,545 150,126 204,671 90,474 4,699 o 
1967 256,726 52,075 127,173 179,248 72,779 4,699 ° 
1968 218,273 47,414 99,225 146,639 66,935 4,699 
1969 182,416 42,526 70,590 113,1X6 64,601 4,699 
1970 154,961 39,823 48,169 67,992 62,270 4,699 
1971 130,367 37,917 33,367 71,284 57,272 1,811 
1972 109,306 34,446 23,074 57,520 49,975 1,811 
1973 98,990 32,067 18,630 50,697 46,676 1,617 
1974 87,195 23,957 16,707 40,664 44,914 1,617 
1975 74,526 16,760 12,988 29,748 43,161 1,617 
1976 63,131 13,134 6,869 20,003 41,511 1,617 
1977 56,449 10,571 4,440 15,011 39,858 1,580 
1978 52,545 9,472 3,28£ 12,757 38,208 1,580 
1979 48,033 8,800 1,354 10,154 36,556 1,323 
1980 44,109 7,607 402 8,009 34,800 1,300 
1981 & 
Aftar 123,9g8 21,20? - 21.207 7tt.b02 33.3U9 
Tot-
j O , 3.076.290 g86,g2lt 1.116.261 1.702.765 1.293.37U 62.131 , 
C a l c u l a t e d from: Braz i l , Super in tendence da Moeda do Credi to , 
Boletlau Rio de Janeiro (March, 1964), P* 82. 
bAs of December 31 , 1963 
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 TABL1 35 "• 
DEBf SBB?10K M!TIO VARIATIONS* 
Debt Debt Debt Debt Debt 
Service Service Service Service Service 
Ratlob EfttlpQ Ratio* Ratio* Ratio* 
^ « — - W I M I in iin i,i HI mi iiiiiiinw in) i iwut—xminn • m uwn IHIIIMM—•mi HIIIIII nnniiini —gSm—»»inn i urn, 
X&H Percentage  
191*8 2.3 6 4 8.7 4.9 7.1 
1949 2.1 6,9 9.0 9.2 11.3 
1950 2.1 5.9 8,0 6.1 Sa 
1951 UZ 7.5 8.7 1.5 2.7 
1952 1.8 6.7 8.1* 2.2 4.0 
1953 2.8 7.3 10.1 2.8 4.5 
195ft 3.9 4.7 8.6 8.0 7.9 
1955 3.0 4.7 7.7 9.1 11.3 
1956 4.5 ft.3 8.7 1 1 4 11.1 
1957 5.2 3.3 8 4 15.2 144 
1958 4.8 3.0 7.7 23.0 17.8 
1959 7.0 3.5 10.5 26.2 15.9 
1960 8*8 4.6 134 284 19.1 
1961 8.3 ft.O 124 21.6 16.3 
1962 9*5 6 4 15.9 24.0 22.7 
1963 5.6 - 5»6 23.7 2 2 4 
mmimmmmmm*mm*mmm*mmMmmammmmmmimtm*mmmmmtmwmmmmmmmmmnmmmmmmmm»mm^ IHMHI n ni l—mmmmmmm—m•» 
•-Calculated frosts Inter national Batik for Re-
construction and Developmentf International Development 
Association, Boonomie growth and External Debt% A Sta-
tistical Presentation, A Report Prepared by the JSconoaio 
Staff (Washington, D« c.i IBID, 196ft) p. ift and from 
Table 31* 
b Ratio of interest payments on loan capital to 
external earnings• 
°Ratlo of dividend payments on equity capital to 
external earnings* 
%atlo of interest and dividend payments to ex-
ternal earnings. 
#Ratio of total amortisation to external earnings. 
^Ratlo of public debt service to external earnings. 
L -J 
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TABLE 36 
DEBT SERVICE HI RELATION TO EXTERHAL EAHNINOS & IMPORT EXPENDITURES* 
Real Value Import & 
External of External Debt Ser-
External Earnings Earnings Import vice Claims Ratio of 
Earnings Remaining Remaining Expend!- Against Debt Service 
Before Debt After Debt After Debt tares External To Import 
Service Service Service** (CI.F.) Earnings Yalta es 
Tear Millions of g,S, Dollars Percentages 
19i*8 121*? 10?8 5?0 1121 1290 15. X 
191*9 1161 950 586 1103 13H| 19.1 
1950 1398 1201 917 1085 1282 18.2 £-
1951 1831 16U5 101*1 1987 2173 9*k E 
1952 U*8? 1329 820 1986 211*1* 8.0 
1953 1653 iMko 1021 1318 1531 16.2 
195U 1667 1389 1129 1629 190? 1?.I 
1955 151*6 128? 1159 1306 1565 19.8 
1956 1635 1305 1176 123U 1561* 26.7 
1957 1592 1212 1102 11*88 1861* 25.3 
195S 11*08 975 975 1352 1785 32.0 
1959 11*1*1 912 991 1371* 1903 38.5 
1960 U*l*l| 81*1 86? 11*62 2065 kl*2 
1961 1511 997 968 11*60 1971* 35.2 
1962 1292 7?6 687 11*75 1991 35.0 
1963 11*92 1056 92S 1^8? 1923 29.3 
^Calculated from Tables 6 and 31. 
bV«luea are adjusted for changes In Import prices, eternal earnings 
remaining after debt service are deflated by an Import price Index (1953=100). 
gee Table 22. _, 
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TABLE 37 
PERCENTAGE CHANGES IH THE VALUJB 
OP RiSMAlHIHG gXTERHAL EAHKIHOS* 
Changes In the Changes in the Changes in the 
Current Current Real 
Value of Export Value of Export Value of Export 
Earnings Before Earnings After igarninga After 
Debt Service Debt Service Debt Service 
Years Percentages 
19U8-U9 -7 -12 *3 
19U9-50 +20 +26 4*57 
1950-51 *31 +37 +U* 
1951-52 -19 -19 -21 
1952-53 +11 +8 +25 
1953-5U •! -3 * U 
195^-55 -7 -7 +3 
1955-56 +6 •! +2 
1956-57 -3 -7 -6 
1957-58 -12 -19 -11 
1958-59 +2 -6 +2 
1959*60 - -8 -12 
1960-61 +5 «*9 *12 
1961-62 -114 ~22 -29 
1962-63 *15 *36 +36 
Calculated from Table 36. 
L J 
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TABLE 38 
NATIONAL ACCOUNTS: 0KOWTH IK INCOME & PRODUCT* 
National National 
GB* ONP ONP Income Income 
{tfnad- (Ad- Growth (Unad- (Ad-
Jttstad) justed) Hate justed) fasted) 
Billions of Billions of 
Year Cruzeiros Percentages Cruaelros 
1946 188.7 203.8 9.5 158.5 171.2 
1949 215.2 215.2 5.6 179.9 179.9 
1950 254.0 226.0 5.0 212.5 189.1 
1951 307.8 237*6 5.1 252.9 195.3 
1952 350.fc 250.3 5.6 292.6 209.5 
1953 U25.2 25c.9 3.2 356.9 217.4 
1954 550.6 278.9 7.7 451.2 228.6 
1955 665.9 297.8 6.8 573.3 248.9 
1956 877.5 303.4 1.9 726.7 251.3 
1957 1,049.9 324.3 6.9 865*3 267.3 
195» 1,300,0 345.8 6.6 1,046.2 278.3 
1959 1,774.3 371.2 7.3 1,403.8 293.7 
1960 2,263*6 394.7 6.3 1,879.2 327«7 
1961 3,499.0 425.0 7.7 2,834.2 344.2 
1962 5,419*3 447.1 5.2 4,389.6 362.1 
1963 9,451.3 456.5 2.1 7,655.6 369.8 
mmmtmmtmmm^mmmmmtmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm^im^mmmmm 1 m H I um'»ini«nniii»iii«iiiii I ISIBJI»«IMWI—»—•——•MWMWIUM M M m i i i i n i — « — W M — W 
aCaleulated fromi United Nations, Statistics of 
National Income and Expenditure. New York, 1952-1963, 
and Brasil, Institute Brasilelro de Oeografla e Estatia-
tioa, Conselho Naoional de Estatistlea, Anuarlo Estatlstleo 
do Brasll. Rio de Janeiro, 1948-1963. 
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TABLE 38 (Continued) 
Hational Per Capita Per Capita Per Capita 
Income Income Income Income 
Growth (Unad~ {M*» Growth 
Rate Justed) floated),. Rate  
Thousands of * 
Year Percentages Oruzelros Percentages 
191*8 9,8 3,216 3,473 3*1 
191*9 5.1 3,541 3,541 2.0 
1950 5.1 4,087 3,636 2.7 
1951 3.3 4,736 3,657 0.6 
1952 7.3 5,292 3*788 3.6 
1953 3.8 6,295 3,834 1.2 
1954 5.2 7.726 3,914 2.1 
1955 8.9 9*523 5,135 5.7 
1956 1.0 11,71*0 4,059 -2.8 
1957 6,1* 13.563 4,190 3.2 
1958 4.1 15*921* 4,236 1.1 
1959 5.5 20,735 4,338 24* 
1960 11.6 26,961 4,701 8.4 
1961 5.0 39,474 4,79* 2.0 
1962 5.2 59,239 4#887 1.9 
1963 2.1 100,204 4*840 -1.0 
MakMaaMaaiaaaaMaMMaaaaaiMalMalMMMaaaMnwaaaaalllMaaaa^ 
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 TABLE 39 n 
NATIONAL ACCOUWTSJ INVESTMENT & SAVINGS* 
Gross Gross 
Domestic Domestic Gross Gross Gross Gross 
Invest- Invest- National National Domestic Domestic 
merit roent Savings" Savings Savings0 Savings (tTnad~ (Ad- (ffnad- (Ad- (TTnad- (Ad-
Justed ) lusted) justed) .lusted) justed) justed) 
Year Bi l l ions of Cruzeiros 
191*8 2i*.9 26.9 21*.1 26.0 26.1 28.2 
191*9 2?.2 27.2 25.X 25.1 26.9 26.9 
1950 3 4 ^ 30.6 36.3 32.3 38.5 31*.3 
1951 1*6.3 35.8 37.7 29.1 i*l*.3 31*.2 
1952 56.5 i*0.l| 1*3.5 31.1 1*5.8 32.8 -T 
1953 61.0 37.2 61.5 37.5 66.2 1*0.3 <£ 
1951* §3.0 U2.1 71*.1 37.5 79.5 1*0.3 
1955 99.0 1*3.0 97.5 1*2.3 102.6 kk*5 
1956 123.1 1*2.6 123.5 1*2.7 131.1* 1*5.1* 
1957 136.0 1*2.0 119.5 36.9 126.9 39.2 
1958 181.0 k®*2 162.£ 1*3.2 170.0 1*5.2 
1959 288.0 60.3 261.8 ft .8 2 7 3 4 57.2 
1960 355.6 62.0 306.3 53.4 323.7 56.k 
1961 1*89.9 59.5 1*51.1 Sl.8 1*76.2 57.3 
1962 758.7 62.6 671*.8 55.7 712.2 58.8 
1963 1.323.1 63.9 1,281.6 61.9 I,307.7 63.2 
•calculated from: United Nations, S t a t i s t i c s of National Income 
and Expenditure. New York, 1952-1963. 
bGrose national savings equal gross domestic Investment plus (or 
minus) the balance of payments surplus (or deficit) on current account. 
L
 cGross domestic savings equal gross national savings plus Invest- _i 
stent Income payments (public and private) abroad. 
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TAHCA 1*0 
DBBT SERVICE IN REUTIOH fO NATIOHAL ACCO0NTSa 
Ratio of Ratio of Ratio of 
Ratio of Debt Sex»~ Debt Ser- Debt Ser-
Debt Ser- vice to vice to vice to 
vice to dross 0roas Gross 
Rational Domestic national Domestic 
Income Investment Sayings Savings 
Yaar JPeroentages .. 
191*6 2.0 12.5 12.9 11.9 
191*9 2.2 It.3 10.5 11* .1* 
1950 1.7 10.5 10.0 9.1* 
1951 1.3 74 9.1 7.7 
1952 1.0 5.1 6.7 6.3 
1953 1.7 9.9 9.6 9.1 
1955 2.3 12.6 11*. 1 13.2 
1955 2.0 11.3 11.1* 8.7 
1956 2.5 11*. 7 11**? 13.8 
1957 2.1* 15.2 17.3 16.3 
1958 2.9 16.8 18.7 17.8 
1959 2.9 ll*.0 15.1* li.7 
1960 2.9 15.3 17.7 16.8 
1961 2.k Ik* I 15.3 11* .5 
1962 2.1 12.1* 13.9 13.2 
1963 1.8 10.3 10.7 10.5 
Calculated from fables 311 38, and 39. 
L _J 
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TABLE kO (Continued) 
Gross 
Savings Gross national Per Capita 
Reaalnlng Savings Ineo&e Income Batlo 
After Debt Bemalnlng Remaining Remaining of Re-
Servloe After Debt After Debt After Debt Mining 
(Unad~ Service Service Service Savings 
lusted) (Adjusted) (Adjusted) (Adjusted) to GNP 
Thoueands 
of Percent-
Year Billions of Cruzeiros Cruzelrog ages 
1948 23*0 24*8 167.8 3,383 12-2 
1949 23.0 33.0 176.0 3,1*64 10*7 
1950 34.9 31.1 185.9 3,575 13.7 
1951 1*0.9 31.6 192.7 3,609 13.3 
1952 52.9 30.7 207.1* 3,764 12.2 
1953 o0.2 36.6 213.7 3,769 111. 2 
1951* 69.0 35*0 223.3 3,821* 12.5 
1955 91.5 39.7 244a 5,055 13*5 
1956 132.5 39.1 245.0 3,958 15.1 
1957 106.2 32.8 260.9 1*,089 10.1 
195Q 139.7 37.1 270.2 4,113 10.8 
1959 233.2 1*8.8 285.3 4,211* 13.1 
1960 269.1* 1*6.9 318.2 4,565 11.9 
1961 407.0 49.1* 335*8 4,677 11.6 
1962 618.5 51.1 354.4 4,783 11.4 
1963 1,171.0 56.6 363.2 4,754 12.4 
1 I l l . l l I I m i •• .! .• • - I I K . I — I I •"••'•• » • " « "•»'< " • n i M i . n . i . n • • • . • . . . • • m - i i i i i . . . i . i 
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TABLE kl 
EXTERHAL PUBLIC DEBT SERVICE IH RELATION TO PUBLIC HBVEHTO* 
Ratio of Ratio of 
Public Debt Public Revenue 
Public Servioe to RemaiaiDg 
Public Debt Public After Debt 
Revenue Service Revenue Service to OffP 
Tear Billions of Cruzeiros . Percentages  
1948* b b b b 
1954 29.8 2.U8 5.0 8.3 
1955 5? a 7.49 13. i 7.2 
1956 67.3 9.93 14.8 6.5 
1957 76.1^ 12.56 164 6.1 
1953 102.0 17.57 17.2 6.5 
1959 157.8 17.47 11.1 7.9 
1960 219.6 24.88 11.3 8.6 
1961 317.5 33.17 10.4 8.1 
1962 497.9 53.32 10.7 8.2 
1963 930.3 104.94 U.3 8.7 
••.•[• • ••;•. ...I L. . .1' 1" I... "1. II r 1'1 "I "' " " " • — — — — — — — — — — n « _ _ ^ _ _ ^ _ ^ _ ^ _ ^ . „,, ,„ 
•calculated from* Braail, Inatituto Braailelro de 
Geografia e Batatlstica, Conselho Haoional de Eatatiatica, 
Aauarlo ggtatletloo do Brazil, Rio de Janeiro, 1948-1963 
and from fable 31. 
b Period averages. 
r i 
TABLB k2 
BXf^ RHAL mm Bf mhkTION fO mfMMAt DEBT* 
Internal External Ratio of External 
Debt Debt to Internal 
fo|»|f ?<**aff -»., gftt£tmn<jl>nff , Debt , 
Year Bi l l ions of Crtaaetroa Peroentagea 
1955 51.3 5fc.8 1.07 
1956 75.7 71*.6 .99 
1957 1H*.7 54.6 «U8 
1958 145.2 107.0 ,74 
1959 197.3 128.7 .65 
1960 292.8 162.8 .56 
1961 536*0 283*3 .53 
1962 781.7 1*05.5 .52 
1963 1322.9 726.3 .55 
mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmtmmmmmmmiimmmmmi, n> nil • •! mmimmmmmmmmmmmim**mmimmmmmimmimimmmmmr n <M i I X W H H H M IIKM. nnwiir m in •mi »• • • » • i m i 
aOal0ulat©a fromt Brazil, Inatltut© Braallelro 
da Geografia a Eatatletlea, Consello Hacional da Estatlstlca, 
Anuarlo Satatlatloo do BragII. Hlo da Janeiro, 194$-1963» 
and international Bank "for" Seeonstnaetlon and Development, 
International Development Association, loonomlg Growth and 
External Debts A Statlstloal Presentation, a Report 
Prepared by"She Ioonckio &taff (Wasiilngton, D.C.i IBRD, 
I96U), p. 9. 
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TABLE k3 
mmim imEsmm? mcom m RELATION TO HATIOHAL ACCOUNTS* 
Animal Outflows Ratio of Invest- Ratio of Investment 
of Foreign stent Income Pay- Income Payments to 
Investment Income merits to National Income Proas Domestic Savings 
Billions o f ' P e r c e n t a g e s 
Teai" Oruselros  
191*8 1.81* 1.2 7.0 
X9%9 1.91 1.1 7•! 
1950 2.06 1.0 54 
1951 2*92 1.2 6.6 
1952 2.30 0.Q 5.0 
1953 k* 7k 1.3 7.2 *r 
1951* 543 1*2 6.8 H 
1955 5.12 0.9 5.0 ^ 
1956 7.67 1.1 6.0 
1957 7.37 0.9 5.8 
1956 7.63 0.7 &.5 
1959 11.55 0.B- li.2 
1960 17.37 0.9 5 4 
1961 25.17 0.9 5.3 
1962 3 7 4 1 0.9 5.3 
1963 26.06 0.3 2.0 
— — — — — — — — — — — — — — - — _ _ _ _ , _ _ — _ _ _ . . . — _ _ , - ^ ,. . ..
 1 , t T . . . . r || ii in -T ' I • I • I I ' 1 I I I ' •• • I—- • I 1- • - II I 
Calculated fro® Tables 31, 3B9 and 39. 
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R u a f t? 1,1. XAJDJUJCS <*i* 
SHARE OF HH,BXIBI«E IMPORTS IS TOTAL IMPORTS* 
Raw Materials 
(Except Fuela) 
Consumer Non- Fuels & LubrI- & Intermediate Total Inflexible 
durables as cants as Per- Products as Items as Per-
Percentages of centages of Percentages of centages of 
Total Imports0 Total Imports0 Total Imports*5 Total Imports** 
ii i.mii WHlUlii ilium MIIIJIIII i*m» - ii mi in I I . I I mm i .11 11 - i i i in»Jt»—«»—a——»-II»I i i Him i m II IMII I i.Miinii i in n . i mi nini l . i l i i i M II »i«'mi i 
Year Percentages  
^ - - - r — r •• -| in -1 u |„ | •—• | I I i mill' , i in i J L i | •--• i i *•* | n i r - -•• •-
191*8 7.5 13.0 39.8 60.3 
191*9 7.k 13.** M>.3 61.1 
1950 7.0 13.? 1*2.3 63.0 
1951 6.6 l l . i * 39.9 5?.9 £ 
1952 6.8 13.1 31* .6 %*$ U 
1953 7.% ao. l 39.8 6?.3 
19$* 6.1* 18.3 1*6.9 71.6 
1955 7.6 22.8 kk*k 7k*% 
1956 7.9 2l*.6 kh*k 76.9 
1957 6.1* 19.0 1*3.6 69.0 
195S 1*.? 21.? 1*5.5 71.9 
1959 I*.3 19.3 1*6.1 69-7 
1960 5.6 2Zm2 i*I*.2 72.0 
1961 6*8 22.7 M>.2 69.7 
1962 7.8 254 3B.5 71.7 
1963 6*5 28*8 1*2.6 77.9 
Calculated from Table 25. 
DImp©rts are measured in thousands of dollars at 1955 prices. 
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TABLE kS 
EXTJiRNAL RBCEXriS AVAILABLE AFTER FIXED IMPORTS & DEBT SERVICE® 
Export 
Receipts Fixed Imports Debt Service  
(Goods & Hens- Amortl- I n - Balances 
Services) Ptaels Wheat p r i n t Total ssatlon t e r e s t Total Available 
Year H i l l tons of U.S. Dollars "" 
191*8 12l|? 138.li 62.0 11.1- 2X1*5 61 28 89 91*7 
19i*9 1161 129.2 1GI*.9 B*2 21*2.3 10? 2k 131 ?88 
1950 X398 158.1 109.6 10.1 277.8 8$ 29 111*. 1006 
1951 1831 238.2 130.8 25.1 39lul 2? 22 1*9 1388 
1952 i p ? 263.5 131.2 30.9 1*25.6 33 26 59 1002 *r 
1953 1653 255.8 80.2 22.1 358.1 1*6 ttf 93 1202 £ 
195H 166? 282.7 125.8 28.5 1*37.0 131* 65 199 1031 
1955 151*6 28LI4 11*2.1 30.0 1*53.5 11*0 I*? 18? 906 
1956 1635 302.6 108.6 35.3 W*6.5 18? 73 260 929 
1957 1592 290.0 IOI4.2 1*5.2 1*39.1* 21*2 82 32k 829 
1958 11*08 297.6 111.8 35.6 1*1*5.0 321* 6? 391 572 
1959 11*1*1 272.1* 131.5 32.1* 1*36.3 37? 101 1*?8 £28 
1960 11*1*1* 281.1* li*2.? 36.5 1*60.6 1*10 127 53? W> 
1961 151X 261*.9 138.9 32.2 1*36.0 32? 126 1*53 622 
1962 1292 262.6 161.1 26.? 1*50.1* 310 123 1*33 1*®9 
1963 11*92 262.1* 161*.0 26.0 1*52.1* 353 83 1*36 601* 
Calculated from: United Hat Ions, Economic Commission for Latin 
America, *fhe Growth & Decline of Import Substitution in Brazil,* Economic 
Bulletin for Latin America. IX (March, 1961*), 15• and United nations. 
Yearbook of International Trade Statistics. Hew York, 1960*1963. 
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TABLE 1*6 
Reserve Positlog Ratio of Ratio of 
Convertible Gold Tranche Reserves to Reserves to 
doW Foreign Position at Import Total 
Stock Exchange , jEW* .. Total Values Debt Service 
Year Millionsofll.i. Dollars Percentages 
195U 319b 132b - £*5lb .31b 2.23b 
1955 323 52 - 375 .29 l»i|8 £ 
1956 321* 130 - U54 »37 1.36 ^ 
1957 32^ %2 - 366 .25 .97 
1958 325 37 - 362 .27 M 
1959 327 fio - 367 .27 .69 
1960 287 58 - 3i*5 *2k .57 
1961 285 173 - U5B .31 .89 
1962 225 1& - 378 .26 .73 
1%3 150 168 - 318 .21 .73 
aCalculated from; International Monetary Wan&§ International 
Financial Statistics, Washington, 0.0.
 # 19V3-1963. 
bPerlod averages. 
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TABt*E k7 
OOKDIfIOHAL LXQVIDITX* 
Ratio of 
Hatio of Conditional 
Credit Conditional Liquidity 
IMF XMF Tranche Liquidity to Debt 
Quota. Drawings Fogltlon To Import* Service 
Year Mill long of tr,8« ^ ollarg ' ' feroaptaRag ' 
1955 150 66 122 .09 .hi 
1956 150 38 150 .12 .1*6 
1957 150 75 112 .08 .30 
1958 150 112 75 .06 .17 
1959 150 92 95 .07 .18 
1960 280 340 210 .11* .35 
1961 280 180 170 .12 .33 
1962 280 162 188 .13 .36 
1963 280 167 183 .12 .1*2 
•Calculated from? International Mc^ etarjr Fund, 
International Financial Statlgtloa, Waahington, D.C.f 
vm^mr 
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TABLE 48 
BRAZILS EKTEmkh immTEmma AS OF JOTE 30, 1963* 
'" fiiifTl^u^" x# "if"" g" r fdi'i i " r y i ' T """""•"""'<nmi.muni.ni 
{Millions or u«s# Dollars; 
Balance of payments loans 
Consolidated agreements with: 
European countries and European stand-by loans 5^.1 
Export-Import Bank Ui|2,0 
U.S. commercial banks 195*5 
U.S. Treasury 52.2 
Agency for International Development 100.0 
International Monetary itand 16?.0 
Japan 17.5 
Interest g06.5 
Total balanee~of-payments loans If3$b4*8 
Imports and other operations 
Commercial arrears 175*3 
Public external debt §7«1 
Uncovered accounts with bankers abroad 12.2 
Financed imports (principal and Interest) l,6i{3.1 
Swaps 1*00.7 
Other debts ??^*^ 
Total imports and other operations &fj52io,0 
Total external indebtedness J7SES7S 
mmmmmmmmmmmimmmmmmmimmmmmmmmmmmmmmmimmM IHIIIMIW n n i n i • i n 11111111 » win 1 11 n 11 11 i i n i n i i i i i 
•-Calculated fromt Economist Intelligence Unit, 
Quarterly leonomle Review? Brajll, Ho* 1|8, (Deoember, 
1963), p# | 7 
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Brasll, Embalxada. U. S. Surrsy of tha Braglllan Economy. 
Waahlngtont Braall Embalxada, i960* 
Braall. Inatltuto Braallalro da Qaografla • Eatatlatloa. Qowalho Kaolanal da Batatlatioa. Anuarlo 
gfltllf**«? fr Byaal^ 1 9 V > - 1 % 3 . - " * " 
Braall. Suparlntsndanola da Moada y to Oradlto. Bolatlm* 
Saptaabar, 1955 • INHMttH*** 1963. ' 
Institute of Intar^Amarlcan Affairs. Foreign Operation* 
A&ainiatration. Tha Devalopmant of Braall. A 
Mpoa* Praparad !>y^br lSWl ib tE / O . 
Soondnlo Davslopraant Conod.salon* Waahlngto©, D. C.i 
Inatituta of Intar-Amarican Affaire, 1955* 
Intarnatlonal Basic for Raoonatruetlon and Davalopmant. 
Intaraafcional Dsvslonmsnt Association. Boonomio 
A Raport Praparad by tha Eoonomio staff; 
Washington, D. C.t IBRD, 1961*.. 
•aiayi sjF^s/d^i|ia}^^»^FawTiaspS^s»(S* a*p^^sjipss> #jt TBWS s^^si^Tipajs^^'''Ffla7^swa* ^Psa^iWpS ^ ^ ( W T ^ a i ^ ^ ^ w ^^awiiffa^swRTR*aia^aaj^ 
iBtsroatlonal Davalopownt Association. Booaoalo 
Orowtb asd Sxtarnal B j i A i ^ i i U a a l - ^ ^ t l g n . 
A Raport Praparad by tha Economio Staff. 
Washington, D. C»i IBRD, X96t|.* 
Intaroational Bank for Reconstruction and Daralopment. 
Intamatlonal Development Aaaoolatlon. Boonomlc 
Praparad by tba BCOBORIO Staff* waahlngton, D» O.i 
IBRD, 19ol|t* 
Intamatlonal Bank far Raoonatruotlon and Development. 
Intarnatlonal Development Aaaoolatlon. Raoant 
Ohangaa In tba External Public Indabtadnaaa or 
Eailn American countries, a Report; prepared OY 
tho Saooontio slaff• Washington* D. C.i IBRD, 
19&3. 
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International Monetary Fund. International Flnanolal 
Statletlog. 19^8-1963. 
Beei^tarlaTTor the Inter**A»erican Boonomle and 
Social Council, Washington, $* O.j Fan American 
Union, 1953* 
United Yatlone* Analytic and ProJectlona of Eoonomlo 
A Raport Prepared by tha Joint Working Group of the 
Bacoo Haolonal do Deaenvolvimento Sconomloa of 
Braill and tha Boonomlo Coramlsalon for Latin 
America of tha Unltad Rations, Kew Yorlu Unltad 
Katione, 1956. 
Unltad 9aH«it»# Coffaa In Latin Aaerloat Productivity 
of tha Economic Commiaelon for Latin America and 
tha Pood and Agricultural Organlaation of tha 
United Vatione. Maxloot United Katione, I960. 
»"" ^S'pA^iaaSa^ifflffi^dfiS ABB. 
unit** S»M«M. g« !^l3LCT lmt^.?L^t!L^rt<>» 
Latin tow^w, wwftwit ^ t t t e w . i*M. 
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Rcmet United tfatione, 1961. 
United Vatlone. Eeonomio CoHmiseion for Latin America. 
United Iatl<ma, Beonomlo aommiafiion for Mftto America. 
mil tad Katlone. Economic Goran! salon for Latin Amerioa. 
Statist ical Builttl^ for lat in A&arioa. March, 
iwC i ^ t / i m r * *^ 
U« S» Aga&ay for International Davtlopmant. U» 3 . Foreign 
^gaalaationg * Obllgatlona and Loao Authorization! 
^BB< ! • I9ti9 «> Jape 30i 1961» Washington* P> 0»t 
a+th seasion. Washington, ff» f # i tf, 8* 
WF^p^ W^ST e^ a^eaes^ppeja ^ff a^* as e^sw ^PaSM^s^pa ^sreji^ ew <a»^F^p ajt sejfr ^^^^"-"W 
1W>-61. A Raport Prepares t>y the international 
CoWeroe Bureau. Washington, D. C.i tJ. S* 
Government Printing Office, 1962. 
IT* $» Department of Commerce. Sgg^fijff-, jff ftffyEjjy 
IrjieM of tf • S #. * r«Lvatt._. jE^ iHNPtliM^ P^ .SMIL x*atiiEi JMiNisi^ Lda • 
Jfc Ktpoi^ Freparea oy tne coas&aroe uossRittee rcfip 
the Alliance for Progress. Washington, D. C.i 
0 . S. Oovemmcnt Printing Office, 1963* 
U. §« Department i f Treaeury. International and 
United States Agencies financing international 
operations* waenington, p» c»* u* s*cwNfcpowant 
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